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ABSTRACT
This Article reevaluates the original meaning of “recess” in the Recess Appointments Clause. The
dominant view of that word holds that it refers only to breaks between official Senate sessions. By
identifying new evidence and correcting mistaken interpretations, this Article finds support only
for the conclusion that the original public meaning of “recess” was ordinary and broad, referring
to any time when a legislative body is not conducting business. The evidence does not support any
particular limitation on recesses, although it does not rule out the possibility that one existed. For
those seeking to limit “recess,” the Article poses four reasonable nonoriginalist limiting
constructions. It also considers whether the divergence in views on “recess” can be attributed to
methodological differences among originalists and finds that explanation improbable. Finally, the
Article makes two general points that arise from its analysis: it may be more difficult than is widely
appreciated to establish a specialized original meaning, and scholars making originalist claims
should provide clear accounts of the scope and limitations of their research.
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INTRODUCTION
After more than a decade of skirmishes between the President and
the Senate over the Recess Appointments Clause, the Supreme Court
largely settled the matter in National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Can1
ning. Constitutional scholars anticipated that the case might be historically significant in two ways. First, the Court might dramatically
alter the balance of power between the President and the Senate by
2
giving one of them a firm upper hand in appointments. Second, the
case might produce a constitutional rarity: a Supreme Court decision
3
squarely grounded in the original meaning of the Constitution. In
fact, Noel Canning largely preserves recent practice regarding recess
appointments. Indeed, in permitting appointments during intra4
session recesses longer than nine days, as well as recesses from three
to nine days long if justified by genuine need in unusual circum5
stances, the majority made a point of “put[ting] significant weight
6
upon historical practice.”
The role of originalism in the opinions, however, is more complicated. The dissent-like concurrence, written by Justice Antonin Scal1
2

3

4

5

6

705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 573 U.S. __ (2014).
The President urged the Court to permit recess appointments liberally so that he could
circumvent the Senate’s advice and consent authority. The challenger asked the Court to
authorize the Senate to block virtually all presidential appointments, recess or otherwise,
and leave the President unable to govern effectively. See David J. Arkush, The Senate and
the Recess Appointments, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 1 (2013).
Cf. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (noting the rarity of cases like
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), in which “original understandings [take]
center stage”); Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
411, 420–32 (2013) (arguing that the “new originalist” emphasis on original public meaning has exerted a “gravitational force” on the Supreme Court even though its decisions
rarely rely explicitly on original public meaning).
NLRB v. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281, slip op. at 20–21 (U.S. June 26, 2014) (“[W]e have
not found a single example of a recess appointment made during an intrasession recess
that was shorter than 10 days.”).
Id. at 21 (“We . . . leave open the possibility that some very unusual circumstance—a national catastrophe, for instance, that renders the Senate unavailable but calls for an urgent response—could demand the exercise of the recess-appointment power during a
shorter break.”).
Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted).
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ia, purports to be grounded in the original meaning of the Recess
Appointments Clause. It adopts a view promoted by originalist scholars in recent years, which rapidly has become the predominant view
of the Clause’s original meaning. This Article presents new evidence
and argument that this view of the original meaning of the Clause is
almost certainly mistaken, at least regarding the word recess, and likely regarding the word happen as well. Curiously, the majority, while
not expressly originalist, comes closer to reflecting the Clause’s original meaning.
Until recently, all three branches of government believed that “recess” for constitutional purposes has an ordinary, general meaning
that refers to any time the Senate is not sitting for business, with the
possible limit of a minimum duration. That longstanding consensus
began to erode rapidly after the publication of a 2005 law review article by Michael Rappaport arguing that “recess” originally had a nar7
row, specialized meaning. In Rappaport’s view, the Clause contemplated only the long breaks between annual, formal sessions of the
Senate, which in the present day are sometimes called “inter-session”
8
recesses. Rappaport also argues that the President may only fill a va9
cancy if it arises during the relevant recess. The combination of these positions would all but read the Recess Appointments Clause out
of the Constitution. In the present day, inter-session recesses are of10
ten very short, and sometimes the Senate does not take one at all.
This new position on the meaning of “recess,” which we may call
11
the “technical” or “narrow” view, gained influence rapidly, with the
7
8
9
10

11

Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 1487, 1491 (2005).
Id.
Id.
JT. COMM. ON PRINTING, 112TH U.S. CONG., CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 535–38 (2011),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=CDIR
[hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY] (providing the commencement adjournment
dates for the first eighty Congresses as well as recess dates). The Senate does not appear
to have taken a recess between the first and second sessions of the 111th Congress. On
December 30, 2011, the Senate adjourned until January 3, 2012, without ending its first
session. See 157 Cong. Rec. S8793. The second session began when the Senate met on
January 3, 2012. See 158 Cong. Rec. S1.
Naming positions is a difficult task. Rappaport labels his view the “inter-session” position.
Id. at 1547. This Article eschews that name because views may differ on the meaning of
“session,” rendering the label “inter-session” more confusing than illuminating. As an
example, one might adopt the view that the Clause permits appointments only during
“inter-session” breaks and that “session” is not limited to official Senate sessions. Perhaps
a session for purposes of the Clause is any work period between breaks of one week or
more. See infra text accompanying notes 361–69. This position is no less “inter-session,”
but it contemplates a much broader set of appointments than Rappaport’s. When possible, it is useful to name viewpoints based on unique characteristics. Rapport’s view is
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D.C. Circuit and Third Circuit adopting it in 2013 to strike down re12
cess appointments by President Barack Obama, and the four con13
curring Supreme Court Justices adopting it in Noel Canning. Because the narrow views of both “recess” and “happen” had become
almost universally viewed as correct but stood in stark contrast to
longstanding practice, Noel Canning was framed as a clash between
14
text and tradition, original meaning and historical practice.
This Article argues that the narrow, technical position on “recess”
is mistaken as a matter of original meaning. Many contemporary
originalists distinguish between “interpretation,” the work of ascertaining original public meaning, and “construction,” the act of sup15
plementing original meaning where it is ambiguous or vague. This
Article’s claim is that, as matter of interpretation, the evidence on
“recess” supports only the conclusion that the word’s original public
meaning was ordinary and general, just as it is today. By “ordinary”
and “general,” this Article means that “recess” was not limited to a
particular, technical type of break, such as the break between formal
Senate sessions.
Within the broad original meaning of recess, there exist some reasonable narrowing constructions of the word, but the technical position is not one of them. The Senate likely has some authority under
the Rules of Proceedings Clause to define its recesses and sessions for
purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, and the President may
have some interpretive role as well. One might reasonably believe

12

13

14

15

alone in turning on formal or official Senate sessions. Naming it the “formal” position
seems improper, as that label carries overtones of formalistic legal analysis and discussions of formalism and pragmatism in separation of powers cases. “Technical” and “narrow” are better descriptors, as Rappaport’s position relies on technical definitions rather
than ordinary meanings and it adopts the narrowest possible meaning of the relevant
terms.
See NLRB v. New Vista Nursing and Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We hold
that ‘the Recess of the Senate’ in the Recess Appointments Clause refers to only intersession breaks.”); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d 490, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding
that the presidential appointments in question were invalid under the “Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 3”).
See NLRB v. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 26, 2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that “the President lacked the authority” to make the appointments at
issue).
Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Noel Canning, No. 12-1281 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2014)
(questioning by Justice Antonin Scalia asking, “What do you do when there is a practice
that—that flatly contradicts a clear text of the Constitution? Which—which of the two
prevails?”); Jonathan Turley, Constitutional Adverse Possession: Recess Appointments and the
Role of Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 965, 966–67
(2013) (laying out his “minority” position favoring “original interpretation” of the Clause
versus the meaning that has evolved through history).
See infra text accompanying notes 282–90.
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that there should be pragmatic limits on appointment-enabling recesses, such as a minimum duration. Or perhaps “recess” refers to
any break of some significance, such as the breaks between periods of
ordinary legislative business—what contemporary senators refer to as
16
“recesses” between “work periods.” Finally, it is possible that the only limit on “recess” is whatever the political process bars as a practical
matter.
Evidence for each of these positions is too weak to support the
conclusion that it was the exclusive original public meaning of “recess” in the late eighteenth century, but each is a reasonable elaboration or construction of the term. Among the constructions, this Article
favors a “work period” view under which the President may make unilateral appointments during breaks, usually one week or longer, be17
tween ordinary periods of Senate business. The Senate appears to
have adopted this position implicitly. It is also the most likely candidate for what the Framers meant by “recess” if they envisioned anything short of the broadest definition. This Article would further
supplement that construction with a rule that is consistent with the
purpose of the Clause and that the Senate would likely accept if relevant circumstances were to arise: the President can also make appointments when the need is urgent and the Senate is actually unavailable.
Part I of this Article presents the evidence for the ordinary, broad
reading of “recess.” Historical dictionaries strongly support it. Nine
ratification-era state constitutions appear to use “recess” in its ordinary, general sense, and none clearly uses it narrowly. Every unambiguous use of “recess” in the records of the Constitutional Convention is general. Examples of general usage can also be found in
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law, Thomas Jefferson’s 1801 Manual of Parliamentary Practice, the records of the House of Commons, and
records of state legislative proceedings in the years before the Constitution’s drafting. In one of the most compelling pieces of evidence,
state legislative practices varied regarding the styling of sessions and
recesses in the ratification era. An identical recess would have been
“intra-session” in New Jersey and “inter-session” in Massachusetts.
This variation makes it almost inconceivable that provisions of the
United States Constitution would turn on the strict, formal application of any particular understanding of words like “recess” and “session.” Multiple structural inferences from the Constitution also sup16
17

See infra text accompanying notes 362–63.
See infra text accompanying notes 361–69.
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port a general reading of “recess.” The Rules of Proceedings Clause
of Article I grants the Senate the authority to define its own sessions
and recesses. This Clause is inconsistent with the notion that the Recess Appointments Clause draws strict, technical distinctions based on
the words “session” and “recess,” as those distinctions would effectively limit the Senate’s ability to control its own practices. Moreover, the
Senate Vacancy Clause triggers state selection of senators during the
“recess” of a state legislature. It is even more implausible that the
Constitution implicitly prescribes, or turns on, a strict plan for state
legislative practice regarding sessions and recesses. The Constitution
also distinguishes between sessions of Congress and sessions of each
house of Congress, further undermining the notion that the document embeds any particular prescription regarding sessions or recesses.
Part II reviews the evidence for the technical position and finds it
wanting. Proponents of that position rely mostly on a few usage examples that, on close inspection, do not support a narrow reading of
“recess.” The two texts on which they rely most heavily—the ratification-era Constitutions of Massachusetts and New Hampshire—use
“recess” to refer to intra-session, not inter-session, breaks. Supporters
of the technical position also attempt to draw on a constitutional distinction between “adjournments” and “recesses,” but they misread the
text.
The strongest support for the technical position derives not from
textual sources, as most theories of originalism prescribe, but from
twenty-first-century reasoning about the Framers’ goals and expectations. As for goals, it is said that the Framers should have wanted the
shortest possible terms for recess appointees, should have crafted a
bright-line rule to prevent the President from circumventing the Senate, and should have limited the President’s unilateral appointment
power to very long recesses. Each of these assertions contradicts the
plain text of the Recess Appointments Clause. Some also contradict
its universally accepted purposes, and none is supported by evidence
of the Framers’ actual intent. Moreover, to the extent that the proposed policies have merit, a general reading of “recess” serves them
as well as the technical position, if not better.
The technical position also draws support from a narrative about
the Framers expectations for congressional practice: “recess” in the
Clause must mean “inter-session recess” because that is the only type
of recess the Framers expected the Senate to take. Most scholars,
originalists and nonoriginalists alike, reject using arguments about
the Framers’ expectations as a trump card in constitutional analysis
because such claims involve counterfactual guesswork and carry a
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high risk of motivated reasoning.
Indeed, the “inter-sessionexpectations” narrative, as we can call it, ignores important historical
evidence: the records of the Constitutional Convention reveal that
some delegates believed the Senate would stay in session continually.
Perhaps those delegates therefore would have expected most Senate
recesses to occur during its formal session. At a minimum, the Framers would have had difficulty predicting how the Senate would style
and enumerate its formal sessions and recesses.
It is also not difficult to generate other persuasive stories about
the Framers’ expectations. One is what we might call a “militaryresponsiveness” narrative: the recess appointment power and related
federal and state powers were established in the shadow of existential
threats of violence, both foreign and domestic, which make nonsensical the notion that the powers would turn on the vagaries of legislative procedure. The point was to give the President, particularly but
not exclusively when acting as Commander in Chief, the power to act
quickly to respond to crises when the Senate is unavailable. On this
view, to restrict the Recess Appointments Clause to formal intersession recesses would undermine some of the Constitution’s most
important, expressly granted federal powers.
Part III comments briefly on the original meanings of “session”
and “happen,” making initial observations based on the most important evidence. That evidence suggests that “session” did not have
a narrow technical, meaning, which casts further doubt on the possibility that “recess” had a narrow meaning. The technical position defines recesses as breaks between official Senate sessions. If “session”
was not used in this technical sense, then it is highly unlikely that “recess” was. Regarding “happen,” this Article observes that the dominant, narrow view has less evidentiary support than is commonly believed, and the broader view more support. The “happen” question
would benefit from more thorough research akin to this Article’s inquiry into “recess.”
Despite the evidence against the technical position on “recess,”
several prominent originalists have endorsed it. Part IV asks whether
the divergence between this Article’s and their conclusions can be attributed to differences in methodology. It examines four contemporary theories of originalism and concludes in most cases that methodological differences are an improbable explanation. Part IV also
considers whether and how one might restrict the definition of an
appointment-enabling “recess” despite the lack of evidence that the
term’s original meaning was restricted in any particular way. In the
parlance of originalist theory, this is an exercise in “construction” ra-
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ther than “interpretation,” of supplementing what we know about
original meaning rather than discerning that meaning conclusively.
Part IV then makes two points for contemporary originalist inquiry and debate that arise from this Article’s analysis and the sharp
disagreement over the original meaning of “recess.” First, some
originalists may underappreciate the difficulty of establishing narrow
or specialized original meanings of particular terms. Second, because of originalism’s goal of objectivity, its special claim to authority,
and the difficulties inherent in conducting originalist inquiries,
originalist scholars should work to establish a set of standards or
methods that promote quality, rigor, and thoroughness in originalist
research. As a starting point, this Article proposes that originalists
provide thorough and frank accountings of the scope and limitations
of the research on which they rely.
I. THE ORDINARY READING OF RECESS
In recent years, two interpretive questions have arisen under the
Recess Appointments Clause. One is whether the President can make
recess appointments only during breaks between formal Senate sessions (“inter-session” recesses) or also during other Senate breaks
(“intra-session” recesses). A second question is whether the President
may fill vacancies only if they arise during a given recess, or also those
that existed before the recess began. This Article touches only briefly
on the latter question.
A. Ordinary Reading: Text and Structure
1. Text: Dictionary Evidence and Interpretive Default Rules
The Recess Appointments Clause states:
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall
18
expire at the End of their next Session.

When analyzing the word recess, we start with its ordinary, commonsense meaning, as evidenced by contemporaneous dictionaries. It
appears to be universally accepted that the ordinary meaning of “recess” refers to any legislative break, both now and in early America.
The 1755 and 1785 editions of Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language define “recess” in relevant part as “[r]emission or sus18

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
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pension of any procedure” and provide the following usage example:
“I conceived this parliament would find work, with convenient recess19
es, for the first three years.” Noah Webster’s 1828 American Dictionary of the English Language defines the term similarly, as “Remission or
suspension of business or procedure; as, the house of representatives
20
had a recess of half an hour.” The Oxford English Dictionary (OED)
defines recess, in relevant part, as “a period of cessation from usual
work or employment” and identifies its early use as having been
21
“chiefly of Parliament” before expanding to schools. The OED’s usage examples, which are from the 1600s and 1700s, do not limit the
22
word to a specific recess.
In standard textual analysis, two related presumptions establish
that one’s default position in interpreting the term recess should be
its broad, ordinary meaning. The first holds that terms are to be given their ordinary meaning unless there is good evidence for some
23
other meaning, which usually comes from contextual cues. This
principle applies to the interpretation of the Constitution as well as
24
statutes. Second, a general term like “recess” is read as applying
19

20
21
22

23

24

2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1650 (1755), available at
http://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/?page_id=7070&i=1650 [hereinafter JOHNSON
1755] (attributing the statement to King Charles I); 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 469 (6th ed. 1785), available at http://publicdomainreview.org/
collections/samuel-johnsons-dictionary-of-the-english-language-1785/
[hereinafter
JOHNSON 1785].
2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 428 (1828).
THE COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1525 (1991).
See e.g., id. (quoting, the 1620 Journal of the House of Lords, “They [sc. the Commons]
humbly desire to know the Time of the Recess of this Parliament, and of the Access again
as They may accordingly depart and meet again at the same Time their Lord-ships shall”);
id. (quoting a 1706 Royal speech printed in the London Gazette as stating, “[i]t would be
convenient to make a recess in some short time”).
See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 69 (2012) (“The ordinary-meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic
rule of interpretation . . . . Interpreters should not be required to divine arcane nuances
or to discover hidden meanings.”); see also Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1494 (“If two interpretations are possible, but one uses the language in a more natural or common way,
then the more natural interpretation governs unless purpose, structure, and history provides evidence strong enough to outweigh the impact of the greater naturalness of the
usage.”). Where a text concerns law, legal terms are typically given their ordinary legal
meanings. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 23, at 73 (“And when the law is the subject,
ordinary legal meaning is to be expected, which often differs from the common meaning.”). This point makes no difference regarding the words “recess.” The broad and narrow readings of the word are both contextually appropriate, legal meanings; each applies
to legislative breaks. The relevant distinction is that the general meaning is ordinary and
the narrow reading is specialized, or a term of art, even in discussions limited to legislatures.
See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 23, at 69 (“‘[E]very word in the constitution is to be
expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some
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generally, absent good reason to read it narrowly.25 This latter principle typically holds in the face of arguments that the drafters actually
26
had a narrower objective in mind or could not have imagined the
27
present application. To be clear, these interpretive principles are
only rebuttable presumptions, not rules of law, and it is impossible to
state in the abstract what showing will suffice to unseat them in any
given case. But they establish a default position and make clear
where the burden lies—with the proponent of reading a broad, ordinary term to mean something narrower or more technical. This Article concludes that the evidence on the original meaning of “recess”
falls far short of meeting that burden.
2. Structure: The Rules of Proceedings Clause, the Senate Vacancy
Clause, and the Textual Distinction Between Sessions of Congress and
Sessions of the Senate
Two constitutional provisions bear on the proper reading of “recess” in the Recess Appointments Clause, as does a conceptual distinction that the Constitution draws. First, Article I states that “Each
28
House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” Read naturally,
this Clause applies to the Senate’s comings and goings, and therefore
authorizes the Senate to define its recesses (and sessions) absent a
29
clear, specific constitutional provision to the contrary. It is hard to

25
26
27
28
29

ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.’” (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 436–37 (1833))); see also Jack M. Balkin, Must
we be Faithful to Original Meaning?, 7 JERUSALEM REV. OF LEGAL STUD. 57, 72 (2013)
(“[M]ost of the Constitution does not consist of generally recognized terms of art or of
words with narrow meanings that would seem unusual to us today. With very few exceptions the words that constitute its abstract principles and vague standards mean today
what they meant at the time of their adoption.”).
See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 23, at 101–06 (discussing the “General-Terms Canon” of construction).
See id. at 103–04 (discussing instances in which narrow meanings were rejected in favor of
more general readings regardless of the primary intent of various drafters).
See id. at 104–05 (discussing cases in which terms were given general interpretations even
if Congress did not forsee the applications at issue).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
This is not to suggest that the Senate has limitless authority to define its recesses. At a
minimum, the courts can likely police the boundaries of the word “recess” and reject absurd or outlandish Senate positions. This view is somewhat analogous to Justice Souter’s
concurrence in Nixon v. United States, although this Article does not take a position on
whether Justice Souter’s view or this Article’s position on Senate authority under the
Rules of Proceedings Clause should be characterized as falling within the “political question” doctrine. See Arkush, supra note 2, at 2 n.4 (citing the argument in Nixon v. United
States, 506 U.S. 224, 253–54 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) that when
the Senate exercises its duty to “try” impeachments under the Impeachment Trial Clause,
the courts should yield under the political question doctrine to the Senate’s choice of
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read the Recess Appointments Clause as such a provision. The
Clause neither explicitly exempts recesses from the Senate’s authority
over its proceedings nor gives any other hint that it is meant to displace the Rules of Proceedings Clause regarding the word recess. Indeed, if the Recess Appointments Clause were meant to prescribe a
fixed, constitutional definition of recess from which the Senate cannot deviate, one would expect it to provide that definition rather
than leaving it open to debate. Instead, the Clause uses the most
general terms available to describe the concepts it invokes. That
word choice is consistent with an understanding that the terms are
general and will be explicated, if at all, by the appropriate house of
Congress in accordance with the Rules of Proceedings Clause. It is
much less consistent with the view that the Framers were attempting
to constitutionalize specific forms of sessions and recesses.
In fact, there appears to be universal agreement that the Senate
can redefine its sessions and recesses, at least within reasonable limits.
Michael Rappaport, the principal proponent of the technical position
on “recess,” doubts that the Constitution would prevent the Senate
from redefining its own sessions, and he even suggests that Congress
30
(or the Senate) could have chosen to hold semiannual sessions with
31
two of what he calls “inter-session” recesses. But the Senate’s authority to redefine its sessions is deeply problematic for the technical
position on recess. If “session” is not a fixed constitutional concept—
if the Senate can redefine its sessions at will—then an “inter-session”
requirement establishes nothing of significance. There is no obvious

30

31

procedure “within broad boundaries,” but the courts might properly intervene if the Senate were to range too far outside those boundaries, for example by using a coin toss).
One might argue that Congress and the President can alter the congressional sessions by
passing a law, but a single house cannot. Cf. Edward A. Hartnett, Recess Appointments of Article III Judges: Three Constitutional Questions, 26 CARDOZO L. REV 377, 422–23 (2005) (noting that “[t]he two houses of Congress can control when they are in recess by concurrent
resolution” and can end sessions if they act concurrently). This is not the place to endorse or dispute that argument, as it makes no difference to the point here: if the definitions of recesses and sessions are mutable, then it makes little sense to say that the Recess
Appointments Clause invokes either concept in a narrow, technical sense.
See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1570 (“[T]he alternative interpretation [permitting intrasession recess appointments that expire upon the next intrasession recess] has the curious effect of depriving Congress of control over the length and number of its sessions.”); id. at 1565 n.235 (citing Michael Carrier for the proposition that inter-session
recesses are at least one month long, whereas intra-sessions are generally shorter than
twenty days); see also Hartnett, supra note 30 at 413 (“Nothing in the Constitution precludes Congress from having multiple sessions each year. The First Congress had three
sessions, as did the Fifth Congress. Considering only the antebellum years, four additional Congresses—the Eleventh, Thirteenth, Twenty-Fifth, and Twenty-Seventh—held three
sessions each.”).
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reason why the Senate could not opt for monthly or even weekly sessions, with the latter establishing what Rappaport calls an “inter32
session” recess every weekend. (Rappaport does not put any minimum time duration on an appointment-enabling inter-session recess.) In other words, the Senate’s authority to redefine its sessions
renders the technical position nonsensically ephemeral, making it a
deeply unlikely candidate for adoption in the Constitution. Additionally, there is a simpler and more direct way to produce the same
result—by permitting appointments during any “recess,” which is also
a term that the Senate can define.
We also have historical evidence about the Framers’ concerns regarding congressional rules, and none of it suggests a desire to limit
congressional control over the styling or enumeration of sessions or
recesses. The Framers carefully considered questions regarding how
Congress should convene and adjourn, viewing them as important to
33
congressional independence. They settled on three simple rules.
Congress must meet at least once each year. Each house of Congress
must consent before the other may adjourn for more than three days
during a legislative session. And the President can adjourn the Con34
gress if the two houses disagree on when to adjourn. In contrast to
their careful consideration of these rules, the Framers did not discuss
the meaning of the terms “recess” or “session,” as used in the Recess
35
Appointments Clause; nor for that matter did they discuss “ad36
journment,” which appears in the next section of the Constitution.
No one has discovered any suggestion by the Framers that these
terms were intended to have anything but their ordinary, commonsense meanings. Moreover, a broad, ordinary, and practical
meaning fits what we know about the pragmatic, dual purpose of the
Recess Appointments Clause. It was intended to relieve the Senate of
the burden of remaining in perpetual session to provide advice and
32

33

34

35
36

See Michael Herz, Abandoning Recess Appointments?: A Comment on Hartnett (and Others), 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 443, 459 (2005) (“I would think that pursuant to the authority of each
House to make rules for its own proceedings Congress could decide to hold twelve ‘sessions’ each calendar year, with a few days off—perhaps just a weekend—between them.”).
See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
361, 386–88 (2004) (explaining how certain constitutional provisions relating to the convening and adjourning of Congress reflect the value of congressional independence and
discussing debates about this value).
See id. at 386–87 (“Article II gives certain scheduling powers to the president, who may
‘. . . in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment . . . adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 3)).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
Id. at § 3.
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consent on presidential appointments and to enable the President to
37
fill important offices temporarily when the Senate is unavailable.
Notably, the view that the Senate can define its own recesses also advances the primary policy underlying narrower interpretations of the
Clause—limiting the President’s recess appointment power to prevent circumvention of the Senate—and does so without unduly tying
the Senate’s hands.
The Senate Vacancy Clause is also relevant to the Recess Appointments Clause. Before the ratification of the Seventeenth
Amendment, which established the direct popular election of United
38
States senators, Article I of the Constitution provided that state legislatures selected senators, and it gave state executives the power to appoint senators “during the Recess of the Legislature of [the execu39
tive’s] state.” To hold that “the Recess” has a narrow, technical
meaning in the Senate Vacancy Clause would imply that the Constitution prescribes a uniform session and recess practice not only for the
United States Congress, but also for state legislatures. This would be
peculiar. The Constitution has virtually nothing to say about the
structure or internal workings of state governments except that the
federal government should guarantee each state a “Republican Form
40
of Government.” If, on the other hand, the Clause does not restrict
state practice, then it is hard to say that it limits the Senate’s.
A final structural inference stems from the Constitution’s distinction between sessions of Congress and the sessions of the individual
houses of Congress. The Recess Appointments Clause states that recess appointments expire at the end of “their next Session,” by which
41
it means the Senate’s next session. The Adjournments Clause, by contrast, states that each house needs the other’s permission to adjourn
42
for more than three days during “the Session of Congress.” Section 6
37

38
39
40
41
42

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 67 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the last clause of Article II
and noting that “it would have been improper to oblige this body [the Senate] to be continually in session for the appointment of officers and as vacancies might happen”).
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
Id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
Id. at art. IV, § 4.
Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
Id. at art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (emphasis added). Note that the Adjournments Clause’s use of “the
session of Congress” also lends further support to the argument that the House may not
constitutionally interfere with the President and the Senate’s appointment authority by
refusing to grant the Senate permission to adjourn for more than three days in order to
block recess appointments. See Arkush, supra note 2, at 6–7 (discussing the House’s lack
of authority “to block recess appointments”). Under this view, the Senate’s consideration
of executive business qualifies exclusively as the Senate’s own session, not “the session of
Congress.” The session of Congress includes only the joint business of the House and
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of Article I immunizes senators and representatives from arrest while
43
they attend “the Session of their respective Houses.” Thus, the text
seems to contemplate a difference between the sessions of Congress
and the sessions of each house. This makes sense because the Constitution supplies the houses with different powers. Senate consideration of treaties and nominations does not concern the House or require its presence, and, from the founding until the 1930s, the Senate
frequently held special sessions without the House to consider these
44
matters. In the present day, when the Senate considers these executive-branch matters, its rules refer to the situation as “executive ses45
sion.” Additionally, the President may convene either or both hous46
es on “extraordinary occasions,” giving rise to any number of
situations in which the two houses can have separate sessions. This
constitutional distinction between sessions of Congress and sessions
of each house suggests that the document contemplates a variety of
possible sessions (and therefore a variety of “inter-session” recesses),
further suggesting that the Constitution uses the broad, ordinary
meaning of the words recess and session and does not limit the Senate’s ability to define them in the context of its own proceedings.
B. Contemporaneous Usage
Another common source of evidence regarding original meaning
47
is contemporaneous usage. This evidence overwhelmingly supports

43
44
45

46
47

Senate—legislating. Indeed, an early draft of the Adjournments Clause expressly exempted the Senate when conducting certain business. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 180 Sect. 8 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (“Neither House,
without the consent of the other, shall adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other
place than that at which the two Houses are sitting. But this regulation shall not extend
to the Senate, when it shall exercise the powers mentioned in the article.”). An intermediate proposal, not adopted, would have changed the language to “during the session of
the House of Reps.” Id. at 262. Then, the delegates amended the provision to add “during the session of the legislature” and the sentence exempting the Senate. Id. The records do not explain the change, and there was no debate about the Senate exemption.
The amendment was arguably more cosmetic, merely reaching the same result by more
elegant means. Compare id. at 456, with id. at 474.) (“[S]ession of the Legislature” was
“changed to session of Congress” by the Committee of Style and Arrangement.)
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
See CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 10, at 522–28.
MATTHEW MCGOWAN, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS,
AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. DOC. NO.
112-1, at 55–59 (2011) (providing rules XXIX–XXXI which pertain to executive sessions).
U.S. CONST. art. II., § 3.
See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 93 (2004) (noting that the “shift to original public meaning” brings references to
“common contemporary meanings”).
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an ordinary reading of “recess” or, perhaps more precisely, is inconsistent with the view that the word was limited to “inter-session” recesses. For this Article, I began by surveying the Federalist Papers
and records from the Constitutional Convention and the ratification
48
debates. In these sources, every unambiguous use of the word “re49
cess” is inconsistent with the technical “inter-session” position. For
example, George Washington referred to a ten-day break from the
Constitutional Convention during which the Committee of Detail
50
drafted the Constitution as “the recess.”
The nine ratification-era state constitutions that use the word re51
cess also invoke its broad meaning. Typically one can discern this

48

49

50
51

When referring to the convention, this Article cites the 1911 edition of Max Farrand’s
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 42. Later editions have corrected errors and added to the original.
However, none of the modifications are directly relevant to the original meaning of recess, and the 1911 edition has the advantage of being available online. I also surveyed
Jonathan Elliot’s five-volume collection of ratification-era materials, but found no nonduplicative, unambiguous uses of “recess” there. See JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (2d
ed. 1827). The Federalist Papers use “recess” only in three places. One refers to “the recess of the Senate” of the Achaean League, an ancient Hellenistic confederation, in a passage from which the modern reader can glean nothing useful about the meaning of recess in the Constitution. THE FEDERALIST NO. 18 (James Madison and Alexander
Hamilton) (“The senate, in which they were represented, had the sole and exclusive right
of peace and war; of sending and receiving ambassadors; of entering into treaties and alliances; of appointing a chief magistrate or praetor, as he was called, who commanded
their armies, and who, with the advice and consent of ten of the senators, not only administered the government in the recess of the senate, but had a great share in its deliberations, when assembled.”). The other two instances, including a multi-paragraph discussion by Alexander Hamilton, also provide no guidance because their usage of recess
simply mirrors that of the Recess Appointments Clause and the Senate Vacancy Clause.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 67 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining the Recess Appoitnements
Clause); THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the Senate Vacancy
Clause).
For unambiguous uses in correspondence, see 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 217; 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 138, 269, 323, 601, 605. All uses at the Convention were ambiguous, tracking the usage in the Recess Appointments Clause itself. See 2
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 190, 372, 431; 3
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 202, 545, 756, 765.
Two uses were ambiguous on their faces but might be resolved with further research. See
id. at 712, 722.
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 76.
DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 7; MD. CONST. of 1776 pt. 2, art. XIII, XLI; MASS. CONST. of 1780
pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. V; N.C. CONST. of 1776 §§ XVIII–XIX; N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. 2, §
L; PA. CONST. of 1776 pt. 2, § 20; S.C. CONST. of 1778 arts. IX, XVIII, XXXV; VT. CONST.
of 1777 ch. II, §§ XVII–XVIII; VT. CONST. of 1786 ch. II, § XI. Connecticut and Rhode Island did not adopt new constitutions after independence, instead maintaining their colonial charters from 1639 and 1663, respectively. The South Carolina Constitution of
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meaning in a given state constitution because the document grants
powers that it makes little or no sense to limit to inter-session recesses. For example, seven ratification-era constitutions authorize the
executive to impose embargos for up to thirty days “in the recess” of
52
the legislature. The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 empowers
the governor “in the recess of the General Assembly . . . to embody
53
the militia for the Public safety.” These constitutions were adopted
in wartime, during a revolution against the British Empire. It is implausible that the availability of these powers would turn on accidents
54
of parliamentary procedure or nomenclature.
Robert Natelson has identified numerous ratification-era legislative enactments that granted similar emergency powers during re-

52

53

54

1776, as well as those of Georgia, New Jersey, and New York did not use the word “recess.”
See GA. CONST. of 1777; N.J. CONST. of 1776; N.Y. CONST. of 1777; S.C. CONST. of 1776.
DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 7 (“A president or chief magistrate . . . may, by and with the advice of the privy council, lay embargoes or prohibit the exportation of any commodity for
any time not exceeding thirty days in the recess of the general assembly . . . .”); MD.
CONST. of 1776 pt. 2, art. XXIII (“[The Governor] may, during the recess of the General
Assembly, lay embargoes, to prevent the departure of any shipping, or the exportation of
any commodities, for any time not exceeding thirty days in any one year-summoning the
General Assembly to meet within the time of the continuance of such embargo . . . .”);
N.C. CONST. of 1776 § XIX (“He [the Governor] also may by and with the advice of the
Council of State, lay Embargoes or prohibit the Exportation of any Commodity for any
Term not exceeding thirty days, at any one time, in the recess of the General Assembly . . . .”); PA. CONST. of 1776 pt. 2, § 20 (“They may also lay embargoes, or prohibit the
exportation of any commodity, for any time, not exceeding thirty days, in the recess of
the house only. . . . ”); S.C. CONST. of 1778 arts. XXXV (“That the governor and commander-in-chief for the time being, by and with the advice and consent of the privy council, may lay embargoes or prohibit the exportation of any commodity, for any time not
exceeding thirty days, in the recess of the general assembly.”); VT. CONST. of 1777 ch. II,
§ XVIII (“[T]hey may also lay Embargoes, or prohibit the Exportation of any Commodity,
for any time not exceeding thirty days, in the recess of the House only . . . .”); VT. CONST.
of 1786 ch. II, § XI (“[T]hey may also lay Embargoes, or prohibit the Exportation of any
Commodity, for any time not exceeding thirty days, in the recess of the House only . . . .”). Many of the ratification-era documents discussed in this section provide recess
powers to the executive and a small committee, acting jointly, not solely to the executive.
For simplicity, this discussion refers to each as if the grant is just to the executive.
N.C. CONST. of 1776, § XVIII. The OED defines “embody” in relevant part as “[t]o form
into a body or company for military or other purposes; to organize” and includes a usage
example from Thomas Jefferson in 1779. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2001)
[hereinafter “OED”].
Notably, when James Madison proposed language at the federal convention that would
have barred states from laying embargoes, George Mason argued that the amendment
would be not only improper but dangerous, as the Genl. Legislature would not sit
constantly and therefore could not interpose at the necessary moments—He enforced his objection by appealing to the necessity of sudden embargoes during the
war, to prevent exports, particularly in the case of a blockade—.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 440–41.
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cesses,55 including authority to “call out the militia” and “issue other
56
military orders.” Natelson asserts that the legislatures that granted
these powers “obviously” meant them to be available only during
57
long, inter-session recesses. He appears to think it unlikely that a
legislature would grant significant powers during short breaks. But
the critical factor is whether the state might face an emergency that
requires an immediate response, not how long the legislature plans
to be away when a crisis happens to arise. Natelson appears to be asserting that the assemblies meant to leave their states without anyone
who had authority to call out the militia or issue military orders merely because the legislature happened to be on a break that was called
one thing rather than another (or was relatively short rather than
long). In colonies that were actively contemplating or waging war
against the world’s preeminent imperial power, at the same time as
58
they faced threats of domestic rebellion, the notion is implausible.
Moreover, even if legislators had long, inter-session recesses in
mind when granting these emergency powers, it seems unlikely that
they would object to the governor using them to respond to crises

55

56
57
58

See Robert G. Natelson, The Origins and Meaning of “Vacancies That May Happen During the
Recess” in the Constitution’s Recess Appointments Clause, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 218–
24 (2014) (explaining the various states’ emergency recess powers).
Id. at 220.
Id. at 224.
Natelson agrees that “[i]n legislative practice, ‘recess’ (without ‘the’) could refer to any
time when the legislature is not physically sitting, including intrasession breaks and apparently even a noon recess.” Id. at 213. But he asserts that the phrase “the recess”
meant something different “in government practice”: “[i]t seems . . . that in government
practice the phrase ‘the Recess’ always referred to the gap between sessions.” Id. (emphasis in original). There are several problems with this claim. First, it is mistaken as an empirical matter. This Article cites examples in which “the Recess” refers to intra-session recesses. Second, Natelson does not explain the difference between “legislative practice”
and “government practice,” nor why a constitutional provision involving Senate recesses
would use the “government” rather than “legislative” definition of a term. Third, Natelson does not explain why a reasonable drafter would distinguish among types of recesses
by the oblique means of including or omitting the word “the.” That mode of drawing (or
inferring) distinctions is implausible on its face. One expects to see the word “the” precede “recess” in many cases simply because the speaker is referring to a particular recess,
not because the speaker is trying to limit the scope of the word “recess.” One who wishes
to limit the term “recess” would be wise to use more obvious textual cues.
Natelson supports his claim regarding the phrase “the Recess” by citing two types of
pre-ratification usage: instances in which (a) a text refers to a specific inter-session recess
as “the Recess,” or (b) a state legislature granted recess powers that Natelson believes
should have been limited to inter-session recesses (the examples mentioned in the text
corresponding to this footnote). Id. at 214–27. The former fail to support Natelson’s position because they are silent on whether other recesses were also called “the Recess.” The
latter do not support it because Natelson’s opinion that certain powers were intended only for “inter-session” recesses is no more obvious than the contrary view.

Oct. 2014]

THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF RECESS

179

during other types of recesses. Imagine the governor receives word
of a violent riot in the middle of the night between daily legislative
sessions, and he responds by summoning a local militia to quell the
unrest. Are we to assume that, on meeting the following morning,
the assembly would chastise the governor for abusing his “recess”
powers to defend the populace instead of convening the assembly
first? If so, then let us modify the facts: imagine the mob was burning down the assembly building. This hypothetical is not a stretch.
We know that the Framers contemplated situations in which domestic
59
violence might prevent legislatures from meeting.
Similar evidence comes from ratification-era constitutional provisions that do not involve military matters or foreign relations. The
North Carolina Constitution of 1776 generally gives the governor the
power to “grant[] Pardons and Reprieves,” but specifies that in cases
prosecuted by the General Assembly he “may in the recess grant a re60
prieve until the next sit[t]ing of the General Assembly.” When the
North Carolina legislature is away, surely the governor can grant a
temporary reprieve to an individual with good cause who faces imminent and potentially irreversible punishment regardless of the technical styling of the legislature’s break.
The South Carolina Constitution of 1778 states:
[D]uring a recess the president of the senate and speaker of the house of
representatives shall issue writs for filling up vacancies occasioned by
death in their respective houses, giving at least three weeks and not more
than thirty-five days’ previous notice of the time appointed for the elec61
tion.

It would make little sense to grant the officer of a legislative body the
power to schedule a popular election to fill a vacancy within thirtyfive days during one type of recess but not another. Why should public representation in the legislature turn on technicalities and accidents of timing regarding the definitions of legislative breaks?
The Maryland Constitution of 1776 authorizes the governor “in
the recess of the General Assembly” to appoint a register of wills for a
62
county in which the position becomes vacant. There are two ways to
59

60
61
62

See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 467 (“Mr.
Dickinson moved to insert the words, ‘or Executive’ after the words ‘application of its
Legislature’—The occasion itself [the occasion requiring a state to ask for federal assistance responding to domestic violence] he remarked might hinder the Legislature from
meeting.”).
N.C. CONST. of 1776, § XIX.
S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XVIII.
MD. CONST. of 1776, pt. 2, art. XLI (“That there be a Register of Wills appointed for each
county who shall be commissioned by the Governor, on the joint recommendation of the
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discern that this use of “recess” is probably broad. First, as in the previous examples, it is unlikely that one would permit appointments of
county registers of wills during only some narrow type of recess and
not others. Second, the provision specifies that an appointee will
63
hold the position “until the meeting of the General Assembly.” It is
doubtful that “meeting” refers only to formal sessions; the word likely
64
means any convening for legislative business. If the “meeting” that
follows a recess has no specified type, then the recess also has none.
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 and the New Hampshire
Constitution of 1792 use “recess” to refer to intra-session recesses.
One can discern their usage from the text, without reasoning about
the purpose of the provisions. Because the Massachusetts and New
Hampshire Constitutions are often cited to support the technical position on “recess,” this Article discusses them in greater detail below,
65
in its review of the evidence for that position. Briefly, however, these constitutions give the governor power to “prorogue” the legislature, which means to end its session, during a recess. If the legislature is on “recess” and its session has not already ended—which

63
64

65

Senate and House of Delegates; and that, upon the death, resignation, disqualification, or
removal out of the county of any Register of Wills, in the recess of the General Assembly
the Governor, with the advice of the Council, may appoint and commission a fit and
proper person to such vacant office, to hold the same until the meeting of the General
Assembly.”). The Maryland Constitution also provides that the Governor may appoint
“Treasurers . . . and the Commissioners of the Loan Office . . . in the recess of the General Assembly,” id. at pt. 2, art. XIII, as well as Clerks of court “in the vacation” of courts,
id. at pt. 2, art. XLVII. By the document’s usage, “vacation” and “recess” appear to be virtual synonyms, with the former used to refer to judicial breaks and the latter legislative
breaks.
Id. at pt. 2, art. XLI.
Both Johnson’s 1755 and 1785 dictionaries define “meeting,” in relevant part, merely as
“[a]n assembly; a convention.” 2 JOHNSON 1755, supra note 19, at 1281; 2 JOHNSON 1785,
supra note 19, at 112. The OED provides two relevant definitions, each dating from the
Middle Ages or earlier and continuing in use to the present: “[t]he act or an instance of
assembling or coming together for social, business, or other purposes; the action of encountering a person or persons” and “[a] gathering or assembly of a number of people
for entertainment, discussion, legislation, etc.; the people so assembled.” OED, supra
note 53. In addition, other usage in the Maryland Constitution confirms that “meeting”
does not signify a formal session. For example, Article XIX supplies the Senate with power to fill a vacancy in its own ranks “immediately . . . or at their next meeting.” MD.
CONST. of 1776, pt. 2, art. XIX. This provision would be nonsensical if “meeting” meant
“formal session.” That reading would permit the Senate to fill a vacancy immediately if it
happens to be in session when the vacancy arises, but if the Senate is on an intra-session
recess would force it to leave the position open through the end of the current session
and the subsequent inter-session recess, only to be filled at the onset of the next session.
See infra text accompanying notes 124–32.
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should often (if not always) be the case if the governor can “pro66
rogue” it—then it must be on an “intra-session” recess.
Examples of ordinary usage abound elsewhere, including in other
texts on which proponents of the technical position rely. Blackstone’s Commentaries uses “these recesses” to refer to three kinds of
breaks—those following a parliamentary “adjournment,” “prorogation,” or “dissolution” (a “dissolution” dissolved the parliament):
As to all other privileges which obstruct the ordinary course of justice,
they cease by the statutes 12 W. III. c. 3. and 11 Geo. II. c. 24. immediately after the dissolution or prorogation of the parliament, or adjournment
of the houses for above a fortnight; and during these recesses a peer, or
member of the house of commons, may be sued like an ordinary sub67
ject . . . .

Likewise, Thomas Jefferson’s 1801 Manual of Parliamentary Practice,
written to guide the Senate, uses the term “recess” to refer to breaks
following both prorogations and adjournments: “[c]ommittees may
be appointed to sit during a recess by adjournment, but not by pro68
rogation.” The Manual further makes clear that recesses can occur
during sessions because it states that an “[a]djournment . . . is no
69
more than a continuance of the session from one day to another.”
If an adjournment “continu[es] . . . the session,” and there is such
thing as a “recess by adjournment,” then the word recess must contemplate what modern observers call “intra-session” recesses—
70
recesses without a break in the session.
The Blackstone and Jefferson passages quoted above each refer to
English parliamentary practice. One might think it proper to look
directly at parliamentary records as well. There, too, one finds examples of “recess” referring to intra-session recesses—or, leaving “session” out of the discussion—passages that refer to relatively brief recesses that follow adjournments rather than prorogations. For
example, the record of the House of Commons from 1660 to 1680,
published in 1742, includes the following passage:
The next Day, which was the 20th of December, the Money Bill, and the
three other Bills being ready for the Royal Assent, the King came to the
House of Peers . . . . Upon the passing of which, the Parliament was ad66
67
68

69
70

See id.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *161 (emphasis added).
THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE
OF THE UNITED STATES 174 (1801) (citations omitted). Rappaport cites this text when
explaining English parliamentary practice regarding “adjournment” and “prorogation.”
See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1550–51 nn.192–94. But he appears to have missed its significance for his argument regarding the word “recess.”
Id. at 173.
Id. at 173–74.
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journ’d to the 10th Day of January; and so breaking up, had a Recess for near
three Weeks . . . . The Parliament being again met, January 10, according to
Adjournment, the joint Committee of Lords and Commons appointed to make enquiry during the Recess, into certain Plots about that time said to be on foot,
71
gave in their Report . . . .

Numerous examples can be found in the American colonial legislatures as well. In 1754, Governor Jonathan Belcher of New Jersey sent
a message to the General Assembly in which he referred to “the Recess” that he was granting them by adjourning from April 29 to June
72
1 —and this appears to be the only use of the word “recess” in the
four-year volume of New Jersey assembly records in which it appears.
When Massachusetts legislators asked their governor on June 29,
1768 to grant them a “recess,” he responded as if either a “prorogation” or an “adjournment” would initiate a “recess,” saying, “I cannot
consistently with my Sense of Duty Prorogue or Adjourn the General
73
Court until I have receiv’d your Answer to his Majesty’s Requisition.”
In 1771 the Pennsylvania Gazette specified that a break which it called
“the Recess” of New York’s legislature was an intra-session recess:
Captain McDougall . . . remains still in the New Gaol, for the Assembly
was not prorogued, but adjourned; so that the Sessions is not at an End,
and the Recess is only till the 25th Instant, when the Members are to
74
meet again . . . .

On July 18, 1775, one month after the Battle of Bunker Hill and two
weeks after George Washington was named Commander in Chief of
the Continental Army, the Continental Congress adopted a resolution that foreshadowed the use of “recess” in several ratification-era
constitutions:
RESOLVED, THAT it be recommended to the inhabitants of all the
United English Colonies in North-America, that all able bodied effective
71

72

73
74

1 THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 46–60 (1742), available at
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=37617 (emphasis added). Not only
does the House of Commons use “the Recess” to refer to the break following an adjournment; it is discussing a break similar in timing to the one at issue in Noel Canning.
THE PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, May 16, 1754, at 1 (digital copy on file with author); THE
VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY 10
(1785), available at https://archive.org/details/votesproceedings1754newj (Apr. 29,
1754). Ordinarily the Governor “prorogued” the New Jersey Assembly to end its sittings,
meaning that what we would call a new session began at its next meeting. See id. at 12
(Dec. 14, 1752) (stating that the governor “directed a prorogation”); id. at 52 (May 16,
1753) (“[T]he Governor was pleased to prorogue the House to the 10th of July next.”).
But on April 29, 1754, Governor Belcher issued a “Writ of Adjournment.” Id. at 10 (April
17, 1754 to April 25, 1754). The assembly met “pursuant to an Adjournment” on June 1.
Id. at 11 (June 3, 1754).
45 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1768–69, at 86, 88
(1976) (emphasis added).
THE PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, Feb. 28, 1771, at 2–3 (digital copy on file with author).
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men, between 16 and 50 years of age, in each Colony, immediately form
themselves into regular companies of militia . . . * * * That all officers
above the rank of a Captain be appointed by their respective Provincial
Assemblies or Conventions, or in their recess by the Committees of safety
appointed by said Assemblies or Conventions. That all officers be commissioned by the Provincial Assemblies or Conventions, or in their recess by
the Committees of Safety appointed by said Assemblies or Conventions. *
* * That it be recommended to each colony to appoint a Committee of
Safety, to superintend and direct all matters necessary for the security
and defence of their respective Colonies, in the recess of their Assemblies
75
and Conventions.

It is doubtful that the Continental Congress meant these provisions to
turn on a particular definition of “recess.” In that case, it would have
needed to canvass the session and recess practices of each colonial
legislative assembly before crafting its one-size-fits-all recommendation—or, worse, made one in ignorance. It also would have to have
concluded, inexplicably, that the assemblies should leave critical military posts vacant and their territories without emergency legislative
powers when they happen to be on breaks that fall during rather than
between formal legislative sessions.
In fact, ratification-era state legislatures varied substantially in
their nomenclature for legislative sessions. This evidence casts strong
doubt on the possibility that federal drafters would craft rules that
turn on strict semantic distinctions between “inter-session” and “intrasession” recesses. The contrast between New Jersey and Massachusetts practices illustrate the point. The New Jersey legislature enumerated its “sessions” by year and called each work period within a
76
given (annual) session a “sitting.” By contrast, when the Massachusetts legislature met multiple times a year, it called each sitting a new
77
“session.” Imagine, then, that the U.S. Constitution limits recess appointments to “inter-session” recesses in accordance with the technical position (it does not use the word, but let us assume it is fairly
implied). In that case, one cannot tell whether the document incorporates the New Jersey or the Massachusetts sense of “inter-session.”
The difference between the two is stark. The New Jersey definition
75
76

77

THE PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, July 26, 1775, at 2 (digital copy on file with author) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., THE VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PROVINCE OF
NEW JERSEY, supra note 72, at 5 (“At a SESSION begun at Trenton on the 25th Day of October, 1785, and continued by Adjournments. Being the first Sitting.”); id. at 177 (“Being
the second Sitting”); id. at 265 (“Being the third Sitting”).
See, e.g., 47 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1770–1771,at
vii (1978) (listing in the table of contents four sessions of the “General Court, 1770–
1771”: “First Session: 30 May–25 June 1770;” “Second Session: 25 July–3 August 1770;”
“Third Session: 26 September–20 November 1770;” “Fourth Session: 3–26 April 1771”).
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would permit recess appointments only once per year, while the Massachusetts definition would permit them multiple times—for an identical pattern of legislative meetings and breaks. It is difficult to imagine, then, that the Constitution turns on the strict application of one
of these definitions, particularly when there is no record of its drafters discussing which definition to choose.
To be sure, there are numerous examples from the 1770s and
78
1780s in which “recess” is used to refer to an inter-session recess. But
that is to be expected of a general term. General words are used to
refer to various specific things, so long as each falls within the word’s
general definition.
C. Purpose
The purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause is to enable the
President to fill posts when necessary or convenient without requiring
the Senate to remain in session continually or return to Washington
79
when inconvenient. This policy appears to be based on two beliefs:
the Senate was not likely to—or perhaps should not—spend too much
time in Washington, and generally it should not be forced to return
to Washington merely to consider appointments. These views, in
turn, appear to have been driven by the Framers’ relatively narrow
expectations for federal legislative business and their brand of republican political theory, which held that elected representatives should
80
spend a good deal of time in their local communities.
Three aspects of the Clause’s purpose are worth noting. The first,
which has gone largely unnoticed, is that the Clause advances the interests of not just the President, but also the Senate. The Senate
might prefer the President to have recess appointment power so that
senators can spend more uninterrupted time in their home states. As
a general matter, the Senate should hold this preference whenever it
does not anticipate opposing the President’s nominations, which
means most of the time. There is evidence that the Framers expected
this to be the norm, as they believed the Senate would only rarely re78

79
80

See, e.g., THE PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, Jan. 19, 1774, at 2 (reporting that the Governor
“opened the sixth Session of the General Assembly” and printing his speech to the assembly, which, among other things, recounts that “since your Recess” representatives
from New York and Massachusetts reached a provisional agreement to settle the border
between the two jurisdictions); see also THE PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, Feb. 9, 1774, at 1 (referring to a “Recess of the General Court by Propogation [sic]”).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 67 (Alexander Hamilton).
See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1564, n.232 (noting Republican political theory and
expectations regarding Congress’s legislative business).
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ject presidential nominees.81 But regardless of their views, it should
be the norm even in modern times. The Senate majority typically
supports the President’s nominations when it is aligned with him and
opposes them only infrequently even when it is not. To the extent
that the Clause’s widely acknowledged purpose has any implication
for how one reads its text, the fact that the Clause serves both the
President and the Senate in most situations lends some support to
broader readings. The technical position has a weaker connection to
the Clause’s purpose, as it seeks to protect the Senate from subversion by the President without accounting for the Senate’s affirmative
82
interest in recess appointments.
Second, the Clause is pragmatic and reflects a compromise between competing values. Although the Framers settled on presidential nomination and Senate consent as the primary method of appointment, the Clause embodies a recognition that practical
considerations (from the perspective of the President, the Senate, or
both) can trump the primary method. If any inference can be drawn
from this purpose, it suggests the aptness of reading the Clause plainly, which establishes the following pragmatic arrangement: the terms
of the Clause have their ordinary, general meanings, perhaps subject
to the Senate’s refinement under the Rules of Proceedings Clause. If
disputes arise under the Clause, the President and the Senate are
bound not by judicially imposed, technical interpretations of the
Clause but by notions of reasonableness enforced largely, if not en83
tirely, through the political process. In this view, the Clause does
81

82
83

See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation
Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 653–54 (1993) (“Given that the Senate was not to exercise choice itself, it appeared to Alexander Hamilton
that a nominee should be rejected only for ‘special and strong reasons.’ . . . [T]he original understanding of the Appointments Clause does not contemplate rejections for reasons of partisanship or disagreement over the nominee’s likely vote in a single case, because these reasons would be neither special nor strong.”); see also 4 ELLIOT, supra note
48, at 134 (quoting Iredell as saying, “Suppose a man nominated by the President; with
what face would any senator object to him without a good reason? There must be some
decorum in every public body”).
See infra text accompanying notes 183–87.
Cf. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 577 (2012) (“Here, actual usage has not always precipitated fixed
rules, but instead has structured a conversation between presidents and senators resulting
in evolving understandings, conventions, and truces.”); Patrick Hein, In Defense of Broad
Recess Appointment Power: The Effectiveness of Political Counterweights, 96 CAL. L. REV. 235,
252–54 (2008) (discussing political confrontations between the President and the legislative branch); Herz, supra note 32, at 460 (“Thus, proposals for a fast-track confirmatory
procedure, or for disaggregating spending into hundreds of separate ‘bills,’ never went
anywhere. Neither would the twelve-sessions-a-year idea. There are surely many reasons
why they do not. But the beginning of an answer would seem to lie in the facts that: (1)
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not limit recesses to any particular type. One might reasonably wish
to read minimum length limitations into the Clause, but that matter
is largely left to the President and the Senate to negotiate.
Finally, the Framers scarcely discussed the Clause at all, and there
is no record of any debate over it at the Constitutional Convention or
the ratification conventions. This, too, lends slight support to a
pragmatic, plain reading. If the Framers were concerned about the
technicalities of the Clause or wished it to draw bright lines, one
might expect them not only to have used narrower language, but to
have discussed or debated their policy views, as well as their word
choice. They were not averse to quibbling over technicalities. Regarding the ten-day period for the President to sign bills passed by
Congress, the delegates at the Constitutional Convention considered
whether the text should read “within ten days (sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him” or “within ten days (sundays
84
excepted) after the day on which it shall have been presented to him.”
In contrast to this close consideration of the deadline for presidential
signatures, the drafters did not debate the Recess Appointments
Clause at all. Sometimes drafters who adopt general language are intentionally delegating authority to those who implement it. We have
too little evidence to suggest intentional delegation in the Recess Appointments Clause. It is plausible, but it is no less plausible that the
Framers simply did not think about the Clause much. At a minimum,
however, they appear to have been unconcerned with the details of
its operation enough that they did not bother to ensure that would
be read more narrowly than its ordinary terms suggest.
D. History
The historical record also supports an ordinary reading of the
Clause. This view predominated from the nation’s founding until
2013. The executive branch adopted a contrary view for no more
than twenty-five years, from 1901 to 1921 and possibly from 1974 to
1979.
In the earliest years after independence, governors in Pennsylvania and Vermont exercised their embargo powers during intra-

84

Congress and the president both realize that two can play this game; (2) political will always matters as much as legal authority; and (3) the participants are all repeat players,
who do not know whether their side is going to control the White House, Congress, both,
or neither at any given point and so cannot risk shifting too much authority to any particular locus.”).
See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 608 (citing
Madison’s desire to add those words).

Oct. 2014]

THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF RECESS

187

session recesses, suggesting that they interpreted “in the recess” in
85
their state constitutions to include those recesses. Likewise, in 1798,
the Governor of New Jersey must have interpreted “Recess” in Article
86
I of the United States Constitution to include intra-session recesses,
as he appointed a United States senator during an intra-session recess
87
of the New Jersey General Assembly.
The earliest formal opinion on the Recess Appointments Clause,
by Attorney General William Wirt in 1823, concerned whether the
President could fill a pre-existing vacancy during a recess. Wirt did
not consider the meaning of “recess” directly, but he described the
Clause in terms that suggest, if anything, support for an ordinary,
pragmatic reading of the Clause:
Now, if we interpret the word ‘happen’ as being merely equivalent to
‘happen to exist,’ (as I think we may legitimately do,) then all vacancies
which, from any casualty, happen to exist at a time when the Senate cannot be
88
consulted as to filling them, may be temporarily filled by the President . . . .

If the Clause were perceived as enabling appointments only between
formal sessions, this would be an odd way of referring to the period
during which the President can make unilateral appointments. Wirt
does not use the word “recess,” nor does he reference in any way a
lengthy period between formal sessions of Congress. Instead, he describes the relevant period pragmatically, as “a time when the Senate
89
cannot be consulted as to filling [vacancies].” To be sure, Wirt was
not squarely considering the “recess” question. But his description is
unlikely if people in the early nineteenth century commonly believed
that the Clause contemplated only recesses between official sessions
of Congress.
As soon as the United States Congress began taking significant intra-session recesses, presidents began making intra-session recess appointments, and the historical record is bereft of any contemporaneous objection based on their intra-session nature. President Andrew
85

86

87

88
89

See NLRB v. New Vista Nursing and Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 225 (2013) (providing examples “of state executives assuming that a constitutional recess includes intrasession
breaks”).
Until the Seventeenth Amendment established direct popular elections of senators, see
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, Article I directed that state legislatures selected senators, and
that “the Executive” of a state could appoint senators “during the Recess of the Legislature of [that] State.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
See New Vista, 719 F.3d at 225–26 (“[The New Jersey’s Governor’s] appointment of a senator on December 19, 1798, shows that he construed recess to include intrasession breaks
because the New Jersey General Assembly was in an intrasession break from November 8,
1798, until January 16, 1799.”).
1 Op. Att’y Gen. 633 (1823) (emphasis added).
Id.
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Johnson made fifty-seven appointments during four different intra90
session recesses in 1867 and 1868. The “intra-session” nature of these appointments appears to have generated no controversy at all. As
Edward Hartnett has pointed out, although the Fortieth Congress
impeached and tried Andrew Johnson on charges related to appointments and removals, it notably did not dispute the constitution91
ality of intra-session recess appointments. During this period, Attorney General William Evarts issued three opinions on recess
appointments, none of which draws any distinction between intra92
session and inter-session appointments. Similarly, a United States
district court that passed on the validity of a Johnson recess appoint93
ment gave no attention to the question of the type of recess. And
the Court of Claims expressly affirmed the legitimacy of a Johnson intra-session recess appointment, stating that it had “no doubt” that the
94
President could legally fill a vacancy during the recess in question.
Rapport argues that Johnson’s contemporaries might have viewed
95
the relevant recesses as “inter-session.” The effort is unconvincing.
First, Rappaport concedes that two of four relevant periods were in96
tra-session recesses. Regarding the remaining two, Rappaport points
to aspects of the congressional record from which one might argue—
or might have believed at the time—that the Senate had ended its
97
session even though no one at the time voiced that perspective. He
then takes silence on the recess question as evidence in his favor. He
doubts that the President would have taken the “unprecedented” step
of making intra-session recess appointments without attempting to

90

91

92
93

94

95
96
97

See Hartnett, supra note 30, at 408–09 & n.143 (discussing President Johnson’s recess appointments); Michael B. Rappaport, Why Nonoriginalism Does Not Justify Departing from the
Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause 26–33 (Jan. 3, 2014) (San Diego Legal
Studies Paper No. 14-140), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2374563 (discussing
Andrew Johnson’s numerous recess appointments).
See Hartnett, supra note 30, at 409 & n.143 (“Attorney General William Evarts issued his
opinion concurring with his predecessors that the President could exercise his recess appointment power even when the vacancy arose while the Senate was in session, as well as
two other opinions approving recess appointments.”).
See id. at 409–10 n.143 (citing 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 449 (1868); 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 455, 457
(1868); 12 Op. Att’y Gen 469 (1868) in discussing these opinions).
The court found the appointment invalid because it predated the relevant recess, but it
viewed the recess itself as adequate. In re District Attorney of the United States, 7 F. Cas.
731, 744 (E.D. Pa. 1868).
Gould v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 593, 595–96 (1884) (“We have no doubt that a vacancy
occurring while the Senate was thus temporarily adjourned, from July 20 to November 21,
1867, could be and was legally filled by appointment of the President alone . . . .”).
Rappaport, supra note 90, at 27–31.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 27, 28–29.
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“justif[y]” them.98 This argument assumes its conclusion. Perhaps
the President did not attempt to justify the appointments because
neither he nor anyone else thought they needed justification, as no
one thought it relevant whether the Senate ended a formal session
before the break in question.
The first known suggestion that the Constitution might not authorize intra-session recess appointments did not appear until 1901,
in an opinion of Attorney General Philander Knox advising President
99
Theodore Roosevelt against such appointments. Knox mistakenly
characterizes the Evarts opinions as “relat[ing] only to appointments
100
during the recess of the Senate between two sessions of Congress,”
and he dismisses the Court of Claims decision with an unsupported
suggestion that the circumstances giving rise to the intra-session recess were “unusual and involved results which should not be viewed
101
as precedents.” There is no doubt that the circumstances were unusual; less clear is why the episode has no precedential value on the
“recess” question.
Knox’s textual analysis relies principally on the definite article
“the.” He states, “[i]t will be observed that the phrase is ‘the re102
cess,’” arguing that “there have always been two sittings, sessions or
assemblings of each Congress” and “the recess” is the break between
103
He also argues that the Constitution distinguishes between
them.
an “adjournment,” which means any break, and “the recess,” which is
104
the single break between official sessions of Congress. Knox’s assertion about sessions is simply mistaken. The Constitution does not establish the name or numbering of congressional sessions, and Congress can hold—and has held—multiple formal sessions in a single
year if it chooses. The First and the Fifth Congresses each held three

98
99

100
101
102
103
104

Id. at 29.
See 23 Op. Att’y Gen. 599 (1901) (advising the President not “to appoint an appraiser of
merchandise in the district of New York during the current holiday adjournment of the
Senate”). The 1868 opinion of the district court that invalidated a Johnson appointment
suggests that “[w]hether there was a recess of the senate upon adjournment of congress
on 27th July last” is a question “upon which opinions have, I believe, differed.” In re District Attorney of the United States, 7 F. Cas. 731, 734, 744 (E.D. Pa. 1868). But the court
did not specify whether the “believe[d]” disagreement concerned the intra-session nature
of the appointment or something else; nor did it offer any source expressing the supposed belief.
23 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 99, at 602. Hartnett caught this mistake. See Hartnett, supra
note 30, at 410–11 (highlighting the mistake).
23 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 99, at 603.
Id. at 600 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 603–04.
Id. at 601.
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sessions, as did four other antebellum Congresses.105 On close inspection, the distinction between “adjournment” and “recess” also lacks
merit. As this Article discusses in greater detail below, the Constitution uses “adjournment” as the noun form of “adjourn,” not as a
106
means to distinguish between “recesses” and other breaks.
Knox was also motivated by policy concerns. He disliked the possibility that a recess appointment being made over a weekend, which
he believed would be permissible if intra-session appointments were
107
At the same time, he apparently saw no limit on intralawful.
session recess appointments other than that they fell between official
sessions of Congress. His view led to President Theodore Roosevelt
making appointments during what he called a “constructive recess”
that occurred when the Senate ended one session and began another
108
with a single gavel stroke.
When the Senate Judiciary Committee responded to Roosevelt’s
appointments with a 1905 report defining recesses, it did not distinguish between inter-session and intra-session breaks. It endorsed a
pragmatic view of the word recess:
[The Framers] used the word [recess] as the mass of mankind then understood it and now understand it. It means, in our judgment, in this
connection the period of time when the Senate is not sitting in regular or
extraordinary session as a branch of the Congress, or in extraordinary
session for the discharge of executive functions; when its members owe
no duty of attendance; when its Chamber is empty; when, because of its
absence, it can not receive communications from the President or partic109
ipate as a body in making appointments.

In 1921, Attorney General Harry Daugherty concurred with the Senate Judiciary Committee, rejecting Knox’s view and restoring the con110
sensus view that the type of recess is not important. Daugherty did,
105

106
107

108

109
110

See Hartnett, supra note 30, at 413 (“The First Congress had three sessions, as did the Fifth
Congress. Considering only the antebellum years, four additional Congresses—the Eleventh, Thirteenth, Twenty-Fifth, and Twenty-Seventh—held three sessions each.”).
See infra text accompanying notes 143–47.
See 23 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 99, at 603 (“If a temporary appointment could in this
case be legally made during the current adjournment as a recess appointment, I see no
reason why such an appointment should not be made during any adjournment, as from
Thursday or Friday until the following Monday.”).
See Michael A. Carrier, When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess Appointments
Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204, 2211–12 (1994) (“Roosevelt claimed that a split second
separated the two sessions, thus creating a recess which allowed him to make recess appointments.”).
S. REP. NO. 58-4389 (1905), reprinted in 39 CONG. REC. 3820, 3823 (emphasis omitted).
33 Op. Att’y Gen. 20, 24 (1921)(“If the President is empowered to make recess appointments during the present adjournment, does it not necessarily follow that the power exists if an adjournment for only 2 instead of 28 days is taken? I unhesitatingly answer this
by saying no.”).
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however, conclude that an appointment-enabling break might have
111
some minimum length, likely more than “5 or even 10 days.” But
he believed that a precise number could not be determined, as the
112
Later presiword recess “must be given a practical construction.”
dents and attorneys general have all agreed with Daugherty’s rejection of a distinction between types of recess. They have differed only
113
on the question of minimum length.
In the second half of the twentieth century, intra-session recess
114
President Harry
appointments became much more common.
Truman made twenty appointments during four intra-session recess115
President Dwight Eisenhower made nine, and President Riches.
116
ard Nixon made eight. A 1979 Office of Legal Counsel memorandum states that from 1974 to 1979, presidents were “reluctant” to
make intra-session recess appointments because of the 1974 D.C. Circuit holding that the President could pocket-veto bills during intra117
session recesses. But President James Carter resumed making them
118
in 1979, and through 2012, presidents made 340. In 1979, a United
States district court passed on the validity of an intra-session recess
appointment without questioning the constitutionality of its intra119
session rather than inter-session nature. Despite the increased use
of intra-session recess appointments in recent decades, no court

111
112
113

114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 25.
See 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 463, 468 (1960) (agreeing with the court’s opinion in Gould v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 593 (1884)); 3 Op. O.L.C. 314, 316 (1979) (finding that “the President
is authorized to make recess appointments during a summer recess of the Senate of a
month’s duration”); 6 Op. O.L.C. 585, 585 (1982) (approving of a 2 month intra-session
recess); 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 161 (1996) (finding “that the President has discretion to
make a good-faith determination of whether a given recess is adequate to bring the
Clause into play”); 36 Op. O.L.C. __, at 2, 13 (Jan. 6, 2012) (concluding “that the President may determine that pro forma sessions at which no business is to be conducted do
not interrupt a Senate recess for purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause”).
See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 108, at 2212–16 (discussing the recess appointments made
since 1947).
See id. at 2212–13.
See id.
See 3 Op. O.L.C., supra note 113, at 313 (1979) (citing Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430
(D.C. Cir. 1974)).
See infra note 352.
See Staebler v. Carter, 464 F. Supp. 585 (D.D.C. 1979). The court rejected a statutory argument that the Federal Election Campaign Act required all appointees to be Senateconfirmed in apparent contravention of the Recess Appointments Clause, as well as an
argument that the Clause provides recess appointment power only in “instances of absolute need.” Id. at 597. The court implicitly took the broad view of the words “recess” and
“session.” It stated that “[r]ecess appointments have traditionally not been made only in
exceptional circumstances, but whenever Congress was not in session.” Id.
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squarely addressed the “recess” question until 2004, when the Elev120
A court first
enth Circuit approved intra-session appointments.
took the position that the Recess Appointments Clause is limited to
121
recesses between sessions of Congress in 2013, 226 years after the
ratification of the Constitution, 215 years after the word “recess” in
the U.S. Constitution was first interpreted by the Governor of New
Jersey to include intra-session recesses, and 146 years after the first intra-session recess appointments were made without any recorded objection. In short, with only two brief exceptions in the twentieth century, the word recess appears always to have been viewed as having an
ordinary meaning, not limited to any formal type of recess.
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE TECHNICAL POSITION
Until very recently, the ordinary reading of “recess” dominated.
Michael Rappaport overturned that longstanding consensus with a
2005 law review article arguing that original meaning of the Recess
122
Appointments Clause was narrow and technical. Because of its influence, the argument merits a detailed evaluation. Perhaps most illuminating is what it does not argue: Rappaport did not uncover any
evidence that the Framers intended “recess” to have a special meaning, nor for that matter any evidence that the Framers thought about
the word at all. He and other proponents of the technical position
also agree that the term, on its face, has a general meaning and cite
historical dictionary evidence that exclusively supports the general
123
meaning. One might expect these points to end the inquiry, leaving the term its broad, ordinary meaning, subject only to Senate con120

121

122

123

See Evans v. Stevens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1224–25 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e accept that ‘the Recess,’ originally and through today, could just as properly refer generically to any one—
intrasession or intersession—of the Senate's acts of recessing, that is, taking a break.”).
See NLRB v. New Vista Nursing and Rehabilitation, 719 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (We
hold that ‘the Recess of the Senate’ in the Recess Appointments Clause refers to only intersession breaks.”); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d 490, 506 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“In
short, we hold that ‘the Recess’ is limited to intersession recesses.”).
See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1490 (arguing that “the original meaning [of the Recess
Appointments Clause] confers quite narrow authority” on the President to make recess
appointments); see generally Brief of Originalist Scholars as Amici Curiae at 24, NLRB v.
Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013) (No. 12-1281), 2013 WL 6213265 at *24 [hereinafter Originalist Brief] (arguing that the narrow reading of the word “recess” “best comports with the Constitution’s text, structure, and purpose”).
See Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 23–34 (admitting that “‘recess’ could be used more
generically to refer to any break in a legislature's conduct of business, including short
breaks during a session”); Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1550 (discussing dictionary definitions and an “interpretation [that] reads the term ‘recess’ to mean all periods, no matter
how short, when the Senate is not conducting business”).

Oct. 2014]

THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF RECESS

193

struction under the Rules of Proceedings Clause. Instead, Rappaport
and others attempt to muster indirect evidence to support a narrow,
technical reading of recess. The evidence is hard to find.
A. Contemporaneous Usage
The primary argument for the technical position derives not from
the text of the Constitution, but the use of “recess” in two roughly
124
The evidence is thin—a single pascontemporaneous documents.
sage in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, similar to one in the
125
New Hampshire Constitution of 1792 —and adherents to the technical position misread it. Rappaport begins by explaining that in
England, breaks during a session were called adjournments, while in126
Then he quotes the
ter-session breaks were called prorogations.
Massachusetts Constitution:
The Governor, with advice of Council, shall have full power and authority, during the session of the General Court [that is, the Massachusetts legislature], to adjourn or prorogue the same to any time the two Houses
shall desire . . . and, in the recess of the said Court, to prorogue the same from
127
time to time, not exceeding ninety days in any one recess . . . .

The quoted passage states that the governor may prorogue the legislature “in the recess.” If, as Rappaport explains, a prorogation is “an
128
order that . . . would end the session,” then the legislature must be
in session for the governor to prorogue it. Therefore, the phrase “in
the recess” must refer to an intra-session recess. The passage appears
129
to use “recess” to refer exclusively to intra-session recesses.
124

125
126

127
128
129

See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1549–53 (discussing the use of “recess” in both the Massachusetts and New Hampshire Constitutions); Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 24–25
(discussing “[e]ighteenth-century state constitutions [that] used ‘recess’ to refer to the
time that the legislature was not in session”).
Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1551–52 (discussing and citing MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2,
ch. 2, § 1, art. V; N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. 2, § L).
Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1550–51 (explaining that “an adjournment was a break in the
business of a house that occurred during the legislative session” while “a prorogation was
an order by the King that Would end the session for both houses”).
Id. at 1552 (quoting MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. V) (emphasis in original).
Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1550–51.
One caveat here is that perhaps the Massachusetts Governor could prorogue the assembly
even when it was already prorogued. If that were the case, then the passage would appear
to refer to both intra-session and inter-session recesses rather than just the former: the
governor could “prorogue” the assembly when it was on “recess” regardless of whether
the recess was inter-session or intra-session. It is not clear whether such authority existed
in Massachusetts. It appears to have existed in New Jersey before independence, but not
after. Pre-independence, one finds instances in which the New Jersey Governor prorogued the assembly to a certain date, but the assembly did not meet until later and, upon reconvening, noted “his Excellency’s several Prorogations.” MINUTES OF THE
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Rappaport reaches the opposite conclusion. His argument appears to flow as follows:
(1) If “in the recess” includes times when the legislature is in session, then the quoted passage should grant the governor power to
adjourn as well as prorogue.
(2) The passage grants power only to prorogue and not to adjourn.
(3) Therefore 130“in the recess” must refer only to recesses in between sessions.
This gets it backward. When the legislature is in recess, it has already
been adjourned (if not prorogued). Therefore it does not make
sense to give the governor power to adjourn the legislature during a
recess. The more sensible arrangement is that the governor has power to adjourn or prorogue the legislature during a session but only to
prorogue when it is already on recess.
Rappaport makes one other argument about the passage: because
one clause discusses what the governor may do “during the session”
and the next addresses what he may do “in the recess,” the latter must
131
refer to a time when the legislature is not in session. This reasoning
begs the question by assuming that “session” and “recess” are mutually exclusive. The point of the inquiry is to determine whether the
word “recess” can refer to a break during a session.
Note also that the italicized portion of passage states that the governor may prorogue the legislature “from time to time, not exceed132
The phrase’s use of “from time
ing ninety days in any one recess.”
to time” is curious. It appears to mean something like, “the governor
may occasionally prorogue the legislature during a recess, not to exceed ninety days in any one recess.” In any event, it arguably suggests
an intent for the governor to use the granted power reasonably or in

130

131
132

PROVINCIAL CONGRESS AND THE COUNCIL OF SAFETY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 282
(1879) (Nov. 15, 1775). After independence, however, this practice appears to have ended, with the assembly instead meeting on the day appointed by law and continuing to new
sittings by “adjournment.” See, e.g., THE VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 72, at 8 (providing specific times
for meeting after adjournment); THE VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY 6–7 (1786) (providing specific times for meeting after
adjournment). This author has not found evidence (whether pre- or post-independence)
suggesting that the Massachusetts governor could prorogue its assembly when already prorogued, but it is possible that the power existed.
See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1552; see also Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 25 (“The
lack of authority to adjourn the legislature during its recess makes sense if the legislative
session has ended; by definition, a legislature cannot be adjourned when it is not in session.”).
See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1552.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. 2 § 1, art. V.
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moderation—and therefore to imply a belief that for some reason
governors could be trusted to do so. In effect, the passage may evince
an intent to establish a loose, pragmatic standard rather than a hard
rule, and to trust the constraints of the political process to sort out
the details. The Recess Appointments Clause arguably reflects a similar posture.
Proponents of the technical position also point to two additional
sources—two passages in Blackstone’s Commentaries and a single order
133
These texts provide little
from the Virginia House of Delegates.
support. As discussed above, Blackstone sometimes uses “recess” in a
134
One of the Blackstone passages cited for the
general manner.
technical position appears to use words casually, not formally. It contemplates that a matter arising during an “intermission or recess of
parliament” might be “brought . . . unto the next parliament” for res135
The word “intermission” likely refers to a relatively short
olution.
136
When an important matter
break during a continuous session.
arises during an intermission, it makes little sense to wait and present
it to the “next parliament” rather than the current parliament, when
it returns from the intermission. The natural inference is that this
Blackstone passage uses words loosely and therefore provides little if
any support for strict, technical usage.
137
The other Blackstone passage, and the passage from the Virginia
House of Delegates, appear to use “recess” and “session” in their narrow, technical senses, although one cannot be certain without examining other records. But no matter. These are instances in which
133

134
135

136
137

See Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 25–26 (citing for support 3 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 67, at *57; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at *260; JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 123 (1777–81) (Thomas W. White ed.,
1827)); Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 26 (“Ordered, That the delegates for the several
counties consult with their constituents, during the recess of Assembly, on the justice and
expediency of passing [a bill] . . . and that they procure from them instructions, whether
or not the said bill shall be passed, and lay the same before the House of Delegates at
their next session.” (quoting JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (1777–81), supra note 133, at 123).
See supra text accompanying note 67.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at *57 (emphasis omitted) (“This committee seems to have
been established, lest there should be a defect of justice, for want of a supreme court of
appeal, during any long intermission or recess of parliament; for the statute further directs, that if the difficulty be so great, that it may not well be determined without assent of
parliament, it shall be brought by the said [committee] unto the next parliament, who
shall finally determine the same.” (emphasis omitted)).
See infra note 231.
2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at *338 (“During the session of parliament the trial of an
indicted peer is not properly in the court of the lord high steward, but before the [high
court of parliament]. . . . But in the court of the lord high steward, which is held in the
recess of parliament, he is the sole judge in matters of law. . . .”).
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“recess” happens to have been used to refer to inter-session breaks.
They demonstrate nothing about whether other types of breaks were
also called “recesses.” The source from which the originalist scholars
find the passage from the Virginia House of Delegates builds its principal argument about “recess” on this mistaken inference, commit138
ting it many times over. One needs more than a few, or even many,
examples of a technical meaning to establish that it was exclusive.
Conversely, just a few examples of general usage go a long way toward
rebutting claims of a technical meaning—and in fact such examples
abound.
B. Structure: An Inference from “Adjournment”
Proponents of the technical position have also attempted to infer
from the Constitution’s text a distinction between the words “recess”
and “adjournment,” in which the former stands exclusively for intersession recesses and the latter describes all legislative breaks. The argument begins with the notion that because the Constitution uses
139
This interpretive
both words, they must have different meanings.
140
move is by no means uncontroversial. But that is no matter because
the words do in fact mean different things, just not things that support the technical position. Adherents to the technical position argue that each use of “adjourn” or “adjournment” appears in a context
that makes clear that the text refers to both intra-session and intersession recesses, whereas “recess” appears only twice, in contexts that
141
Since “adjournment”
might refer only to inter-session recesses.
138

139
140

141

See Natelson, supra note 55, at 215–17 (arguing, based on the Massachusetts and New
Hampshire Constitutions and the Virginia House of Delegates document, “that it is clear
that ‘the recess’ represented the period between sessions and was clearly distinguished
from them”).
Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 30 (“The choice to use different language (‘the Recess’ rather than ‘Adjournment’) indicates a different meaning.”).
See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 23, at 170 (explaining that presumption of consistent usage “more than most other canons . . . assumes a perfection of drafting that, as
an empirical matter, is not often achieved”); cf. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S.
561, 598 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The tendency to assume that a word which
appears in two or more legal rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose,
has and should have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against.”
(quoting Walter Wheeler Cook, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J.
333, 337 (1933)); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751,
756 (2009) (noting, regarding the related rule against surplusage or redundancy, “[t]his
interpretive rule, of course, is not absolute. While it provides weight in favor of one interpretation, it can be overridden by other considerations.”).
Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 30.
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clearly refers to all breaks, they argue, the “most obvious” inference is
142
that “recess” means only inter-session recesses.
But a more obvious interpretation is apparent on the face of the
text: the Constitution does not distinguish between one type of break
called a “recess” and another called an “adjournment” because the
document never refers to any break as an “adjournment.” It uses “ad143
journment” just three times, and in each instance the word is a
mere nominalization of the verb “to adjourn.” In other words, “adjourn” and its noun-form “adjournment” refer to the act of adjourning, while “recess” refers to a break that follows the act. To illustrate
this point, one can substitute a verb form for “adjournment” each
time it appears and fully preserve the meaning of the text. Here are
the three passages, with the original usage bracketed and the illustrations in bracketed italics:
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall
be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress [by
their Adjournment] [by adjourning] prevent its Return, in which Case it
144
shall not be a Law.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on [a question of
Adjournment]) [a question of when to adjourn] shall be presented to the
145
President of the United States . . . .
. . . in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time [of
Adjournment] [to adjourn], he may adjourn them to such Time as he
146
shall think proper . . . .

In short, to argue that the word “adjournment” implies a type of
147
break distinct from a “recess” is to mistake style for substance.

142

143
144
145
146

Id. (“The most obvious explanation is that ‘the Recess’ had a narrower meaning encompassing only the expected longer (and, from an appointments standpoint, more problematic) break between sessions.”); see also Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1559–60 (“The
most obvious explanation is that the Framers used the two terms to have different meanings. They used the term ‘adjournment’ to have the all-recess meaning, whereas they
used the term ‘recess’ to have a narrower meaning.”). The D.C. Circuit adopted a form
of this argument. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d 490, 500 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (arguing
that there is an “inescapable conclusion that the Framers intended something specific by
the term ‘the Recess,’ and that it was something different than a generic break in proceedings”). The Third Circuit concluded that “recess must mean something narrower
than any break that follows an adjournment,” but that “what this narrower definition is
cannot be derived from the dichotomy between adjournment and recess alone.” NLRB v.
New Vista Nursing and Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 233 (3d Cir. 2013).
See infra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
Id. at art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
Id. at art. II, § 3.
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Finally, Rappaport notes that the Framers abandoned English par148
liamentary usage of the terms “adjournment” and “prorogation.”
This abandonment gives rise to the question whether, when the
Framers eschewed distinctions between types of adjournments, they
also left behind distinctions between types of recesses (if they believed any existed in the first place). To the extent that the Framers
thought about the concept of prorogation, we have evidence that
they were concerned about whether and when the President could
149
adjourn the Congress, and they supplied that power only when the
150
In contrast,
House and Senate could not agree when to adjourn.
we have no evidence that the Framers were concerned with distinctions between types of recesses. Rappaport states that, having adopted a broad use of “adjournment” to refer to all breaks, the Framers
“needed” a new way to refer to inter-session breaks, for which they
151
chose the word “recess.” But it is Rappaport, not the Framers, who
needs this distinction, to support a narrow, technical reading of “recess.” If the Framers wished to draw distinctions between recesses
similar to those that existed in England, then the most obvious course
of action would have been to adopt (or at least adapt) English parliamentary usage, not abandon it in favor of new, more confusing usage.

147

148
149
150

151

Not only is this nominalization point apparent on the face of the Constitution’s text; the
Eleventh Circuit made a similar point in 2004. See Evans v. Stevens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1225
(11th Cir. 2004) (“Instead of describing a block of time, the term ‘Adjournment’ in the
Constitution can be read to signify a parliamentary action: Congress’s taking or having
taken a break.”). So did Hartnett in 2005. See Hartnett, supra note 30, at 422 (explaining
that “‘adjourn’ or ‘adjournment’ is used in the Constitution to refer to the parliamentary
action of choosing to take a break, with ‘recess’ used to refer to the resulting break”).
Evans also noted that Supreme Court usage in the 1938 Pocket-Veto case, Wright v. United
States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938), would require a reading opposite that of the technical position on the Recess Appointments Clause—that “adjournment” refer only to inter-session
breaks and “recess” to intra-session breaks. See Evans, 387 F.3d at 1225 (“We note, however, that even if the Wright Court’s usage of ‘Adjournment’ and ‘Recess’ were directly applicable here, their usage would suggest that the term ‘Adjournment’ is the formal break
occurring at the end of a Session and that a ‘Recess’ is something that can and does occur
during a Session. This usage by the Supreme Court tends to support our accepting the
President’s interpretation that a ‘Recess’ includes a break during a Session.”)
Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1551.
See supra notes 33–34.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing that “in Case of Disagreement between them [the
House and the Senate], with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them
to such Time as he shall think proper”).
Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1551 n.198 (“Having abandoned the term ‘prorogation’ and
using a broader meaning of ‘adjournment,’ the Framers needed a term to refer to breaks
between the sessions—for which, I argue, they used ‘recess.’”).
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C. Purpose
Given the want of textual evidence for the technical position, its
proponents rely heavily on arguments about the Framers’ original
purpose in adopting the Recess Appointments Clause, or their expec152
This section reviews the evidence
tations for how it would apply.
and analysis on those questions.
1. The Duration of Recess Appointments
Proponents of the technical position also argue that the relative
length of different recess appointments supports their view. The Recess Appointments Clause specifies that appointments “shall expire at
153
Supporters of the techthe End of [the Senate’s] next Session.”
nical position point out that an intra-session recess appointment
would last through the end of the current official Senate session and
the following Senate session, which they deem an “implausible” ar154
Similarly, Rappaport writes that intra-session recess
rangement.
appointments “could be considerably longer” than inter-session recess appointments, and reasons, “[b]ecause there is no reason why
the Framers would have desired this result, this suggests that they did
155
not intend the intrasession interpretation.”
This reasoning is flawed. If we assume that formal sessions are
roughly one year in length, then the average intra-session recess appointment is eighteen months (from mid-way through one year to
the end of the next formal session) and the average inter-session appointment twelve months (a full formal session). A six-month difference between appointment terms is not very significant; either length
is far shorter than the tenure of a typical confirmed nominee, particularly in the case of judges, who enjoy life tenure. There is no reason
to assume the Framers even noticed, much less sought to prevent,
such a minor difference in duration of appointments. And it is
abundantly possible that they would have preferred the longer of the
two terms, particularly when one considers the tradeoffs involved.
Prohibiting intra-session appointments would sharply limit the use152
153
154

155

See Herz, supra note 32, at 447–48, 456–57 (noting that arguments for and against intrasession recess appointments rely heavily on considerations of purpose).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 30–31 (“If ‘Recess’ instead meant any break in legislative business, a recess appointment would last from the date of the appointment,
through the end of the current session, through the intersession recess, and through the
entire subsequent session. This arrangement is implausible.”).
Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1567.
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fulness of the Recess Appointments Clause by leaving the President
unable to make key appointments when it is desirable to do so,
thereby undercutting the Clause’s purpose, in exchange for the small
benefit of reducing the term of the average appointee by six months.
Conversely, permitting intra-session recess appointments would advance the Clause’s purpose—to allow the President to fill important
posts so that the government can function properly and to allow senators to spend more uninterrupted time in the states—at the low
price of accepting appointments that would last six months longer on
average. It is not obvious why someone who would choose to adopt
the Clause in the first place would limit it so sharply for so little benefit.
A second problem with the reasoning on duration of appointments is that it assumes part of the conclusion. It assumes that “session” means an official session of Congress. If the word is used in a
general sense—with “next session” meaning something like “next
Senate work period”—then the technical point on duration evaporates. All appointments would be bounded in the same manner, lasting until the end of the Senate’s next work period, and they would be
far shorter than the inter-session appointments envisioned by the
technical position. This reading is textually plausible, given that it
employs the ordinary meaning of “session.” It is also plausible as a
matter of policy. It would have been reasonable for the Framers to
anticipate that the Senate would readily confirm most recess appointees and that a relatively brief work period would be plenty of time to
do so. As Hartnett has noted, the time from nomination to confirmation “frequently used to be measured in days, even for Supreme
156
Finally, the technical point also disappears if one
Court justices.”
combines the ordinary reading of “recess” with the Rules of Proceedings Clause. If one accepts that the Senate can define its own recesses
and sessions, then third parties need not fiddle with the meanings of
those terms to protect the Senate.
2. Line-Drawing and Judicial Administrability
Another policy consideration driving the “inter-session” position is
157
Rapa concern about line-drawing or “judicial administrability.”
paport argues:
156
157

Hartnett, supra note 30, at 425.
Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 33 (“Under this approach, there is no clear way to
distinguish between legislative breaks that are long enough to count as recesses and those
that are not.”); see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d 490, 504 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (reject-
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It seems plausible, in ordinary language, to use “recess” to mean a break
in legislative business of a substantial degree, excluding very short interruptions as not really amounting to a recess. One significant problem
with this understanding . . . is that there is no clear way to distinguish between legislative breaks that are long enough to count as recesses and
those that are not. The extreme vagueness of this interpretation makes it
unlikely that the Framers would have employed this concept of a “not158
too-short” break in the legislative proceedings.

This position appears to have been first suggested by Attorney Gen159
eral Knox in 1901. One response, drawing exclusively on the Constitution’s text, is that the purported problem is resolved by taking
account of the Rules of Proceedings Clause. Under that Clause,
there is no line-drawing problem because the Senate can define its
own recesses, or draw its own lines, so to speak.
Setting aside the Rules of Proceedings Clause, there are three remaining problems. First is the lack of evidence that line-drawing
concerns motivated the drafters. The Clause’s text, read naturally,
suggests the opposite, as it employs the general terms “recess” and
“session” without providing any limitation, caveat, or special definition. One might propose a general presumption that the Framers
sought to draw bright lines and in turn apply that presumption to our
reading of the Recess Appointments Clause in particular. The
originalist brief suggests this position, but in support it cites only a
160
single 1989 law review. The relevant passage from that article suggests that the Framers generally preferred clarity to a lack of clarity
and explains that anti-Federalists and Federalists debated whether the
161
completed document was vague or precise. For this reason, the article cuts against the technical position as much as in its favor. It reminds us that James Madison, one of the most influential Framers,

158
159

160

161

ing the “functional approach” to interpreting the Recess Appointments Clause for being
too vague and “flimsy”); Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1555 (rejecting an argument for creating a strict time length to constitute a recess).
Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1553; see also Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 504 (“Some undefined
but substantial number of days-break is not a plausible interpretation of ‘the Recess.’”).
See 23 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 99, at 603 (“If a temporary appointment could in this
case be legally made during the current adjournment as a recess appointment, I see no
reason why such an appointment should not be made during any adjournment, as from
Thursday or Friday until the following Monday.”).
See Originalist Brief, supra note 122, at 33 (“The extreme vagueness of the ‘practical unavailability’ interpretation makes it unlikely that the Framers would have employed it.” (citing Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 239, 306–09 (1989))).
See Hamburger, supra note 160, at 306 (“[T]he framers and ratifiers appear to have assumed that they should try to avoid vagueness or imprecision in the Constitution.”).
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thought precision was impossible in legal drafting162 and believed that
“the ‘exposition of the Constitution’ would be a ‘copious source’ of
difficulties ‘until its meaning on all great points shall have been set163
tled by precedents.’” Despite their awareness of the difficulties inherent in drafting and interpreting texts, the Framers nonetheless
used general terms like “recess” and “session” rather than more precise constructions. Perhaps they knew exactly what they were doing
in choosing those words.
The propriety of a more general “bright-lines” presumption is also
doubtful. Line-drawing questions are endemic to legal analysis and
particularly common in constitutional decisionmaking. It is widely
accepted that the Framers sought to draft a constitution to “endure
164
That goal is not compatible with a practice of
for ages to come.”
drawing bright lines wherever possible. It is more compatible with a
practice of drawing standards in plain terms wherever possible, in the
165
Inexpectation that they will prove more flexible and workable.
deed, general, abstract usage is more common than not in the Constitution, which is why the document contains few anachronisms like
166
the twenty-dollar trigger for civil jury trials. The document reflects
precisely what one would expect from sensible drafters: the use of
specific, bright-line rules only where they seem especially warrant167
ed.
A second problem is that the “inter-session” position is a poor fit
for the purposes it ascribes to the Framers. If the Framers were so
troubled by recess appointments, despite feeling the need to establish
162

163
164
165

166

167

See id. at 309 (“Madison argued in the middle of his Lockean analysis of imprecision that
obscure points in the Constitution would be resolved and made certain by caselaw: ‘All
new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and
most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until
their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and ad
adjudications.’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison))).
Hamburger, supra note 160, at 309 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston (June 21, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 250 (1979)).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 137 (recommending that, on general principle, constitutional drafters “insert essential principles
only, lest the operations of government should be clogged by rendering those provisions
permanent and unalterable” and “use simple and precise language, and general propositions”).
Cf. Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 406
(2013) (“The United States is relatively fortunate that the drafters of the Constitution
tended to frame the rules somewhat abstractly, such that the Third Amendment is the exception rather than the rule.”).
Cf. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 69–70
(2011) (“Were a constitution too specific, its original meaning probably would become
outdated very quickly.”).
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the authority, then it makes little sense for them to have permitted all
inter-session recess appointments regardless of when they arise during a recess. Some might arise just before the Senate is scheduled to
return from an inter-session recess. The “inter-session” position
would permit an appointment in this situation despite maintaining
168
that the Framers would have opposed it. A much more obvious approach would have been to limit recess appointments to situations in
which the Senate will be away for a long time.
Finally, the Framers might have had policy views wholly different
from those that the technical position ascribes to them. For example,
as suggested above, they may have expected (or desired) the Clause
to operate pragmatically, perhaps even flexibly, as befits the Clause’s
169
Yet despite the absence of evidence that the Framers
language.
were concerned about line-drawing in the Clause, the “inter-session”
position assumes that the concern was so weighty that the Framers let
it override the Clause’s core purpose. To constitutionalize any bright
line regarding what constitutes a “recess” would risk tying the Presi170
dent’s (and the Senate’s) hands at times, preventing appointments
when they would be useful to both branches—and in the national interest. Proponents of the technical view have not addressed the reasonable possibility that the Framers intended what is most consonant
with a plain reading of the text of the Recess Appointments Clause—
a pragmatic standard under which the President and Senate would be
bound not by hard rules, but by notions of reasonableness enforced
171
largely, if not entirely, through the political process.
3. The Length of Recesses
Rappaport also argues that it would have been sensible for the
Framers to limit the unilateral appointment power to very long recesses, using this point to support the notion that “recess” must have
172
meant “inter-session recess.” Many of this argument’s problems are
similar to those regarding the line-drawing point. One is that we
168
169
170

171
172

Rappaport himself seems to think it would be “absurd” to permit recess appointments
during a recess as short as two weeks. See infra text accompanying note 173.
See supra text accompanying notes 82–84.
A rigid construction of the Recess Appointments Clause would not only bar the President
from making recess appointments at times, but also the Senate from enabling them when
it wishes to do so. See supra text accompanying notes 81–82.
See supra text accompanying notes 82–84.
See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1562–67 (discussing the Framers’ ideas about lengths of
recesses); id. at 1563–64 (“Thus, by limiting the Recess Appointments Clause to intersession recesses, the Framers would have restricted recess appointments to long recesses,
without imposing an arbitrary time limit on the length of recesses.”).
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have no direct evidence of the Framers’ policy views. Here, more
than anywhere else, Rappaport appears to fill the vacuum with his
own. He believes it is “extremely unlikely” and “seems absurd to imagine” that the Framers would have permitted presidential appoint173
In his view,
ments during recesses lasting only one or two weeks.
174
These assertions
“[e]ven one-month recesses seem too short.”
themselves might strike the reader as implausible given the historical
evidence: ratification-era state constitutions used “recess” to trigger
175
powers that one wants the executive to have in an emergency; state
legislatures in the ratification era sometimes took “inter-session” re176
cesses as short as one month in length, if not shorter; and every attorney general to have considered the question has concluded that
the minimum duration of appointment-enabling recesses ranges be177
tween three days and roughly two weeks.
Moreover, as Hartnett has pointed out, the entire session of a
178
court in the ratification era sometimes lasted only one or two weeks.
It is difficult to maintain that the Framers would have been “absurd”
to give the President power to supply judges for courts before their
sessions come and go. Rappaport responds to this evidence in two
ways. First, he argues that, even though we can (and presumably the
Framers could) imagine benefits to enabling appointments during

173
174
175
176

177

178

Id. at 1562.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 51–64.
See, e.g., 47 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1770–1771,
supra note 77, at vii (reporting that one session ended on June 25 and the next began on
July 25). It is possible that a thorough search would reveal even shorter inter-session recesses. This author happened upon this example of a one-month recess (and others)
without even attempting an exhaustive search.
As discussed above, Attorney General Knox wrote the first opinion squarely addressing
the validity of intra-session recesses in 1901. 23 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 99. Because he
rejected intra-session recesses, he did not squarely engage the question of the minimum
length of a recess, although his opinion does suggest that he thought the Clause should
not permit a recess appointment over a weekend. See id. at 603 (stating disapprovingly
that “[i]f a temporary appointment could in this case be legally made during the current
adjournment as a recess appointment, I see no reason why such an appointment should
not be made during any adjournment, as from Thursday or Friday until the following
Monday”). In the earliest opinion to address that question, from 1921, Attorney General
Harry Daugherty concluded that a break must be somewhere over ten days in length but
could not be determined with precision, as the word recess “must be given a practical
construction.” 33 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 110, at 25. More recent views have been
eighteen days, twelve days, ten days, just three days, or possibly no minimum length. See
Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1548–49 (discussing the various Presidents who made recess
appointments during these lengths of time).
See Hartnett, supra note 30, at 416 n.172 (“At the founding, however, an entire term of a
court might come and go within a week or two.”).
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relatively short recesses, the drawbacks would still be too great.179 He
does not offer evidence that the Framers analyzed these tradeoffs or
that they agreed with his assessment of the costs and benefits. Rappaport’s second response is to point out that Senate confirmations
would sometimes take more than two weeks and to argue, therefore,
that it would not have made sense to permit the President to act
180
But as Rappaport notes elsemore quickly on a unilateral basis.
181
where, the Senate could confirm nominees quickly when necessary.
In fact, in the early years of the republic, the Senate commonly held
182
single-day special sessions to consider nominations. It is difficult to
maintain that the Framers would have been “absurd” to let the President fill vacancies with similar speed in the Senate’s absence.
What appears to drive the inter-session position, as Rappaport’s
discussion of “costs” suggests, is a concern that the President might
183
We have no evidence
subvert the ordinary nomination process.
that the Framers shared this concern, much less shared it to a degree
184
that would justify severe restrictions on the Clause, and one might
179

180

181
182
183

184

See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1562 n.226 (“The question, though, is not whether one
can imagine circumstances when it might be convenient for a recess appointment to be
made during a short recess. . . . Rather, the question is whether the Framers would have
wanted the President to have the power to make recess appointments during all brief recesses, even though filling vacancies during these short recesses would generally not be
critical. The answer to that question remains clear no.”).
See id. (“It is hard to believe that the Framers would have wanted to take the extraordinary
step of bypassing the Senate for a recess of a week or two, when a considerably longer period often would be needed to make either a recess appointment or an advice and consent appointment.”)
See id. at 1511–12 (arguing that the President and Senate can quickly nominate and confirm appointees to fill late-session vacancies).
For example, the Second, Third, and Fifth Senates held one-day sessions of this type. See
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 10, at 522 (providing the dates of these sessions).
See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1491 (summarizing that contrary views “would allow recess
appointments during recesses that seem far too brief to justify bypassing the Senate’s constitutionally mandated role”); id. (“If the original meaning were followed . . . the President could only make recess appointments during the single annual intersession recess
and only for vacancies that arose during that recess. This would make it extremely difficult for the President to use his recess appointment power as a means of appointing individuals who could not secure the consent of the Senate.”); id. at 1494 (stating that “perhaps the biggest interpretive error concerning the Recess Appointments Clause has been
the view that its sole purpose is to fill vacant offices, rather than to fill such offices while
preventing the President from too easily circumventing the Senate’s confirmation role”);
id. at 1499–1500 & n.34 (deeming the Clause “striking” in how far it departs from the ordinary appointment method and asserting that “the significance of the recess appointment power conferred by the Framers is a strong reason for construing the Clause to apply only in narrow circumstances”).
The closest Rappaport comes to attempting to substantiate the notion that the Framers’
shared his concern is when he advocates reading the purpose of the Appointments
Clause into the Recess Appointments Clause. Id. at 1494 (“[T]he Framers’ decision to
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reasonably conclude that history has shown the concern to be overstated. Presidential administrations have held since 1921 that the
185
Apparently
President can make intra-session recess appointments.
no majority of senators has ever objected to this view, and no President has “easily circumvented” the Senate’s advice and consent, to
186
use Rappaport’s phrase. This is particularly true if the Senate’s role
is conceived as requiring majority rather than supermajority con187
sent.
A final problem with the absurdity argument regarding the length
of recesses is it presents a false choice between long and short breaks.
The Framers could have preferred another design entirely. They
might have thought it best to grant the Senate power to define its
own recesses (and sessions), as the Rules of Proceedings Clause directs. That approach would quiet concerns about subversion of the
Senate without constitutionalizing a rigid rule that could yield undesirable or arbitrary results. Alternatively, the Framers might have
thought it best to establish a pragmatic regime in which the Constitution defines the recess appointment power in broad, even vague,
terms and leaves it to the Senate and the President to negotiate the
meaning over time, constrained by the political process.
4. The Framers’ Expectations
a. The Inter-session-Expectations Narrative
One argument that Rappaport does not state explicitly, but that
one gathers impressionistically from his analysis, is that “recess” signi-

185
186
187

employ the Appointments Clause, I will argue, helps to illuminate their purposes in enacting the Recess Appointments Clause.”). Rappaport argues that we should read the
unilateral appointment power in the Recess Appointments Clause narrowly because it
cuts against the Framers’ baseline design of joint power. In light of the baseline, he reasons, it is “hard to believe” that the Framers would have designed a “broad recess appointment power” that would allow the President “to easily circumvent” the Senate. Id. at
1507. But the purpose of an exception is to cut against the rule from which it departs.
There is no basis for a general rule that all exceptions should be construed narrowly, and
Rappaport provides no special reason—certainly not one attributable to the Framers—to
adopt such a rule when reading the Recess Appointments Clause. The only Framer he
cites who holds that view is Edmund Randolph. Id. at 1518–19 (discussing Randolph’s interpretation). But Randolph opposed the presidential appointment power and the Recess Appointments Clause and wanted to see them removed from the Constitution. See
infra text accompanying notes 266–67. His views on the Clause can hardly be taken as
representative of general opinion.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1507.
See infra text accompanying notes 350–58.
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fies “inter-session recess” in part because that is simply what the
Framers had in mind—or perhaps was the only type of recess they
188
We can call this the “inter-sessioncould have anticipated.
expectations” narrative. It may be the most intuitively appealing
point in favor of the technical position. The basic idea is that the
Framers would have thought “recess” referred to long, inter-session
recesses because at the time, legislatures typically held a single session
189
annually, followed by a long break. One reason was the difficulty of
eighteenth-century travel and communication over long distances,
which made it unlikely that Congress would choose to hold multiple
190
Another was a prevailing theory of
work periods in a given year.
republican governance, which held that representatives should spend
191
a significant portion of their time at home.
One problem with this narrative is that, even if we assume that the
Framers thought Congress would choose not to take multiple breaks in
192
a year—which is only an unsubstantiated guess —that is a far cry
from prohibiting it from doing so, or from writing rigid constitutional
rules that function properly only if Congress conforms to expectations. Moreover, reading the text in accordance with the intersession-expectations narrative would have the strange result of actually frustrating the Framers’ presumed goals. Rappaport argues that
the Framers expected Congress to hold one session annually and take
193
one long recess between sessions. He also argues that the Framers
wanted (or should have wanted) to limit recess appointments to long
recesses, and that the sensible way to accomplish that goal would be
194
to limit the power to inter-session recesses. From these points, he
anomalously concludes that the Clause should be read to permit all
188
189
190

191

192

193
194

Rappaport does not state this claim explicitly, and it is possible that he does not support
it. This Article’s discussion is directed at the position that it outlines and no more.
See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1498, 1563 (“When the Constitution was written, intersession recesses regularly lasted between six and nine months.”).
See, e.g., id. at 1498, 1564 (noting that early America was “a large nation during an age of
slow transport” and that transportation costs were high and “distances would increase as
the country grew,” which “meant that Congress would meet for one relatively short session per year followed by one long recess”).
See id. at 1564 (“[T]he republican political theory held during the early years of the Republic required that legislatures remain in session only for a fraction of the year, thereby
allowing the legislators to return to their homes and behave like ordinary citizens.”).
Rappaport’s sole evidence on the point is not from the Framers themselves, but rather a
1924 text. See id. at 1563–64 nn.228, 230 (citing and quoting Robert Luce, LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLIES 154 (1924), for the proposition that, “concerning state legislatures, ‘[i]n colonial times and indeed up to the development of our railroad systems, the slowness of
travel made any but periodical gatherings out of the question’”).
See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1563–64.
Id.
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inter-session recesses and to bar all intra-session recesses, regardless of
their lengths. In other words, he retains the inter-session element and
discards duration as a factor—abandoning not just part of what he
deems the original expectation behind “recess,” but the more significant part. He might respond that the Framers thought “inter-session”
195
was synonymous with “long” and therefore the “inter-session” view
conforms to theirs. But in modern times, we know that intra-session
recesses are often longer than inter-session recesses. In other words,
if the Framers held the views that the technical position ascribes to
them, then they are fortunate not to have written the word “intersession” into the Recess Appointments Clause. Why, then, should we
pencil it in?
This tangled web of counterfactual reasoning is one reason why
originalists and nonoriginalists alike criticize the approach of reasoning from the Framers expectations. When one attempts to discern
them, particularly in the absence of good evidence, one is engaging
in a fundamentally creative, counter-factual enterprise, and it is difficult to avoid projecting one’s own knowledge and viewpoints onto
196
the past. Indeed, one reason the inter-session-expectations point is
enticing is that it accords with our knowledge of certain historical
facts. Early Congresses did, in fact, typically take multi-month intersession recesses, although they sometimes took more than one in a
197
single year. They rarely took intra-session recesses at all and, when
198
they did, those recesses were roughly one week in length. But the
fact that we know early Congresses followed a certain pattern does
not establish that the Framers predicted the same events. The evidence on that point is much more equivocal. Alexander Hamilton
predicted that the House and Senate would each meet once annually

195
196

197
198

See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1562–66 (arguing that “the Framers took the length of
recesses into account indirectly”).
See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 574–75 (2008) (arguing that “the expectations of the framers” and “the public meaning of the text” in early America cannot be known); Thomas B.
Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 729–30 & n.96 (2009) (discussing criticisms of the original meanings approach to interpreting the Constitution and citing Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Clichés, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 493, 504 (2008)). As Rappaport notes in the context of an unrelated argument, “our world is completely different
than the Framers’ world.” Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1512 n.70.
See CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 10, at 522–23 (recording one-week recesses in
1800, 1817, and 1828).
See Id.
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for three months and four to six months, respectively,199 and some of
the delegates to the Constitutional Convention were concerned that
the Congress might not even meet once each year unless required to
200
But other delegates expressed concern that the Senate
do so.
201
would stay in session most of the time, and some favored frequent
202
meetings of Congress. Among those who expected the Senate to be
203
“almost continually sitting,” it can hardly be said that “recess” must
have meant “long, inter-session recess.” Of course, one also should
not forget the extensive evidence from dictionaries and ratification204
era usage examples that contradict the “inter-session” view. It is difficult to justify the assumption that “recess” meant something like
“long, inter-session recess” to the Framers when our records of their
correspondence suggest otherwise.
Moreover, we know little to nothing of how the Framers expected
Congress to define its sessions, further complicating the notion that
they had a certain type of “inter-session” recess in mind. Jefferson’s
Manual reasons its way to a basis for how the Senate should define its
205
sessions as if the matter remained unsettled in 1801. As discussed
above, states followed different practices in the ratification era. For
example, while New Jersey enumerated its sessions by year and used
199

200

201

202

203
204
205

THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Hence it is evident that a portion of the
year will suffice for the session of both the Senate and the House of Representatives; we
may suppose about a fourth for the latter and a third, or perhaps half, for the former.”).
See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 200 (noting
that the requirement that Congress meet once a year was added because “that point
seems not to be freed from doubt”).
Id., at 175; id. at 230; id. at 431; LUTHER MARTIN, GENUINE INFORMATION, in 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 255, 271; 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 444. James Wilson
seems to have had mixed views. Compare id. at 523 (reporting Wilson’s view that “[t]he
Senate, will moreover in all probability be in constant Session”), with 2 ELLIOT, supra note
48, at 513 (reporting Wilson as saying, “I apprehend that . . . it will not be found necessary for the Senate always to sit. I know some gentlemen have insinuated and conjectured
that this will be the case; but I am inclined to a contrary opinion”).
See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 199 (“Mr.
Sherman was decided for fixing the time, as well as for frequent meetings of the Legislative body.”).
GEORGE MASON, OBJECTIONS TO THIS CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT, in 2 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 638.
See supra Part I.A–B.
See JEFFERSON, supra note 68, at 96 (discussing motions to adjourn). This is not to say that
the Senate had not settled into a practice, but rather that the basis or propriety of the
practice might still have been unclear, which in turn suggests that the eventual practice
might have been difficult to predict years earlier. Alternatively, the opposite could be
true. Perhaps Congress was just doing what everyone expected. Under that view, Thomas Jefferson’s posture of working toward a legal explanation in the Manual is just that—
posturing.
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the word “sitting” to refer to individual work periods during a year,
206
Observers
Massachusetts labeled each sitting a separate “session.”
following the technical definition of “recess,” then, would call the
same type of break an “intra-session” recess in New Jersey and an “inter-session” recess in Massachusetts. How could the Framers have
known which convention the U.S. Senate would adopt? Imagine
some of them expected Congress to follow the Massachusetts model.
In that case, the “inter-session” view actually defeats their intent. This
discussion illustrates that if the Framers wished to constitutionalize a
certain type of recess, one would expect them to have defined it more
clearly, and possibly sketched a concept of the session as well. Of
course, if they thought about the issue long enough to perceive these
definitional needs, then they also would have been reasonable to eschew strict definitions altogether and leave the details to future polit207
ical actors.
b. A Counter-narrative: Military Responsiveness
One notable aspect of the inter-session-expectations view is its lack
of context. It isolates a single point about what the Framers might
have thought, from which it builds out a view on the Clause’s whole
purpose. What might we see if we were to widen the inquiry at the
starting point? Other possible narratives come into view, including
one that counsels in favor of an ordinary reading of “recess” and a
liberal reading of the Clause more generally.
It is common that the Constitution was born out of the failures of
the Articles of Confederation. The federation lacked a central power
adequate to respond to many of the problems that its member states
faced, including existential threats posed by foreign powers and domestic unrest alike. Developments like Shays’ Rebellion, which began on August 29, 1786, are credited with bringing recalcitrant
members like the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and others back
208
to the drafting table. During that episode, Massachusetts Governor

206
207

208

See supra text accompanying notes 76–77.
Cf. Balkin, supra note 24, at 76 (“We should ask whether it makes sense for us to ascribe to
the adopters the purpose of delegating a particular issue to be worked out in the future,
even though the adopters might have had application beliefs about the issue in question. If
it does not make sense to ascribe a purpose to delegate a question to the future, then we
should infer that this content is part of the framework.”).
See DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYS’ REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN INSURRECTION
120–31 (1980) (discussing the fact that the Rebellion showed that the states were weak as
individuals and some early Americans’ arguments for a more unified national government).
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James Bowdoin struggled for months to maintain order. When he
called on local militia to halt violent attacks on courthouses, many
209
Bowdoin appealed to
militiamen refused, siding with the rebels.
the Continental Congress, which responded by establishing a federal
army, but troop recruitment efforts foundered when every state but
210
Virginia refused to fund the force. After months of violence, mercantile elites in Massachusetts funded a private army to quell the un211
rest. During this period, the former colonies had also just completed a war of independence and faced threats from England, France,
and Spain.
This context helps us understand several interrelated provisions of
the document that emerged from the 1787 convention in Philadelphia, which began less than three months after Shays’ Rebellion was put
down. The Constitution makes the President the Commander in
212
Chief of the armed forces, provides the President authority to appoint “officers of the United States,” a category that includes military
213
officers, with the Senate’s advice and consent, as well as unilaterally
214
on a temporary basis when the Senate is away, and charges the federal government with protecting each state from domestic violence
215
upon its request.
Given the historical circumstances and the apparent motivations
of the drafters, it is implausible that these critical powers would turn
on accidents of Senate procedure. If an emergency arises that requires a federal response, and effective action requires the President
to fill vacant offices, then the Constitution provides a means to do so
regardless of the Senate’s availability. Under the technical position, it
is not hard to imagine the United States experiencing a major attack
to which the President cannot respond quickly and effectively because the Senate happens to be on an “intra-session” rather than “inter-session” recess. From the perspective of what we might call the
“military-responsiveness” narrative, forbidding presidential appointments during intra-session recesses would undermine some of the
Constitution’s core purposes and most important grants of federal
power.

209
210
211
212
213
214
215

See id. at 79–80.
See id. at 84 (discussing the failure of the attempt to create federal troops).
See id. at 82–86 (discussing the Massachusetts recruitment and how it was followed by similar recruitments in other states).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
Id. at art. IV, § 4.
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III. INITIAL EVIDENCE ON SESSION AND HAPPEN
Although this Article does not take strong positions on the meaning of “session” or “happen,” as it does not engage in thorough analysis of those questions. But it is worth sketching a preliminary view on
each. In short, the narrow readings of “session” and “happen” also
appear to have surprisingly little evidentiary support.
A. Session
The definition of “session” is relevant to the technical position on
“recess” because that view requires “session” to have two characteristics: it must be mutually exclusive with “recess,” and it must refer
216
solely to the formal (typically annual) sessions of Congress. A mere
finding that recesses and sessions were mutually exclusive would not
support the technical position because both words might be used in
their ordinary senses, with session referring to any sitting and recess
referring to any break in any sitting. And a mere finding that “session” refers only to formal sessions would not suffice because recesses
might be taken during sessions. That is, of course, the central question regarding the propriety of intra-session recess appointments.
Indeed, one extraordinary oversight by some who hold the technical
position, including the D.C. Circuit, is that they assume that “session”
refers to formal sessions of Congress—thereby assuming away half the
217
This Article does not conduct a comprehensive inquiry
question.
into “session,” but the initial evidence contradicts both of the technical position’s requirements. It is unclear whether “session” in the
Recess Appointments Clause contemplates only formal sessions or
means something like what the contemporary senators call a “work
period,” any period of legislative business between breaks of a week
218
or more. Either is plausible—if anything the “work period” definition appears more likely, as it tracks ratification-era state legislative
216

217

218

See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1550 (“The intersession interpretation . . . reads the
term ’recess’ to mean a period when Congress is not in session. Under this view, a recess
is not just any break in the business of the legislature, but only a break that occurs when
the legislature is out of session.”); Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1487 (“The Article maintains that the Constitution permits recess appointments only during an intersession recess—the recess between two sessions of a Congress—and does not allow such appointments during an intrasession recess—the typically shorter recess taken during a
session.”).
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d 490, 500 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (asserting without citing any
authority that “[i]t is universally accepted that “Session” here refers to the usually two or
sometimes three sessions per Congress”).
See infra text accompanying notes 361–63.
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practices219—and neither would imply that the word “recess” must
220
have a narrow, technical meaning.
Evidence from dictionaries strongly suggests that the word session,
like recess, had an ordinary, broad meaning. Johnson’s dictionaries
define “session” in relevant part as “the space for which an assembly
221
(The dictionary defines
sits, without intermission or recess.”
222
“space” in part as a “[q]uantity of time.” ) Johnson’s makes no mention of a technical notion of “session” that would refer only to an official period of a legislative body. To the contrary, by stating that a session is a sitting without a break of any kind, the dictionary implies the
opposite. Formal sessions are usually (if not always) too long to operate without breaks of any kind.
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) supplies a technical definition
of “session,” but only as a special usage of its third definition of the
word. The OED leads with a rare usage, “[t]he action or act of sit223
ting,” then provides the ordinary, general meaning of “session” as
applied to legislative bodies: “[t]he sitting together of a number of
persons (esp. of a court, a legislative, administrative, or deliberative
224
body) for conference or the transaction of business.” Notably, the
OED states that, in the past, this sense of “session” commonly referred
225
to a single, continuous sitting —a definition that undermines the
technical position on “recess.” If “session” means a single, continuous sitting, and “recess” is defined a time when the body is not in
226
“session” (which is the technical position) then “recess” must refer
to any legislative break—any break in a single, continuous sitting, not
just breaks between official sessions.
219
220

221
222
223
224

225
226

See infra text accompanying notes 361–66.
One problem for the technical position is the implausibility of the Framers restricting the
Senate’s ability to define its own sessions, in direct contravention of the Rules of Proceedings Clause, not to mention doing so obliquely, with general terms in Article II rather
than a clear statement in Article I. This point is made above in the discussion of the
Rules of Proceedings Clause. There is no need to repeat it here.
2 JOHNSON 1755, supra note 19, at 1797; 2 JOHNSON 1785, supra note 19, at 608.
2 JOHNSON 1785, supra note 19, at 696.
OED, supra note 53.
Id. (“The sitting together of a number of persons (esp. of a court, a legislative, administrative, or deliberative body) for conference or the transaction of business. Also (now
somewhat rarely), a single continuous sitting of persons assembled for conference or
business.”).
Id.
See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1550 (“The intersession interpretation, by contrast,
reads the term ‘recess’ to mean a period when Congress is not in session. Under this
view, a recess is not just any break in the business of the legislature, but only a break that
occurs when the legislature is out of session. This position views a recess as mutually exclusive with the legislative session.”).
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Third, the OED supplies a narrower definition: “[a] continuous
series of sittings or meetings . . . held daily or at short intervals; the
period or term during which the sittings continue to be held; op227
This definition still falls short of the
posed to recess or vacation.”
technical position on “session,” as it corresponds not only to official
sessions, but also to other periods of business that are bounded by
significant breaks. In the contemporary Senate, this concept—a period of legislative business between Senate breaks of one or more
228
weeks—is sometimes also referred to as a “work period.” It is here
that the OED finally supplies a meaning of session like that maintained by the technical position, identifying it as a specific, English
parliamentary usage: “[i]n English parliamentary use, applied to the
229
period between the opening of Parliament and its prorogation.”
One might argue that this definition may be precisely what the Framers intended to invoke, despite that it is a specialized meaning. But
that point would be difficult to establish. As the OED explains, even
in the specialized context of English parliament, the word is sometimes used—or misused—more broadly to refer to other legislative
periods:
The term autumn session (instead of ‘autumn sitting’) is sometimes used
to designate the exceptional resumption of the sittings of the Houses, after an adjournment, in what is normally the autumn recess; but this use is
230
condemned by parliamentary authorities as incorrect.

In sum, the evidence from dictionaries confirms the prevalence of
the ordinary meaning of session and casts doubt on the technical po231
sition.
227
228

229
230
231

OED, supra note 53 (emphasis in original).
See infra text accompanying notes 362–63. The Senate Rules use “session” not only to refer to formal, usually annual sessions, but also other periods such as “daily sessions.”
MCGOWAN, supra note 45, at 4 (printing of Rule IV, which governs the “Commencement
of Daily Sessions”). The Senate Rules also refer to open session, closed session, and Executive Session. See, e.g., id. at 1 (referring to an “open session”); id. at 20 (discussing what
happens “when the Senate meets in closed session”); id. at 55 (printing of Rule XXIX
which pertains to “Executive Sessions”).
OED, supra note53.
Id.
Note that Johnson’s definition of “session” refers to an “intermission or recess,” suggesting that those two terms might refer to distinct concepts. Johnson’s 1755 Dictionary defines “intermission” in relevant part as “[c]essation for a time; pause; intermediate stop.”
1 JOHNSON 1755, supra note 19, at 1114. One can infer then, that “intermission” in the
context of legislative business might have referred to an exceedingly short break, such as
a lunch break. This inference does not help establish whether “recess” is used in an ordinary or technical sense in the Constitution, but it suggests an answer to the most common criticism of the ordinary reading of recess, which is that the Framers cannot have intended a broad meaning because it would embrace any break, even a lunch break.
Perhaps such breaks were more commonly known as “intermissions” than “recesses.”
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Aside from the dictionary evidence on “session,” this Article has
already noted that the Constitution appears to distinguish between a
232
It has
“session of Congress” and a session of an individual house.
also noted the existence of variation in state practice for enumerating
“sessions:” some state legislatures used a practice like the modern
Senate’s, in which sessions are enumerated annually; others named
each sitting a separate “session” regardless of how many they held in
233
This usage strongly suggests that “session” in the
any given year.
Constitution does not have a fixed, narrow, and technical meaning
referring only to the formal, typically annual, sessions of Congress.
Rather, the word either refers to any legislative break or something
234
akin to what the modern Senate calls the “work period.” It might
seem odd that the term of a recess appointee could expire at the end
of the Senate’s next work period. But if one recalls that the Senate is
235
usually expected to confirm presidential nominees, then there is
nothing obviously wrong with such an arrangement.
Finally, Edward Hartnett has argued that the Constitution’s structure suggests that recesses and sessions are not mutually exclusive. In
his view, Congress can initiate recesses alone but needs the Presi236
dent’s assistance to initiate a new session. Because the Constitution
puts recess-initiation and session-initiation in separate hands, he reasons, “it must contemplate that [recesses and sessions] are not inher237
ently reciprocal.” Moreover, although Jefferson’s Manual uses “ses238
sion” to refer to formal sessions in multiple places, Jefferson cites
British Parliamentary sources for the proposition that the Senate may
end its current session and start a new one whenever it desires, to
239
His view accords with the point that
solve procedural problems.
sessions are malleable and not a fixed constitutional concept.

232
233
234
235
236

237
238
239

See supra text accompanying notes 41–46.
See supra text accompanying notes 76–77.
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 81–82.
See Hartnett, supra note 30, at 422–24 (“The two houses of Congress can control when
they are in recess by concurrent resolution, but they must act ‘by law’ to exercise control
over their sessions . . . that is, by presenting a bill to the President for signature or veto.”).
Id. at 424.
See, e.g., JEFFERSON, supra note 68, at 38 (“Standing committees . . . are usually appointed
at the first meeting, to continue through the session.”).
See, e.g., id. at 149 (“Or the session may be closed for one, two, three, or more days, and a
new one commenced.”).
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B. Happen
Having presented an affirmative case on “recess” and a comment
on “session,” it now makes sense to discuss the “happen” issue briefly
to generate a more full account of the Recess Appointments Clause.
The question regarding “happen” is whether a vacancy must arise
during a recess, or merely exist during it. Following Rappaport’s
lead, we can call these positions the “arise” view and the “exist”
240
view.
As with the word “recess,” our default position on “happen”
should be the term’s ordinary meaning. Initially, that meaning appears to be “occur” or “happen to arise,” as opposed to “happen to
exist.” That is the word’s modern meaning, and it was certainly a use
of the word in the ratification era as well. Johnson’s 1755 and 1785
dictionaries define the word primarily as “[t]o fall out; . . . to come to
241
pass.” OED’s first definition of “happen” is “[o]f an event, action,
etc.: to take place, to come to pass, occur . . . to ensue as an effect or
242
result.”
Further study would be required to be confident that the present
ordinary meaning of “happen” was the exclusive public meaning at
the time of the Constitution’s drafting and ratification. There is
strong evidence that “happen” might also have meant “exist.” The
243
OED’s third definition is “[t]o chance to be . . . .” It provides the following usage examples, some from or near the ratification era, which
are worth quoting extensively because the usage is so foreign to modern ears:
Scho..tald his Eyme that he was hapnyt thar. (1488)
244
He felt hym self happynnyt amyd his foyn. (1522)
The knots or kernels that happen in any part of the body. (1657)
It made a Jest for every body that went by; and wou’d have been apprehended by the very blind Cuckold himself, had he hapned in the way.
(1693)
Two other Officers..coming up to us, asked how we happened abroad so
245
late? (1755)
240
241
242
243
244

See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1502–03 (discussing the “arise” and “exist” interpretations
of the term “happen” in the Clause).
1 JOHNSON 1755, supra note 19, at 965; 1 JOHNSON 1785, supra note 19, at 929.
OED, supra note 53.
OED, supra note 53 (emphasis added).
This example is from the Aeneid and has also been translated as, “found himself amidst
his foes.” VIRGIL, THE AENEID, book IX (trans. John Dryden, 1697), available at
http://classics.mit.edu/Virgil/aeneid.mb.txt. When rephrased in something closer to
modern English, the OED example apparently would read, “he found himself happened
amidst his foes.”
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I once happened in Company with a very ingenious Gentleman. (1776)
Some young Americans happening at Toulon. (1806)

Although most ratification-era dictionaries provide definitions similar
246
247
to Johnson’s, one also provides the definition “to be.” In perhaps
the most persuasive example, Thomas Jefferson actually used the
word “happen” to mean exist in personal correspondence about va248
His usage is highly persuasive evidence because, unlike a
cancies.
direct opinion on the Clause, it is unlikely to have been strategic. It
probably reflects ordinary usage by one of the more articulate members of the framing generation.
In addition, Attorney General Wirt’s 1823 opinion approving the
“exist” interpretation provides stronger support for that view as a
matter of original meaning than has been recognized previously.
Most commentators focus on Wirt’s concession that the “most natural
249
sense” of “happen” is the arise view. But Wirt noted that “[i]t may
250
mean, also, without violence to the sense, ‘happen to exist.’” In other
words, although the “arise” reading was more natural, the “exist”
reading was also plausible as a textual matter. Wirt’s analysis comes
thirty-six years after the Constitution was adopted, and therefore it is
not the strongest evidence of ordinary meaning in 1787. But it is
consistent with the possibility that the Constitution used a nowarchaic meaning of “happen” that an 1823 reader could still recog251
nize—and some writers, such as Thomas Jefferson, still used —even
though it had already begun to sound less natural than the arise usage. The arise meaning was likely more common even in 1787, but

245

246

247

248

249
250
251

A fuller excerpt reads, “[o]rders were given that no Man should be out of his Quarters . . . . my Comrade Johnston and I were going home, we met on the Market-place the
Major, and two other Officers, who coming up to us, asked how we happened abroad so
late? I answered we were going home . . . .” THE MEMOIRS OF CAPT. PETER DRAKE 37
(1755), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=kl9DAAAAYAAJ.
See Natelson, supra note 55, at 227–28 (discussing “[a] survey of Founding-Era dictionaries” concerning the meaning of the word “happen” and finding that “‘happen’ more likely was used to mean ‘arise’”).
See id. at 228 (“The only arguably dissenting work was that by Thomas Dyche and William Pardon, which gave as a secondary definition . . . the phrase ‘to be.’” (quoting
THOMAS DYCHE & WILLIAM PARDON, A NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY 379 (16th ed.
1777))).
Cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Jan. 26, 1802), available at
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-36-02-0280 (“The phrase in the
constitution is ‘to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate.’
this may mean ‘vacancies that may happen to be’ or ‘may happen to fall.’ it is certainly
susceptible of both constructions . . . .”).
1 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 88, at 631–32.
Id. at 632 (emphasis added).
See supra note 248.
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that a meaning was more common does not mean that the Constitution adopted it.
Alexander Hamilton’s opinion is similar. He appears to endorse
the “arise” view, with the important qualification that he was not considering it directly, but rather addressing the question whether a new252
However, Hamilton
ly established office constitutes a “vacancy.”
characterizes his reading of “happen,” which involves casualty or falling out by chance, not as the exclusive meaning of the word, but only
253
Perhaps this is a rhetorical
its “most familiar and obvious sense.”
flourish rather than a genuine qualification. But perhaps it means
exactly what it implies: that “happen” also had other meanings.
Other evidence comes from appointment powers granted in state
constitutions. Among the ratification-era state constitutions that provide some kind of special appointment power, most, if not all, supply
254
For example, the
it without regard to when the vacancy arises.
South Carolina Constitutions of 1776 and 1778 state:

252

253
254

See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (May 3, 1799), available at
http://founders.archives.gov/?q=Date%3A1799-05-03&s=1111311111&r=2 (“In my opinion Vacancy is a relative term, and presupposes that the Office has been once filled. If so,
the power to fill the Vacancy is not the power to make an original appointment. The
phrase ‘Which may have happened’ serves to confirm this construction. It implies casualty—and denotes such Offices as having been once filled, have become vacant by accidental circumstances. This at least is the most familiar and obvious sense, and in a matter
of this kind it could not be adviseable to exercise a doubtful authority.”).
Id.
See DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 21 (“In case of vacancy of the offices above directed to be
filled by the president and general assembly, the president and privy council may appoint
others in their stead until there shall be a new election.”); PA. CONST. of 1776 pt. 2, § 20
(“The president . . . shall supply every vacancy in any office, occasioned by death, resignation, removal or disqualification, until the office can be filled in the time and manner directed by law or this constitution.”); S.C. CONST. of 1776 art. XXIV (“That in Case of Vacancy in any of the Offices above directed to be filled by the General Assembly and
legislative Council, the President and Commander in Chief with the advice and Consent
of the Privy Council, may appoint others in their stead, until there shall be an election by
the General Assembly and legislative Council to fill those vacancies respectively.”); S.C.
CONST. of 1778 art. XXXI (“That in case of vacancy in any of the offices above directed to
be filled by the senate and house of representatives, the governor and commander-inchief, with the advice and consent of the privy council, may appoint others in their stead,
until there shall be an election by the senate and house of representatives to fill those vacancies respectively.”); GA. CONST. of 1777 art. XXI (“The Governor, with the Advice of
the executive Council, shall fill up all intermediate Vacancies, that shall happen in Offices, till the next general Election . . . .”); VT. CONST. of 1777 ch. 2, § XVIII (“The Governor . . . shall supply every vacancy in any Office, occasioned by Death, Resignation, Removal, or Disqualification until the Office can be filled in the time and manner directed
by Law or this Constitution.”); VT. CONST. of 1786 ch. 2, § XI (“The Governor . . . shall
supply every vacancy in any office occasioned by death or otherwise, until the office can
be filled in the manner directed by law or this Constitution.”). Some of these documents
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That in Case of Vacancy in any of the Offices above directed to be filled
by the General Assembly and legislative Council, the President and
Commander in Chief, with the advice and Consent of the Privy Council,
may appoint others in their stead, until there shall be an election by the
General Assembly and legislative Council to fill those vacancies respec255
tively.

Likewise, the Delaware Constitution of 1776 states:
In case of vacancy of the offices above directed to be filled by the president and general assembly, the president and privy council may appoint
256
others in their stead until there shall be a new election.

The Georgia Constitution of 1777 is the only ratification-era state
constitution that uses the word “happen” when granting special appointment powers. It clearly adopts an “exist” view, and the word
“happen” would serve the same function in the provision regardless
of whether it means “arise” or “exist”:
The [g]overnor, with the [a]dvice of the executive [c]ouncil, shall fill up
all intermediate [v]acancies, that shall happen in [o]ffices, till the next
257
general [e]lection . . . .

This power apparently extends to positions for which the Georgia legislature otherwise has exclusive appointment authority, such as county
258
justices of the peace and registers of probate.
Two possible exceptions to the general “exist” rule are the North
259
Carolina and Maryland constitutions of 1776. The former is sometimes cited as evidencing the “arise” view of “happen” in the federal
260
Constitution. Like all but one of the state constitutions, the North

255
256
257
258

259

260

grant unilateral appointment power to the executive in all situations and therefore must
be discounted.
S.C. CONST. of 1776 art. XXIV; S.C. CONST. of 1778 art. XXXI.
DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 21.
GA. CONST. of 1777 art. XXI.
Id. at art. LIII (“All civil Officers in each County shall be annually elected, on the Day of
the general Election, except Justices of the Peace, and Registers of Probates, who shall be
appointed by the House of Assembly.”).
See MD. CONST. of 1776 pt. 2, art. XLI (“That there be a Register of Wills appointed for
each county who shall be commissioned by the Governor, on the joint recommendation
of the Senate and House of Delegates; anal that, upon the death, resignation, disqualification, or removal out of the county of any Register of Wills, in the recess of the General
Assembly the Governor, with the advice of the Council, may appoint and commission a fit
and proper person to such vacant office, to hold the same until the meeting of the General Assembly.”); N.C. CONST. of 1776 § XX (“That in every case where any Officer the
right of whose appointment is by this Constitution vested in the General Assembly, shall
during their recess die or his Office by other means become vacant, the Governor shall
have power with the advice of the Council of State to fill up such vacancy by granting a
Temporary Commission, which shall expire at the end of the next Session of the General
Assembly.”).
See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d 490, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing the North Carolina
Constitution for support that it, “like the Recess Appointments Clause, describes a singu-
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Carolina and Maryland documents do not use the word “happen,”
which limits their value as to the meaning of the precise text in the
261
It is also questionable whether they
Recess Appointments Clause.
actually incorporate the “arise” view. The North Carolina Constitution arguably limits the recess appointment power to vacancies that
arise during a recess only in cases of vacancy caused by death. If the
office “become[s] vacant” by “other means,” then it is not clear that
the “during the recess” limitation applies. The provision reads:
[I]n every case where any [o]fficer, the right of whose appointment is by
this Constitution vested in the General Assembly, shall during their recess die or his [o]ffice by other means become vacant, the Governor shall
262
have power . . . to fill up such vacancy . . . .

Under an ordinary reading of this passage, “during the recess” modifies “die,” not “by other means become vacant.” On the surface, it
seems implausible that the document would distinguish between vacancies caused by death during recesses and vacancies caused by
“other means.” But if one can think of any rational reason to do so,
then a textualist should take the text as its word, so to speak.
Maryland’s Constitution contains a similar ambiguity. If its drafters intended the “arise” view, then they would have done better to insert an additional comma in the text. Here is the passage, with a
bracketed comma that, if added, would tilt it toward the “arise” view:
. . . [U]pon the death, resignation, disqualification, or removal out of
the county of any Register of Wills, in the recess of the General Assembly[,] the Governor . . . may appoint and commission a fit and proper
263
person to such vacant office . . . .

To improve the text further, the drafters could have omitted the
comma after “Wills.” Without one or both of these edits, the phrase
“in the recess” might modify the phrase “the Governor . . . may appoint” rather than the phrase “death disqualification, or removal.”
That reading is the most natural, and it fits the “exist” view perfectly.
After a vacancy arises, the governor may fill it in the recess if it still exists at that point.
Even if the North Carolina and Maryland Constitutions embody
the “arise” view, they nonetheless betray an imprecision in drafting
that is inconsistent with heightened concern over the point. They
would also be outliers. To the extent that early American drafters of

261
262
263

lar recess and does not use the word ‘adjournment’”); Turley, supra note 14, at 974–75
(discussing early views of the North Carolina Constitution and its relationship to the Recess Appointments Clause).
See MD. CONST. of 1776 pt. 2, art. XLI; N.C. CONST. of 1776 § XX.
N.C. CONST. of 1776 § XX.
MD. CONST. of 1776 pt. 2, art. XLI.
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constitutions had a general vision of special appointment power, they
generally do not appear to have cared whether the triggering event
occurred during a recess. That position is sensible. The purpose of
special recess powers is usually to ensure that the executive can meet
immediate needs expediently. From this perspective, it makes little
sense to the limit the powers based on when a vacancy happens to
have arisen. If filling the vacancy is—or becomes—important, it
should be filled. The ratification-era constitutions are weak evidence
on the timing question, to be sure. But they suggest that recess powers were generally viewed as pragmatic in nature, and that their
drafters and readers generally believed them to be available when
necessary rather than based on technicalities of when triggering
events occur.
Among other types of evidence, support for the “arise” view is
weaker and more mixed than commonly perceived. Early opinions
varied, for example with John Adams apparently taking the “exist”
264
view and Alexander Hamilton taking the “arise” view. Proponents
place great weight on the opinion of the first Attorney General, Ed265
Of
mund Randolph, and the practice of George Washington.
course, one must be careful not to double-count here. To say that
George Washington followed the arise interpretation is merely to say
that he took his Attorney General’s advice. And there is strong reason to discount that advice as evidence of original meaning. Randolph was an opponent of presidential appointment power—so much
that he originally refused to sign the Constitution in part because of
it. At the federal convention, he appears to have objected to the ap266
pointment power in its entirety. When he later advocated ratifica264

265
266

Each opinion is subject to the important qualification that the author was not directly
assessing the “happen” question, but rather the question whether a newly created office
counts as a “vacancy.” See Hartnett, supra note 30, at 384 n.27 (“Care must be taken not to
read such statements out of context. These authors were addressing the creation of new
offices, and relying on the idea, less common in current usage, that only those things that
occur by chance can be said to ‘happen.’ On this understanding, ‘happen’ is not used to
designate a time, but rather to indicate the unplanned nature of the vacancy, best captured today by ‘happenstance,’ or ‘haphazard.’”); Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1538 (“Most
readers of the Clause assume that the recess appointment must be made during the recess when the vacancy arose, but careful examination of the Clause reveals that its language does not say specifically when the appointment must be made. This silence as to
when the recess appointment must be made occurs under both the arise interpretation
and the exist interpretation.”).
See Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1538 (“By contrast, the Washington Administration’s practice, especially as justified by the Randolph opinion, is entitled to enormous respect.”).
See EDMUND RANDOLPH, OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1787) (“Objections to the
Constitution as far as it has advanced . . . . 9th The appointment of officials will produce
to great influence in the Executive.”).
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tion at the Virginia convention, he narrowed his objection, at least
publicly, complaining only about the appointment (and recess appointment) of judges. He qualified his endorsement of the Constitution by expressing hope that other states would join Virginia
in taking from [the president] the power of nominating to the judiciary
offices, or of filling up vacancies which may there happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end
267
of their next sessions.

Rappaport finds that Randolph’s opinion “is entitled to enormous
respect” because he was an executive official arguing for narrower
executive power—and also because Randolph engaged in “penetrating analysis” and “clearly placed great importance on the Constitu268
Apparently,
tion that he had done so much to draft and ratify.”
Rappaport is not aware of Randolph’s strong objections to the appointment power. Rappaport notes, just before discussing Randolph’s opinion, that we should be skeptical of early interpretations
269
For this reason, he
that may have been motivated by self-interest.
apparently discounts the view of any executive official who took the
270
“exist” view because it favors the executive. But Randolph’s example shows that we should be skeptical of the assumption that early officials simply favored their respective branches of government. When
Randolph gained the opportunity to set precedents as attorney general, it is far from obvious that he would conform his views to a general executive-branch boosterism, or for that matter expound earnestly on the “true” meaning of constitutional text. More likely is
that he would take the opportunity to implement his strong, preexisting preferences and weaken a provision that he had openly wished to
excise from the Constitution.
Moreover, as a matter of original meaning, Randolph’s opinion
lends less support to the “arise” view than is commonly assumed.
Randolph scarcely engages in textual analysis. He merely notes that a
vacancy “may be said to have happened” on the day that it “commenced,” giving no consideration to whether “happen” might also
267
268
269

270

See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 127.
See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1538 & n.155 (citing Edmund Randolph, NOTABLE
NAMES DATABASE, http:// www.nndb.com/people/099/000049949/).
Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1537 (“The weight to be accorded early interpretations, however, turns on whether the interpreter impartially based his decision on a genuine and
considered view of the constitutional provision. One reason why an early interpretation
might be given reduced weight is if it was motivated by the interpreter’s self-interest.”).
See id. (“The evidence supplied by Hartnett of Presidents and executive branch officials
who may have interpreted the Recess Appointments Clause broadly raises the suspicion
that these interpretations were influenced by a desire to enhance executive power. Interpretations in these circumstances are entitled to less respect.”).
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mean “exist.”271 Perhaps he failed to consider the “exist” interpretation because it did not occur to him or it appeared unworthy of
comment. But perhaps Randolph deliberately chose not to mention
it because he did not want to lend credibility to an opposing position.
In any event, Randolph expends little energy on the text. Instead, he
relies primarily on his view that the “[s]pirit of the Constitution favors
the participation of the Senate in all appointments,” and therefore
the Recess Appointments Clause “ought . . . to be interpreted strict272
ly.” This is a statement about one man’s policy preferences, not evidence of original meaning.
There is another way in which Randolph’s opinion is notably
pragmatic rather than formalist or textualist. He explains that he
would accept that a vacancy constructively arises during a recess if the
President nominates a candidate and the Senate confirms but the
273
In truth, of
candidate declines the position during the recess.
course, the position has not been filled, and therefore the vacancy
predates the recess. Randolph would nonetheless permit a recess
appointment on the basis that “the Senate have had a full opportunity to shew their sense” and “the vacancy was filled up, as far as the
274
President and Senate could go.” In other words, Randolph departs
from the arise position when his view of “the Spirit of the Constitution” points another direction. Again Randolph demonstrates that
his partial endorsement of the “arise” view rests more on his policy
preferences than his view of original meaning. That Randolph opposed the Clause in its entirety only further diminishes his credibility
as a source of meaning. His view of “the Spirit of the Constitution”
conforms closely to his own preferences regarding the Constitution—
which happen to be preferences that the Constitution’s drafters and
ratifiers rejected when they approved presidential appointments and
recess appointments.
Not only are the early opinions on the “happen” question mixed
at best; each is the work of a political actor who may have had an
agenda beyond the mere ascertainment of original meaning. In sum,
the “arise” view of the “happen” question is the right starting point, as
to the modern reader it seems to reflect the word’s ordinary meaning, but there is good cause to investigate the issue much more thoroughly. Dictionary evidence and early opinions suggest that the “ex271
272
273
274

Edmund Randolph, Opinion on Recess Appointments (July 7, 1792), available at
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-24-02-0176.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ist” view was plausible, and most early documents granting recess
powers adopt the “exist” view, suggesting that in general most founders were willing to forgo legislative participation when expedience
demanded it.
IV. CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF ORIGINALISM AND THE RECESS
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
Despite strong evidence for an ordinary meaning of recess, multiple prominent originalists have endorsed the technical position. The
existence of serious disagreement on the original meaning of “recess”
raises interesting questions. One might start by asking whether
originalists must agree with one another. The general answer is no.
There are multiple theories of originalism, and it is only natural that
275
This
different methodologies might yield divergent conclusions.
Part introduces four contemporary originalist theories and considers
how each might analyze the evidence on “recess.” It finds that, regarding the meaning of recess, most of the divergence in conclusions
is not predicted by theoretical or methodological differences.
A. New Originalism
The most prominent contemporary originalist theory is known as
276
“original public meaning originalism” or simply “New Original277
A good deal of current originalist discussion is framed
ism.”
around New Originalism and its concepts, with participants expressing agreement, suggesting refinements or clarifications, or objecting.
It is therefore the obvious starting point when discussing current
originalist theory.
1. Original Public Meaning, Not Intent or Expectations
New Originalism is distinguished by two main features. The first is
that it attempts to find the original public meaning of the Constitu-

275

276
277

See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 166, at 394 n.82 (“Perhaps it goes without saying that
originalists will no doubt disagree among themselves about the actual content of the Constitution. Although such interpretive disagreements might derive from theoretical disagreements, they are more likely to derive from simply different approaches to and evaluation of the available evidence about original meaning, and are, potentially, resolvable
within the confines of originalist theory.”).
See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
453, 463 (2013) (discussing the origins of “original public meaning originalism”).
See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 3, at 412 (explaining what “New Originalism” is).
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tion.278 This represents a major break with earlier incarnations of
originalism, which focused on original intent or expectations of the
279
Framers. Ronald Dworkin is often cited to explain the difference:
“[t]his is the crucial distinction between what some officials intended
to say in enacting the language they used, and what they intended—
280
or expected or hoped—would be the consequence of their saying it.”
There are many reasons for this move, and we need not rehearse
them at length. The most frequently cited are that it is hard to discern the intent or expectation of the Framers and that, notwithstanding the previous point, the Framers do not appear to have intended
281
legal actors to divine the original intent behind the document.
2. Interpretation and Construction
The second key feature of New Originalism is that it distinguishes
282
Inbetween the concepts of “interpretation” and “construction.”
terpretation is the act of discerning the semantic or communicative
meaning of a text. It is an empirical practice in which one resolves
ambiguities to discover a text’s objective, public meaning (as opposed
283
to a private or idiosyncratic meaning). Construction, by contrast, is

278

279

280

281

282

283

For foundational texts, see BARNETT, supra note 47; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING
(1999); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999) [hereinafter Barnett, Nonoriginalists].
See Randy E. Barnett, Welcome to the New Originalism: A Comment on Jack Balkin’s Living
Originalism, 7 JERUSALEM REV. OF LEGAL STUD. 42, 44–45 (2013) (specifying that New
Originalism does not focus on the Framers’ intentions); Solum, supra note 276, at 462–63
(discussing early originalists’ focuses on original intentions); Whittington, supra note 166,
at 378–80 (discussing the interaction between original meaning and original intent).
Although original intent and original expectations are distinct concepts, they share
common characteristics and can be treated together for present purposes.
Barnett, Nonoriginalists, supra note 278, at 622 (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 116
(Amy Gutmann ed. 1997)) (emphasis in original).
The most influential critiques on these points are those of Paul Brest and H. Jefferson
Powell, respectively. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U. L. REV. 204, 204 (1980) (discussing “strict originalism”); H. Jefferson Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 885–88 (1985) (discussing
the original meaning of “original intent”).
See, e.g., Solum, supra note 276, at 457 (asserting that interpretation “is the activity that
discerns the communicative content (linguistic meaning) of the constitutional text” while
construction “is the activity that determines the content of constitutional doctrine and
the legal effect of the constitutional text”).
See Barnett, supra note 167, at 66 (“It cannot be overstressed that the activity of determining semantic meaning at the time of enactment required by the first proposition is empiri-
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what one does when interpretation falls short because a text contains
284
irreducible ambiguity, vagueness, gaps, or internal contradictions.
In this discussion, ambiguity and vagueness are not synonymous. An
ambiguous word has more than one meaning, whereas vagueness refers to marginal facts that may or may not be included within a
285
word. The question whether “arms” in the Second Amendment re286
fers to human limbs or weapons is one of ambiguity; the question
whether it includes shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles is one of
vagueness. In situations where the meaning of the constitutional text
cannot be determined with enough precision to govern particular
facts, the text is “underdeterminate” and one engages in construc287
tion. Unlike interpretation, construction is a normative enterprise
288
and is not “originalist.” In theory, any norms can be used, whether
289
Larry
stemming from political morality, ethics, or legal practice.
Solum has termed the area outside the text’s determinate meaning
290
the “construction zone.”
The question where interpretation ends and construction begins
can be difficult, and there is substantial disagreement over the exist-

284

285

286
287

288

289
290

cal, not normative.”); Solum, supra note 276, at 472 (“Constitutional interpretation is essentially a factually driven enterprise.”).
See Solum, supra note 276, at 469 (“Construction becomes the focus of explicit attention
when the meaning of the constitutional text is unclear, or the implications of that meaning are contested.”); see also Barnett, supra note 3, at 419 (“New Originalists refer to this
activity [of “supplement[ing] information revealed by interpretation”] as ‘constitutional
construction,’ as distinct from ‘constitutional interpretation’ . . . .”). In other words, construction is what one does when interpretation “runs out.” Barnett, supra note 3, at 419.
See Barnett, supra note 167, at 67 (“Ambiguity refers to words that have more than one
sense or meaning. Vagueness refers to the penumbra or borderline of a word’s meaning,
where it may be unclear whether a certain object is included within it or not.”); Solum,
supra note 276, at 469–70 (providing that “[a] text is ambiguous if it can have more than
one meaning” but vagueness “refers to expressions that have borderline cases”).
See BARNETT, supra note 47, at 119 (arguing that deciphering what is meant by “arms” is a
matter of interpretation).
See Solum, supra note 276, at 458 (“But in other cases, the constitutional text does not
provide determinate answers to constitutional questions. For example, the text may be
vague or irreducibly ambiguous. We can call this domain of constitutional underdeterminacy ‘the construction zone.’”); see also Barnett, supra note 3, at 419 (“. . . although the
activity of construction is constrained by the original meaning of the text, construction is
needed precisely when that communicative meaning is not sufficiently determinate to dictate a
unique application.”).
See Solum, supra note 276, at 472 (observing “that construction is essentially normative”);
see, e.g., Barnett, supra note 3, at 419, 420 (providing that “originalists can and do disagree
on how extra-originalist constitutional construction is to be done”).
See Solum, supra note 276, at 472 (arguing that there is a “range of normative possibilities” that could drive constitutional construction).
Id. at 458, 472 (“We can call this domain of constitutional underdeterminacy ‘the construction zone.’”).
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ence and size of the “construction zone.” New Originalists like Randy
Barnett and Larry Solum argue that interpretation suffices to determine the meaning of most of the Constitution, particularly the structural aspects of the document, but also believe there remains a sub291
stantial construction zone. Others, like Jack Balkin, believe that the
292
Still other
Constitution is largely a “framework” for construction.
originalists who object to much of the “new” theory, such as Gary
Lawson, Michael Rappaport, and John McGinnis, argue there is little
293
Distinguishing between interor no need for construction at all.
pretation and construction can lend clarity to what one is doing in
constitutional decisionmaking and therefore is worth doing.
3. Interpreting Recess
Consider the “recess” question. Given the evidence reviewed in
this Article, one can conclude that the question whether “recess” refers only to “inter-session” recesses or to something broader is a matter of interpretation, or resolving ambiguity. There is overwhelming
evidence that the original public meaning of “recess” included “intra294
There is no evisession” breaks, just as the word does at present.
dence that anyone in the public or the federal or state government
believed otherwise until Attorney General Knox’s opinion in 1901,
which the Senate Judiciary Committee declined to endorse in 1905
295
and Attorney General Daugherty rejected in 1921. Since then, no
President or Senate majority has disputed the issue.

291

292

293

294
295

See Barnett, supra note 3, at 419 (“By adopting the interpretation-construction distinction,
the New Originalism frankly acknowledges that the text of ‘this Constitution’ does not
provide definitive answers to all cases and controversies that come before Congress or the
courts.”); Solum, supra note 276, at 530 (“As I understand the position of the New
Originalists (and I count myself as among them), most of the provisions of the Constitution are structural and have clear original meanings . . . . Many of the vague provisions
(including important individual rights provisions) create construction zones, but this is
because the discernable original meaning underdetermines some constitutional questions.”).
See JACK M. BALKIN,LIVING ORIGINALISM 13 (2011); Solum, supra note 276, at 468 (referring to Balkin and stating that he “explicitly adopts the idea of constitutional construction”).
See Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1233 (2012) (“I want to
dissent from the originalist construction project and declare the Constitution a ‘noconstruction zone.’”); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 140, at 772–73 (presenting “objections to construction”); Solum, supra note 276, at 472 (observing that some originalists
“deny the existence of the construction zone”).
See supra Part I.
See supra text accompanying notes 99–110.

228

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17:1

To be clear, the point is not that “recess” certainly included all
legislative breaks. Rather, to one engaging strictly in originalist interpretation, that is as far as the evidence points. Dictionary evidence
strongly suggests that the ordinary meaning of “recess” was broad and
296
Ordinary meaning is also the default position, the pregeneral.
sumption to be rebutted in interpreting texts. On “recess,” we lack
evidence adequate to conclude that “recess” was limited in any particular way in the Recess Appointments Clause. Evidence for the
most commonly endorsed limitation—restricting the word to breaks
between official Senate sessions—is so lacking that, even if viewed independently, it would fail to rebut the presumption of ordinary
meaning. But that evidence does not stand alone. The record
strongly contradicts it, as there are many ratification-era examples of
297
“recess” referring to intra-session breaks. Moreover, the definition
of an official “session” varied across different jurisdictions, and the
Framers could not have predicted Senate session practice. For these
reasons, it is implausible that the Constitution would incorporate one
particular definition of official sessions or recesses, particularly without any evidence that its drafters wrestled with the choice among definitions.
4. New Originalism and the Recess Question
This Article has attempted to analyze the evidence on “recess” in a
manner consistent with New Originalism. The New Originalist would
use most if not all of the sources discussed in Part I. One conducting
298
this type of inquiry need not reject any particular form of evidence,
although one expects a loose hierarchy of evidentiary value. Most
important are the core tools of textual analysis: the close reading of
text, including which words appear and which do not, their relationships to other words and provisions in the same document, and evidence regarding the “plain meaning” of relevant terms to an ordinary
299
reader. The latter could stem from contemporaneous dictionaries
300
Next would come
or other instances of contemporaneous usage.
296
297
298
299
300

See supra Part I.A.1.
See supra Part I.B.
See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 278, at 389.
See, e.g., id. at 389–90.
See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 47, at 93 (observing that original public meaning references
“dictionaries, common contemporary meanings, an analysis of how particular words and
phrases are used elsewhere in the document or in other foundational documents and
cases, and logical inferences from the structure and general purposes of the text”); Barnett, supra note 3, at 416 (“[E]stablishing the semantic meaning of the words in the text,
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evidence of purpose or values that one finds in the text or structure
of the document, so long as purpose is treated as evidence of mean301
ing rather than an end in itself that trumps the text. Further down
is extrinsic evidence of purpose, such as statements by the Framers,
historical interpretations, or other historical practices.
The strongest evidence discussed in Part I for the ordinary meaning of “recess” is the type that New Originalism values: a close reading of text and structure, informed by evidence from contemporaneous dictionaries and other sources regarding the ordinary
understanding of those terms. By contrast, the technical position
draws significantly less support from these types of evidence. Perhaps
the most compelling support for the technical position is a narrative
302
about the Framers’ expectations —a type of reasoning that New
Originalism rejects.
Perhaps it is not always easy to distinguish between original meaning and original intent or expectations. One could take the view that
the inter-session-expectations narrative is evidence about the meaning of the word “recess” rather than an argument that the Framers’
expectations trump the evidence on meaning. After all, in most cases, one would expect the original meaning of words used in the Constitution to reflect the intentions or expectations of the document’s
303
presumably competent drafters and ratifiers. For this reason, there
should be times when strong evidence of original intent or expectations can help establish original meaning. But the inter-sessionexpectations narrative cannot play that role here because it is not
supported by evidence regarding the Framers’ actual expectations.
Moreover, the inter-session-expectations narrative runs counter to the
weight of the evidence on the text’s meaning. For these reasons, it
should fail to persuade the New Originalist regardless of whether it is
viewed squarely as an appeal to original expectations or as one of the
sole arguments supporting the conclusion that the original public
meaning of “recess” was narrow and technical.

301
302
303

given the publicly available context, requires a survey of relevant usage. The search for
original public meaning should be as systematic and comprehensive as possible with respect to any source one surveys, reporting deviant as well as predominate usage.”).
See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 278, at 390.
See supra text accompanying notes 188–91.
See Solum, supra note 276, at 464 (“Under normal circumstances, the intentions of the
Framers will be reflected in the public meaning of the constitutional text: as competent
speakers and writers of the natural language English, the Framers are likely to have understood that the best way to convey their intentions would be to state them clearly in
language that would be grasped by the officials and citizens to whom the constitutional
text was addressed.”).
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Two additional points are worth raising about the inter-sessionexpectations narrative. First, it is a particularly weak form of expectations argument because it turns on arbitrary historical changes. It
says that the Framers expected inter-session rather than intra-session
recesses only because of now-irrelevant technological constraints in
communications and transportation. By similar reasoning, one might
as well hold that the Second Amendment does not protect the right
to bear semi-automatic firearms, which did not exist in the eighteenth century and therefore were not what the Framers had in mind.
Or one might argue that women cannot hold federal office, for the
Constitution repeatedly refers to representatives, senators, and the
President as “he,” and surely the Framers did not have women in
304
These arguments are widely rejected for good reason; and
mind.
the same reasoning applies to the inter-session-expectations narrative.
In a related point, the inter-session-expectations argument is internally contradictory. To the extent that it turns on failures of imagination, it tacitly admits that “recess” does not affirmatively exclude
intra-session recesses as a textual matter. It is incoherent to say that
the Framers meant to preclude unilateral appointments during a type
of recess that they did not imagine. To the contrary, at most the narrative points to a vagueness problem—a question whether modern
intra-session recesses should be included or excluded, which cannot be
resolved by originalist evidence. A common source of vagueness is
the lack of complete knowledge on the part of drafters, and one
cause of imperfect knowledge is inter-temporal change. Randy Barnett illustrates this point with the question whether thermal imaging
305
of a house constitutes a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes.
One cannot answer the question with an objective, historical inquiry,
306
This type
he notes, because it is “counterfactual, not . . . factual.”
of dilemma is precisely why constitutional drafters prefer general
307
principles to narrow prescriptions where possible.
The discussion of vagueness returns us to the question whether
the analyses in Parts I and II of this Article are exercises in interpretation or construction. With minor exceptions, this Article has engaged in interpretation, as it has sought to derive the original mean304

305

306
307

See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (referring to state representatives using the male pronoun); id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (referring to senators using the male pronoun); id. at art. II,
§ 1, cl. 1 (using the male pronoun to refer to the President).
See BARNETT, supra note 47, at 119–20 (using the example of thermal imaging to show
that “original meaning may not by itself tell us whether [something] lies outside its core
meaning but still possibly within its margins”).
Id. at 120.
See supra text accompanying notes 164–67.
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ing of “recess” as an objective matter, without resort to extra308
To the extent that this Article relies on evioriginalist sources.
dence of purpose or intent, it analyzes that evidence for its relevance
to the meaning of the text of the Constitution. The Article considers
constructions of “recess” separately, in Subpart E below.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the divergence between
this Article’s conclusion and that of some New Originalists is not likely attributable to a difference in interpretive methodology. After a
more comprehensive view of the evidence, one might expect New
Originalists to agree with the positions in this Article. Or they might
muster more evidence for the technical position, although this Article has attempted to canvas the most probative sources. Alternatively,
they might conclude that the term is irreducibly ambiguous.
B. Original Methods Originalism
A second contemporary originalist theory is what John McGinnis
and Michael Rappaport have called “Original Methods Original309
Under this approach, one interprets the Constitution using
ism.”
the “methods that the constitutional enactors would have deemed
310
Although McGinnis and Rappaport do not proapplicable to it.”
vide a comprehensive account of ratification-era interpretive rules,
they argue that the practices embody attempts to discern both origi311
nal meaning and original intent. The particular interpretive methods that they identify appear similar to contemporary tools of legal
analysis. For example, they contemplate the use of structure, pur312
pose, intent, and history and, regarding the reading of text itself,
313
they discuss the use of common canons of construction.
McGinnis and Rappaport’s principal points appear to be that original methods were originalist rather than “dynamic or otherwise
314
nonoriginalist” and that those methods involve not just textual
308

309
310
311

312
313
314

An exception is the discussion of the “military-responsiveness” narrative, which this Article poses as a challenge to the “inter-session-expectations” narrative. See supra text accompanying notes 208–15.
See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 140, at 751 (titling their article Original Methods
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction).
Id. at 751, 754.
See id. at 752 (“[W]e do not attempt to determine the precise interpretive rules . . . .”); id.
at 786 (“We do not have space to provide a comprehensive account of the original interpretive rules.”).
Id. at 752 (“[T]he evidence suggests that ambiguity and vagueness were resolved [in the
Framers’ era] by considering evidence of history, structure, purpose, and intent.”).
See, e.g., id. at 756 (discussing the “antiredundancy rule”).
Id. at 786.
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analysis but also considerations of intent.315 One distinction between
Original Methods Originalism and New Originalism, then, is that the
former approves of considering original intent because, on its ac316
McGinnis
count, ratification-era legal actors would have done so.
and Rappaport also depart from New Originalism in arguing that,
though the use of original methods, one can fully ascertain the mean317
ing of the Constitution without resort to construction. They argue
that the Framers resolved ambiguity and vagueness “by considering
evidence of history, structure, purpose, and intent,” as opposed to
318
“extraconstitutional” sources that are used in construction. To the
New Originalist, the disagreement over construction appears largely
semantic. On this view, everyone must engage in construction, including McGinnis and Rappaport. Irreducible ambiguity and vague319
The Original Methods
ness are inherent in the Constitution.
Originalist is merely arguing about the size of the toolset, and shrinking the list of tools does not mean one is not engaged in construction. The Original Methods Originalist would likely respond that
original methods can reduce or even eliminate the need for construction if those methods require one to choose the best possible answer
in cases of uncertainty. If one is compelled by original methods to
choose an outcome supported by the preponderance of the evidence,
then one can be said to be engaging in the determinate, originalist
act of interpretation, not the indeterminate, nonoriginalist act of
construction.
Because McGinnis and Rappaport do not provide a comprehensive account of original methods, one cannot be certain how their
315
316

317
318
319

See id. (“We present some evidence showing the original interpretive methods were intentionalist . . . .”).
Cf. id. For a contrary view, see Powell, supra note 281, at 887 (“Turning to the views on
constitutional interpretation expressed during and immediately after the ratification process, I conclude that there was a tension during this period between a global rejection of
any and all methods of constitutional construction and a willingness to interpret the constitutional text in accordance with the common law principles that had been used to construe statutes.”).
See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 140, at 752 (“We find no support for constitutional
construction, as opposed to constitutional interpretation, at the time of the Framing.”).
Id.
McGinnis and Rappaport concede that, as a theoretical matter, there might be some residual need for construction. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract
Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 752 n.54 (2012) (“It is theoretically possible that
the interpretive rules may not resolve every uncertainty, especially uncertainty resulting
from vagueness. We have argued that such uncertainties are unlikely if the interpretive
rules require interpreters to choose the meaning that is more likely, even if other meanings are possible. But if there is a remaining uncertainty, then one might be in a situation involving construction, where the original meaning does not provide an answer.”).
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theory would apply to the evidence on the meaning of recess. However, there are three reasons to believe that most of the analysis in
Part I of this Article is apt. First, as mentioned above, original methods appear to have been largely consistent with contemporary practice. Second, Rappaport’s own analysis of the Recess Appointments
320
Clause evaluates similar types of evidence. There, Rappaport states
that he will seek to understand how “knowledgeable individuals
would have understood this language in the late 1780s when it was
321
He also implies that what he will seek the
drafted and ratified.”
meaning in the manner that “[i]nterpreters at the time would
322
have,” but that he will accomplish that task by “examin[ing] various
323
factors, including text, purpose, structure, and history.” Finally, to
the extent that this Article’s analysis is limited to interpretation, it
should not run afoul of Original Methods Originalism’s prohibition
on construction, regardless of the tools one uses to conduct that
analysis.
On the basis of text and structure, it appears that an Original
Methods Originalist should reach the same conclusion as a New
Originalist—that the weight of the evidence supports the general
meaning of “recess,” or at least that the balance of the evidence does
not rebut the presumption in favor of ordinary meaning. McGinnis
and Rappaport part ways with the New Originalists, however, in that
they would also consider evidence regarding original intent or expectations. This difference in methodology could explain the difference
324
As discussed
in conclusions regarding the meaning of “recess.”
above, the most intuitively appealing support for the narrow view of
“recess” is the inter-session-expectations narrative—that the Framers
expected Congress to take long inter-session recesses and no significant other breaks, and therefore long inter-session recesses are what
325
This Article has disputed that view in two
they meant by “recess.”
way: by arguing that even if one assumes those were the Framers ex320

321
322
323
324

325

Rappaport wrote his analysis of the Recess Appointments Clause in 2005 and proposed
Original Methods Originalism with McGinnis in 2009, which naturally raises the question
whether his 2005 analysis followed Original Methods Originalism. Rappaport reendorsed the 2005 analysis in a 2013 brief to the Supreme Court, which suggests that it
cannot have ventured far outside the bounds of his preferred method. See generally,
Originalist Brief, supra note 122.
Rappaport, supra note 7, at 1493.
Id.
Id.
John McGinnis joined the “originalist” amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Noel Canning
advocating the technical position. Rappaport, of course, is the principal advocate of that
view.
See supra text accompanying notes 188–91.
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pectations, they might not have written those expectations into the
Constitution and by offering a “military-responsiveness” counter326
narrative. But one certainly cannot disprove the narrative that the
Framers expected “recess” to mean “inter-session recess.”
It is noteworthy, however, that McGinnis and Rappaport have recognized an exception to following original expectations that applies
to the “recess” question. They have written that modern actors need
not follow original expectations that were based on mistakes of fact,
as opposed to “moral or policy beliefs” with which we happen to disa327
Following this reasoning, we need not adhere to what Rapgree.
paport argues is the original expected application of “recess.” Even if
the inter-session-expectations narrative accurately characterizes the
Framers’ beliefs, those beliefs were mistaken. The Senate now follows
a very different pattern of recesses.
Another aspect of original methods also might cut against the
technical position. There is some evidence that original methods included a view that historical usage and precedent settle the meaning
of terms, trumping their original public meaning. Under that view,
one should defer to the near-complete consensus of the past several
decades, if not since the nation’s founding, that the Recess Appointments Clause permits intra-session recess appointments. One piece
of evidence for the existence of this “original method” stems from a
well-known series of events in which James Madison reversed his position on the constitutionality of a national bank, from opposition to
328
support (or at least acquiescence), over a twenty-five-year period.
Madison’s reasoning was that his view was contradicted for more than
twenty years by usage and precedent, which effectively settled the
question. The precedent did not alter the meaning of the Constitution’s text, on which Madison’s “abstract opinion” remained un329
changed, but rather changed its proper application to the specific
question of Congress’s power to create a national bank. The bank’s

326
327

328

329

See supra text accompanying notes 208–15.
See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of
Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 379–80 (2007) (“While expected applications are
important evidence of the meaning of a provision, they are not always to be followed,
even if they are widely held. But the circumstances must provide strong reasons for believing the applications were mistaken, rather than being merely applications modern interpreters happen to reject.”).
See Powell, supra note 281, at 939–40 (providing that as a result of “the exposition of the
Constitution provided by actual governmental practice and judicial precedents . . . Madison felt himself compelled to change his position on the controversial issue of Congress's constitutional power to incorporate a national bank”).
Id.
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constitutionality was “a construction put on the Constitution by the
nation, which, having made it, had the supreme right to declare its
330
meaning.” From the perspective of Original Methods Originalism,
what is most interesting about this episode is that Madison claimed
that his perspective on precedent was not just his personal view, but
331
If Madison was correct,
one generally intended by the Framers.
then one would expect to see Original Methods Originalists accede to
the ordinary, general reading of recess based on the historical record.
C. Original Defaults Originalism
A third set of originalist theories supports applying constitutional
default rules to resolve residual uncertainty when deciding cases. Accordingly, we can refer to these views as Original Defaults Originalism. Gary Lawson has rightly pointed out that one does not need epistemic certainty to make decisions in the face of legal indeterminacy;
332
He and Mione need only set a burden of proof and allocate it.
chael Paulsen have independently argued for the existence of default
rules prescribed by the text of the Constitution itself. Paulsen’s rule,
in brief, is that when a government act is not clearly unconstitutional,
333
one should defer to the political branches. Lawson’s is a presumption “against the existence of federal power and in favor of the exist334
ence of state power.”
330

331

332

333
334

Id. (quoting Letter from James Madison to Marquis de LaFayette (Nov. 1826)); see also
Letter from James Madison to Mr. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831) (referencing “the obligations
derived from a course of precedents amounting to the requisite evidence of national
judgment and intention”).
See Powell, supra note 281, at 940–41 (“Madison claimed, this view represented not just his
opinion, but the general expectation – the ‘interpretive intention’ – that prevailed at the
time of the Constitution's framing and ratification.”).
See Lawson, supra note 293, at 1233–34 (“The trier of fact may be genuinely uncertain
about the facts. The solution to this uncertainty is not to come up with some extraevidentiary mechanism for constructing facts but to allocate the burden of uncertainty to one
party or the other.”); see generally Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 411 (1996).
See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2009).
Lawson, supra note 293, at 1234. Larry Solum labels Paulsen and Lawson’s views, or
something like them, “Originalist Thayerianism.” Solum notes that the position he
sketches might not conform precisely to their views. See Solum, supra note 276, at 472–73
& n.76, 512 (noting that “[t]he Originalist Thayerian Theory is related to and inspired by
the views of Gary Lawson and Michael Paulsen” but “[t]o the extent that neither Lawson
nor Paulsen embraces Originalist Thayerianism as described here, this discussion does
not directly apply to their views”). I follow Solum with the same disclaimer. Solum’s label
derives from James Bradley Thayer’s influential argument in the late nineteenth century
that a court can deem a statute unconstitutional only “when those who have the right to
make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so clear
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To the extent that this Article engages only in interpretation, a difference in methodology could not explain disagreement with Original Defaults Originalists because their theories concern what to do
when interpretation runs out. In other words, their default rules
should come into play only if they are unpersuaded by this Article’s
account, or they do not view it as an exercise in interpretation. Let us
assume that is their response. In that case, the effect of Lawson’s default rule—a presumption against federal power—is unclear in a separation-of-powers controversy within the federal government. Where
a private litigant challenges a federal action asserting a separation-ofpowers violation, one might believe at first blush that a presumption
against federal power cuts in favor of the challenger. But the case
does not concern the existence of federal power; it concerns the allocation between two political branches of a clearly extant power. The
presumption appears not to apply.
In contrast, Paulsen’s presumption would instruct a court to permit a presidential recess appointment even of dubious constitutionality unless it is clearly unconstitutional—or presumably unless it is
genuinely disputed by the Senate. If the Senate disputes a recess appointment, then a presumption of deference to the political branches
cannot apply because two branches are in conflict. Moreover, in that
case, if one agrees with this Article’s account of the Rules of Proceedings Clause, then that Clause should resolve most disputes between
the Senate and the White House. Because clear distinctions among
recesses cannot be found through interpretation of the Constitution’s text, courts following Paulsen’s default rule apparently should
approve most if not all recess appointments that a majority of senators do not dispute.
D. Living Originalism
Finally, Jack Balkin describes his “Living Originalism” as a method
335
of “text and principle.” It is a form of New Originalism, as it holds

335

that it is not open to rational question.” James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 17, 144 (1893); see Solum, supra note
276, at 472–73 (“[W]hen the meaning of the text is unclear or uncertain, then judges
should defer to decisions made by the political branches. Thus, in a case where the requirements of equal protection are unclear (because of vagueness, for example), judges
should refrain from declaring legislative or executive action unconstitutional.”). The
Thayerian label is most clearly apt as to Paulsen, who straightforwardly advances a theory
of deference to the political branches. On my reading, Lawson’s presumption prescribes
deference to state governments and the opposite of deference to federal political
branches. See supra notes 333–34.
BALKIN, supra note 292, at 3.
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that the Constitution’s text is fixed and binding.336 But it parts with
many originalists, new and old, in its view of the limits of interpretation. Balkin argues that much of the Constitution is underdetermined and must be resolved through construction, but this is by de337
sign. In his view, the Constitution provides a “framework” for later
338
Rather than
generations of political and legal actors to build on.
just a restraint on government actors, the Constitution is a “plan for
339
politics.” The text is binding as far as it goes. When it clearly states
a rule, we must follow the rule. But when it invokes a standard or a
principle, it delegates construction to future actors appealing to the
340
principles underlying the text.
This Article’s reading of “recess” fits well with Living Originalism.
The starting point for the analysis is interpretation of the text: the
original meaning of “recess” was broad, encompassing any legislative
break. The word’s generality indicates that it is used to establish a
standard rather than a rule. When the Constitution invokes a standard or principle rather than establishes a hard rule, it implicitly dele341
gates interpretation to future generations. In the case of the Recess
Appointments Clause, a portion of the delegation is unusually explicit. The Constitution gives the Senate authority over the rules of its
proceedings, and those rules likely include the meaning of Senate recesses.
But it is also reasonable to hold that the President must have a
role in interpreting “recess,” for it is primarily the President whose
constitutional duties are at stake in ensuring that the federal government is staffed adequately. On this view, the President is at risk of
failing to meet executive-branch obligations if the Senate has complete control over the concept of an appointment-enabling recess. At
a minimum, if the Senate is unavailable as a practical matter, then it
336
337
338
339

340

341

Id. at 412–28.
Id. at 3.
See id. at 3 (labeling his position as “framework originalism”).
Id. at 22, 3307; see also id. at 275–78 (“Constitutions are designed to create political institutions and to set up the basic elements of future political decisionmaking. Their basic job
is not to prevent future decision-making but to enable it. The job of a constitution, in
short, is to make politics possible.”).
Id. at 479–80 (“Thus, choosing a standard or principle normally means that adopters are
delegating the task of application to later generations.”); id. at 162 (“And where the text
offers an abstract standard or principle, we must try to determine what principles underlie the text in order to build constructions that are consistent with it.”).
Id. at 165–66 (“Indeed, the fact that adopters chose text that features general and abstract
concepts is normally the best evidence that they sought to embody general and abstract
principles of constitutional law, whose scope, in turn, will have to be worked out and implemented by later generations.”).
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cannot correct any mistakes or oversights it might have made. Some
of the executive obligations at issue are tightly linked to some of the
342
most critical motivations for establishing a “more perfect Union.”
Article IV mandates that “[t]he United States . . . shall protect [each
state] against Invasion” and upon request, “against domestic vio343
These obligations might arise urgently at the onset of a
lence.”
short break that the Senate did not contemplate as an appointmentenabling recess, such as a weekend. They might also require executive-branch appointments. It is reasonable under these circumstances
for the President to note that the Senate break is within the definition of the relevant constitutional text, “recess;” consider the principles underlying the Recess Appointments Clause, principally the importance of ensuring that the President can meet federal obligations
when the Senate is not available and permitting the Senate to take
breaks without disrupting the federal government’s functioning, as
well as the backdrop of constitutional obligations such as defending
344
the states; and conclude that the Senate break qualifies as an appointment-enabling recess under the Constitution. This is the method of “text and principle” in action.
To a lesser extent, the courts might also have a role in building
out the Clause, as arbiters of intractable conflict between the other
branches or as guardians of the text’s outer boundaries, ensuring that
neither political branch stretches the text beyond plausibility. This
vision, in which the Constitution establishes a basic framework that
future actors, largely the political branches, will build upon and implement by appealing to principles underlying the text, is a good illustration of Living Originalism.
Finally, it is noteworthy that, to the Living Originalist, adherents
to the technical position are actually engaging in Living Originalism.
The technical position is based principally on a narrative about original expected application. It is also based on a principle that its proponents argue is embedded in the Clause—ensuring maximal Senate
participation in appointments. The appeal to principle plainly meets
Living Originalism’s method of “text and principle.”
To the Living Originalist, original expected application is a tool of
construction that might help us understand original meaning of text
342
343
344

U.S. CONST. preamble.
Id. at art. IV, § 4.
Cf. BALKIN, supra note 292, at 3310 (“Because the Constitution as a whole is a plan for
politics, we do not look at a particular text or clause in isolation but try to view the Constitution holistically, as a coherent project of governance—or one that at least strives for coherence.”).
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or the principles underlying it. But the inquiry into original expectations should not be confused with an inquiry into original meaning;
nor should original expectations be viewed as binding. What is binding is the text itself, and here the text is far more general than the
technical position holds. Indeed, it is the very generality of the word
“recess” that enables appeals to original expected application.
In other words, Living Originalism is the most descriptively accurate of the originalist theories. It aptly characterizes the bulk of analysis of the Recess Appointments Clause, with the curious exception of
the Noel Canning majority’s ten-day and three-day minimum durations
of recesses.
E. Judicial Construction and Recess
Although interpretation does not yield a limit on the meaning of
“recess,” it also does not rule out the possibility that some limit might
have existed (aside from the technical position) or that some limit is
advisable. One common concern with an ordinary, general meaning
of “recess” is that the President could use broad recess appointment
power to circumvent the Senate by making an appointment during
an overnight or weekend break. Perhaps, then, appointmentenabling recesses have (or should have) a minimum duration. The
evidence on original intent or expectations does not support that
conclusion; however compelling the possibility of presidential abuse
might seem to modern observers, we have no evidence that the
Framers’ shared it, and we have some reason to believe they did not.
The Framers appear to have expected public officials to act with
more “decorum” than some recent Presidents and senators have
345
shown, and they expected the Senate to confirm presidential nomi346
That belief would obviate the
nees in all but extraordinary cases.
need to prevent the President from abusing the recess appointment
power. But this evidence on original expectations does not rule out
the possibility of limits on the word recess, and one might choose to
engage in construction to derive one. Below, this Article first considers whether a limiting construction is necessary or advisable, then examines possible constructions.

345

346

Cf. 4 ELLIOT, supra note 48, at 134 (questioning by Iredell, asking, “[s]uppose a man
nominated by the President; with what face would any senator object to him without a
good reason? There must be some decorum in every public body.”).
See supra text accompanying notes 81–82.
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1. The Need for Constructions of Recess
The principal policy concern driving narrower interpretations of
“recess” is that, under broader readings, the President might abuse
the appointment power and circumvent the Senate by making appointments during any break, however short or insignificant. Attorney General Knox first raised this concern in 1901, suggesting that to
permit intra-session recess appointments would be to permit unilat347
In more recent years,
eral appointments over a mere weekend.
some have come to believe that abuses have rendered the Clause a
source of intractable conflict between the President and the Senate
that requires resolution by the courts.
Before the courts attempt to remedy these problems with a limiting construction of “recess,” it is worth investigating the need more
thoroughly. The record suggests that the concern regarding presidential abuse may be overblown, and the President and the Senate
are negotiating the Clause’s application reasonably well. This is particularly true if one considers the Senate majority, the relevant Senate
body for purposes of the Clause, rather than the minority. There is
good reason to do so. Under Senate rules, a simple majority of senators control the decision to adjourn, and therefore a simple majority
can choose to enable or block recess appointments by deciding
348
Moreover, the Senate recently
whether and how to adjourn.
changed its rules to eliminate filibusters of all nominees except those
349
to the Supreme Court, meaning that the Senate itself has chosen
simple majority rule for nearly all appointments. A future Senate majority will likely adopt the same rule for Supreme Court nominees as
soon as one is filibustered. This shift to simple-majority voting on
nominees may end the problem of controversial recess appointments,
for the principal reason Presidents made them was to circumvent obstruction by minority-party senators.
Even if not for the Senate rule change, the record shows little
cause for concern over presidential abuse; nor does it suggest that
conflict over the Clause between the political branches is intractable,
requiring a judicial reponse. Since 1979, when intra-session recess
347
348

349

See 23 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 99, at 603.
See Arkush, supra note 2, at 5–6 (“Senate rules, in turn, place power to initiate recesses in
the hands of a simple majority. . . . The upshot of these rules is that a simple majority of
senators can initiate a recess, intersession or intrasession, at any time.”).
See Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-motion-steps-tolimit-use-of-filibuster.html?pagewanted=all&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar
&_r=0.
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appointments began their sharp rise, no President has made one dur350
ing a recess of fewer than ten days. Apparently, then, there is little
reason to fear weekend or overnight appointments. One possible exception, of course, is President Obama’s 2012 decision to make appointments during a break that ranged from three days to several
351
But Obama’s apweeks, depending how one defines “recess.”
352
pointments appear to have had Senate majority support, which
sharply diminishes the constitutional or democratic concerns that
they might raise.
Indeed, majority support for recess appointments is the norm.
Since 1979, Presidents have made 231 intra-session recess appointments when their allies controlled the Senate and 109 when the op353
Of the 109 appointments made during oppositionposition did.
controlled senates, of course, only a small fraction were controversial.
The vast majority of President George W. Bush’s and all of President
Obama’s intra-session recess appointments had Senate majority sup354
Bush made fourteen intra-session recess appointments in
port.
2001 and 2002, when Democrats controlled the Senate. When Republicans gained control, he doubled his pace, with 118 appoint355
ments from 2003 to 2006, an average of nearly thirty each year. But
when Democrats regained control of the Senate, Bush made just four
350

351
352

353

354
355

For the years 1981–2013, see HENRY B. HOGUE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
RECESS APPOINTMENTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 7 (2013). The shortest intersession recess during which a President made appointments was eleven days. See id. For the
year 1979, see Brief for the Petitioner at 31a, Noel Canning v. NLRB, No. 12-1281 (U.S.
Sept. 13, 2013) (listing appointments and dates) and CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, supra
note 10, at 531–38 (listing dates of intra-session recesses).
See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 350, at 64a (listing the appointees and dates of appointment).
See Arkush, supra note 2, at 2–3 (“It is uncontroversial that the Senate majority has generally supported the President's nominees, and the most plausible inference is that the majority also supported his recess appointments.”).
Except where otherwise noted, the source for this section’s facts on intra-session recess
appointments is data on file with the author. The data was compiled by combining information from HENRY B. HOGUE ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE NOEL
CANNING DECISION AND RECESS APPOINTMENTS MADE FROM 1981–2013 (2013); Brief for
the Petitioner, supra note 350, and U.S. Senate, Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present,
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/party
SENATE.GOV,
div.htm.
Obama made twenty-two intra-session recess appointments in 2010 and four in 2012. Data on file with author.
President George W. Bush made multiple controversial intra-session appointments during the first three-quarters of his presidency. See HOGUE, supra note 350, at 10 (noting
appointments of William H. Pryor and Charles W. Pickering to United States Courts of
Appeals); Jim VandeHei & Colum Lynch, Bush Names Bolton U.N. Ambassador in Recess Appointment, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2005/08/01/AR2005080100436.html.
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more intra-session recess appointments before the new majority attempted to stop him by holding “pro forma” sessions in which a single senator gavels the Senate in and out of session once every three
356
The gambit worked. Rather than test whether the Senate
days.
could lawfully use pro forma sessions to block recess appointments,
357
Bush declined to make any more. This episode arguably ended the
practice of making recess appointments over Senate majority opposition. In that case, the worst practice regarding intra-session recess
appointments—making controversial appointments over Senatemajority opposition—arose under President H. W. Bush in 1991 and
358
disappeared by 2007.
In summary, the Senate has been well on its way toward ending
the recess appointments controversy since late 2013, when it adopted
simple-majority voting for nominations. Even before then, the most
controversial type of recess appointments ceased in 2007, possibly
never to resume. In 2007, the Senate majority and the President set a
precedent that the Senate majority can hold pro forma sessions to
block intra-session recess appointments that it opposes. No President
has tested that limit. Although President Obama made appointments
during a recess between pro forma sessions in 2012, the Senate majority shared his political party and appears to have supported his appointees. The pro forma sessions were not chosen by the Senate majority, but rather forced by the House. If all that remained of the inintra-session recess appointment controversy was a practice of making
appointments to circumvent obstruction by the Senate minority—or
for that matter, by the House of Representatives, as in the case of the
2012 appointments—then it is not clear that the practice would present significant constitutional or democratic concerns. More likely,

356
357
358

See HOGUE, supra note 350, at 11.
See id.
All of Carter and Ronald Reagan’s “controversial” intra-session appointments were made
when the Senate shared their respective political parties. Reagan made three intrasession appointments in 1988, but they do not appear to have been controversial. President H. W. Bush began making controversial appointments over a Democratic Senate majority in 1991, with an appointment to the Legal Services Corporation. See Carrier, supra
note 108, at 2215–16 (“Both the Ashley appointment and the Legal Services Corporation
controversy[, which resulted from his making eleven recess appointments] suggest that
Bush's legal advisers viewed the clause as an offensive weapon in tilting the balance of
power between the President and the Senate—by evading Senate confirmation procedures – rather than as a supplement to the general appointment power – in filling vacancies when the Senate could not provide its confirmation.”). He continued making such
appointments throughout his term, including some just before he left office. Id. at 2204–
05 (discussing the recess appointments he made two weeks before leaving office).
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even less remains, as the Senate has changed its rules to permit simple majority approval for most appointments.
2. Constructions of Recess
The preceding discussion suggests that there is probably no need
for the courts to adopt limiting constructions of the Recess Appointments Clause. But for one who perceives a need to limit the meaning
of “recess” in some manner, this Subpart offers four reasonable answers. The first two adhere closely to the interpretive evidence, while
the latter two engage more extensively in construction.
a. Senate Control
First, one could hold that the Senate has authority under the
Rules of Proceedings Clause to define with binding force the terms
“recess” and “session,” so long as it stays within the broad boundaries
of the ordinary meanings of the words. Under this theory, the Senate
could protect itself from presidential abuse. A shortcoming, of
course, is that the President would have no relief from Senate obstruction, aside from a judicial decision that the Senate has violated
the separation of powers or exceeded the boundaries of what “recess”
could possibly mean.
Additionally, one must answer how the Senate adopts its views as a
procedural matter. Must it make an official, affirmative statement,
explicitly defining them in rules or a resolution, or can it refine the
meaning of “recess” and “session” implicitly through practice? If the
former, then the Senate appears not to have defined the words. If
the latter, then one could argue that the Senate has accepted that
“recess” includes intra-session breaks, as it has recognized intrasession recess appointments as valid for decades. One could also argue that the Senate has drawn a lower boundary for the duration of
appointment-enabling recesses. They must be longer than three
days, at least when the Senate majority is exercising its prerogative to
control its recesses. This rule is derived from the Senate’s 2007–2008
practice of holding pro forma sessions to block appointments. The
Senate majority plainly did not want the President to make appoint359
ments during the recesses between pro forma sessions at that time.
359

See supra text accompanying notes 356–57. Note, however, that the pro forma sessions at
issue in Noel Canning are a special case because the Senate majority did not want to hold
them. Rather, the House of Representatives refused the Senate permission to adjourn for
more than three days, and as a result the Senate majority believed it had no choice but to
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Less clear is whether the Senate believed that recesses must be longer
than three days as a matter of law, merely hoped that a court would
adopt that position, or expected its pro forma sessions to have more
political than legal impact. Under the “Senate control” view, the
Senate simply has the power to make the relevant law.
b. Ordinary Meaning Plus Politics
Under a second theory, one could hold that “recess” retains its
broad, ordinary meaning and that the President’s and the Senate’s
actions under the Clause are limited primarily, if not exclusively, by
the political process. At first glance, this position appears to be in
tension with the Rules of Proceedings Clause. But one can reconcile
the two by holding that although the Senate can define “recess” and
“session” for purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, its decisions are not judicially enforceable. Under this view, the Senate has
interpretive authority, but it is political rather than legal. Another
possibility is to hold that the joint nature of appointment power rehold pro forma sessions if senators wished to go home for the holidays. See Arkush, supra
note 2, at 2–3, 6–7 (discussing whether the House has authority to block recess appointments and the fact that the Senate felt forced to hold pro forma sessions as a result of the
House’s actions). One could argue that, having established a practice that the breaks between pro forma sessions do not constitute “recesses,” the President and Senate majority
were bound by that practice in 2012. But the result would be perverse: a holding, justified by the Senate’s control over its own proceedings, that pro forma sessions forced by
the House dictate whether the Senate is in recess.
Moreover, the House’s actions were probably unconstitutional. See Arkush, supra
note 2, at 6–7 (discussing “reasons to doubt that” the House has authority “to block recess
appointments”). It purported to act under the Adjournments Clause, which affirmatively
grants each house the ability to block the other from adjourning for more than three
days. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (“Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall,
without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other
Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.”). But it is unlikely this power
extends to interference with appointments. Article II clearly assigns appointment power
to the President and the Senate. It grants the House a single role: the ability to join the
Senate in passing legislation that authorizes the President to make unilateral appointments of inferior officers. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”). It is unlikely that the Adjournments Clause operates as a back-door means for the House to interfere in matters assigned to other branches. Moreover, the Adjournments Clause operates “during the session of Congress,” id. at art. I, § 5, cl. 4, whereas the Recess Appointments Clause turns on
Senate sessions and recesses. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to
fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.”) (emphases added). It makes
sense for the Adjournments Clause to operate when the two houses of Congress have
joint business, “the session of Congress,” but not with respect to the Senate’s own business.
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quires recognizing a limited exception to the Rules of Proceedings
Clause and permitting the President some role in deciding when the
360
Senate is in recess. In either case, politics remains the primary limitation on the Clause so long as the courts largely leave controversies
over recess appointments to the political branches.
c. A “Work Periods” View
A third possibility is that the Clause embodies a concept of recess
that is narrower than “any break” but still much broader than the
technical position. The best candidate is the break between what the
modern Senate refers to colloquially as “work periods.”361 A work period is any period of legislative business between a break of one or
more weeks. The Senate in fact calls these breaks “recesses,” often
362
using more specific names like “the Easter recess” or “the August
363
recess.”
Recall that, in the ratification era, New Jersey and Massachusetts
used different nomenclature for the same underlying concepts. New
Jersey called each period of legislative business a “sitting,” while Massachusetts called it a “session.” To someone drawing distinctions between recesses based on official sessions, an identical recess would
have been “intra-session” in the former and “inter-session” in the latter. This arbitrary variation is why the Framers did not likely make
“recess” turn on official Senate sessions, particularly without defining
that term or prescribing Senate practice. More likely is that the
Framers had in mind a general concept that encompassed the breaks
between New Jersey “sittings” and Massachusetts “sessions.” That
concept, in colloquial Senate parlance, is the recess between work periods. It is characterized by senators taking a break from the ordinary

360
361

362

363

This is a variation on the President’s Noel Canning argument.
See, e.g., 159 CONG. REC. S7563 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 2013) (statement of Sen. Maj. Leader
Harry Reid, Upcoming Work Period), (“This work period is going to be 4 weeks long. We
have a great deal to accomplish during this 4-week period and it will go by quickly . . . .
During this next work period, the only time we will have off will be November 11 for the
celebration of Veterans Day. Therefore, if we are going to finish our work in this 4-week
period, that means we are going to have to work on Mondays and Fridays. I hope we
don’t have to work weekends, but we have to get this work done.”).
See, e.g., Erik Wasson & Bernie Becker, Senate Democrats Strain to Get Budget Over Finish Line
by Easter Recess, THE HILL (Mar. 11, 2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/
budget/287237-senate-dems-straining-to-get-first-budget-in-four-years-over-finish-line.
See, e.g., Ramsey Cox, Durbin Releases 2013 Senate Calendar, THE HILL (Nov. 30, 2012),
http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/270365-durbin-releases-2013-senatecalendar (“The August recess will last for slightly more than a month, going from Aug. 5
to Sept. 6, 2013.”).
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course of legislative business practice and leaving town for some period of time—a sensible trigger for recess powers. Indeed, the technical, “inter-session” position has been justified largely by the narrative that the Framers thought inter-session recesses were the only
364
But the record prosignificant breaks that Congress would take.
vides little basis to conclude that the Framers held or implemented
365
A less ambitious and more plausible assumption about
that view.
the Framers’ expectations, if one chooses to speculate about them, is
that they meant to confine recess appointments to breaks of some
significance, when legislators may be unavailable because they are not
in the midst of a work period, without claiming that the Framers predicted exactly what form those breaks would take. The “work periods” view would preclude recess appointments on nights or weekends. Rather, the appointment power would be triggered when the
Senate takes a recess from a general period of business.
To the extent one is motivated by the Senate’s authority to define
its sessions and recesses, or by historical precedent, then it is noteworthy that the work period concept of “recess” is consistent with
what the contemporary Senate calls recesses, as well as its practice of
accepting appointments during intra-session recesses in the Johnson
Administration and from the Truman Administration to the present.
It is also consistent with Attorney General Wirt’s 1823 intuition that
366
appointments should not be made over a weekend, Attorney General Daugherty’s 1921 view that an appointment-enabling recess
367
should likely be more than five to ten days long, and more contem368
porary views that perhaps a recess must be longer than three days.
Indeed, the work period view is also consistent with the Senate’s attempts to use pro forma sessions to block appointments in 2007 and
2008. The three-day break between pro forma sessions is shorter
than the typical recess between work periods. It comes closer to approximating a weekend, which in the Senate often spans three or
369
four days rather than two. For all of these reasons, the work period
view may be the longstanding consensus position on “recess” dating

364
365
366
367
368
369

See supra text accompanying notes 188–91.
See supra text accompanying notes 199–204.
See 23 Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 99, at 603.
See supra text accompanying notes 110–11.
See supra text accompanying note 177.
It is common for the Senate not to work on Monday, Friday, or both. See, e.g., Days in Session Calendars, 113th Congress 1st Session, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.
gov/home/ds/h1131.html (showing the days that the Senate is in session during the
2013 calendar year, which often excludes many Mondays and Fridays).
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back to the Framers themselves, even though it has never been precisely articulated.
The work period view satisfies the Recess Appointments Clause’s
pragmatic purposes better than the technical position, providing a
means for the President to make appointments when the Senate is
away and for the Senate to leave Washington more frequently without
needing to return to consider nominees. As a result, it also better satisfies specific values that likely motivated the Framers, such as the
need for military responsiveness. Under the work periods view, if the
President needs to make emergency appointments in response to the
attack on the country while the Senate is away on a long “intrasession” recess, the appointments would have been constitutional. By
contrast, under the technical position, the appointments would have
been unconstitutional, leaving the President unable to fulfill one of
the federal government’s principal purposes and leaving the nation
at risk.
Note that under the work periods view, if one holds that “recesses”
and “sessions” are mutually exclusive, then a recess appointment
would expire at the end of the Senate’s next work period. The typical recess appointment would last roughly four to eight weeks. This
arrangement might sound implausible initially. But recall that from
the founding until recent years, the Senate was expected to confirm
most nominees. If one holds that view, and the Framers appear to
370
have held it, then short terms for recess appointees present little
problem, for the Senate can simply confirm them during its next
work period. In the rare case, it might reject one. But if one presumes that the Senate will reject an appointee only for good cause,
then it is all the better for the appointee to have had a short term.
However, it is not obvious that “recess” and “session” are mutually exclusive, and Senate practice does not treat them that way. The Senate
has accepted appointments made during “intra-session” recesses but
adhered to the common understanding that the terms of appointees
last until the end of the Senate’s next formal session.
d. Work Periods Plus
A final construction would supplement the “work periods” view
with allowances for practical necessity. Under this theory, a legislative
break would constitute a “recess” if it falls between Senate work periods or if the Senate is actually unavailable and the President needs to
370

See supra text accompanying notes 81–82.
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make appointments urgently. To give the most extreme example, if
the Senate merely stepped out for lunch and downtown Washington
was annihilated by a nuclear attack, the President could make recess
appointments to replace important officers quickly rather than wait
for the Senate to be reconstituted and to consider nominations. This
construction best serves the main principle underlying the Clause—
ensuring that Senate unavailability does not unduly hamper the federal government’s ability to meet its constitutional obligations.
V. NOEL CANNING, ORIGINALISMS, AND THE RECESS APPOINTMENTS
CLAUSE
A. Noel Canning and Originalism
The role of originalism in the majority and concurrence is in
some ways precisely what one would expect, given the author of each
opinion: Justice Stephen Breyer’s majority opinion makes a point of
asserting that precedent and tradition can trump original meaning,
while Justice Scalia’s dissent-like concurrence stridently claims to
adehere to original meaning. What is perhaps surprising is that despite its disclaimer regarding the authority of original meaning, the
majority comes much closer than the concurrence to respecting the
original meaning of “recess,” and likely “happen” as well. The majority opinion largely reads the Clause correctly. But its argument would
perhaps be stronger if it were more firmly grounded in Living
Originalism—in “text and principle” rather than what we might call
an ad hoc mixture of precedent, pragmatism, and deference to politics.
The majority comes much closer than the concurrence to respecting the original meaning of “recess” because, despite its point regarding precedent and tradition, it takes care to ensure that its analysis
371
falls within the bounds of the text. It recognizes that the meaning
of “recess” is broad and that it does not rule out any particular type of
372
break. Beyond this point, the majority opinion uses multiple analytic tools—precedent, purpose, pragmatism, and deference to politics.
It relies on precedent, purpose, and deference to the political
branches in establishing a ten-day presumptive minimum for recesses,
noting that limiting the Clause to inter-session recesses would “frustrate its purpose” and citing apparently “settled practice” of the polit371
372

NLRB v. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281, slip op. at 21 (U.S. June 26, 2014).
Id. at 21 (“[W]e conclude that the phrase ‘the recess’ applies to both intra-session and
inter-session recesses.”).
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ical branches accepting intra-session recess appointments.373 It also
reasons that because no President has ever made an appointment
during a recess shorter than ten days, appointments “[are] not need374
The majority then notes an exception to the
ed in that context.”
ten-day mimimum for “very unusual circumstance[s]” such as a “na375
tional catastrophe,” apparently as a pragmatic means to ensure that
the federal government can meet its responsibilities even during unprecedentedly short and (therefore presumptively non-qualifying)
recesses. Finally, the majority announces a three-day, hard floor on
qualifying recesses, holding that a three-day recess is constitutionally
376
de minimis. It appears to justify this conclusion in part by deference
to the political branches—the Solicitor General conceded that three
377
days was too short —but also by a loose analogy to the Adjournments Clause, which states that either house of Congress must obtain
378
the other’s consent before adjourning for more than three days.
Implicit in the absence of any exception to the three-day floor is a
pragmatic judgment that the President should not need to make recess appointments during so short a break.
Some aspects of the majority opinion could be characterized as
Living Originalist. Its analysis of the recess questions begins with text
and purpose. It observes that the phrase “the recess” was used in the
ratification era to signify intra-session as well as inter-session recess379
es, and it also notes that the principle underlying the text—allowing
unilateral appointments “so that the President can ensure the continued functioning of the Federal Government when the Senate is
380
away” applies to both inter and intra-session recesses. The majority’s analysis of “happen” is largely Living Originalist as well. It notes
that the text supports either reading of the word, even though the
381
“arise” reading is more natural, and it reasons that the narrow read-

373
374
375
376

377
378
379
380
381

Id. at 16.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 20 (“The Adjournments Clause reflects the fact that a 3-day break is not a significant
interruption of legislative business. As the Solicitor General says, it is constitutionally de
minimis.”).
Id. at 19–20 (“As the Solicitor General says, it is constitutionally de minimis.”).
Id. (“The Adjournments Clause reflects the fact that a 3-day break is not a significant interruption of legislative business.”).
Id. at 9–10 (“The Founders themselves used the word [recess] to refer to intra-session, as
well as to inter-session, breaks.”).
Id. at 11.
Id. at 22 (“We believe that the Clause’s language, read literally, permits, though it does
not naturally favor, our broader interpretation. We concede that the most natural mean-
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ing of the word happen could do more to damage to the Clause’s
purpose by preventing the President from making appointments, “no
matter how dire the need,” “how uncontroversial the appointment,”
382
or “how late in the session the office fell vacant.” It also notes that
its reading is consistent with longstanding historical practice and the
383
apparent agreement of the policital branches.
By contrast, the latter aspects of the majority opinion on “recess”—the ten-day presumptive minimum, the pragmatic exception
to that presumption, and the absolute three-day floor—are driven by
an assortment of analytic tools and rationales. In each case, the majority’s argument or conclusion could be improved by the application
of Living Originalist method. First, there are Living Originalist
grounds on which to support the majority’s ten-day minimum and
the pragmatic exception to it. Historical evidence and the principles
underlying the Clause suggest that what fits best with the constitutional framework, and what the Framers likely expected, is that the
Clause would typically enable unilateral appointments during Senate
breaks of some significance (a concept similar to what the majority
384
calls recesses of “substantial length”). The most obvious candidate
for a break of significance is what this Article has identified as the
break between “work periods,” a concept that embraces both intersession and intra-session recesses of significance at the time of the
framing and that corresponds roughly to a minimum of ten days, as
385
Indeed, the likely
well as to what the Senate refers to as recesses.
reason why this definition corresponds almost perfectly to the ten-day
minimum that the Noel Canning majority derives from politicalbranch precendent is that the modern Senate and the President have
been implicitly following the “work period” view. In fact, the same
was probably true at the time of President Andrew Johnson’s appointments.
The majority is right to sense that the Clause’s broad text and its
underlying principles are in tension with forbidding unilateral appointments during any break when they are genuinely needed and
the Senate is unavailable, even if the break in question does not fit
typical expectations for appointment-enabling recesses. For this rea-

382
383
384
385

ing of “happens” as applied to a “vacancy” (at least to a modern ear) is that the vacancy
“happens” when it initially occurs.”).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 26–33 (discussing the practices of George Washington, John Adams, and Thomas
Jefferson and the lack of Senate hostility to presidential appointments).
Cf. id. at 9 (“All agree that the phrase ‘the recess of the Senate’ covers intersession recesses.”).
See supra text accompanying notes 361–63.
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son, the majority’s exception for “unusual circumstances” is amply
justified by text and principle. For the same reason, the same cannot
be said for its absolute three-day floor. The text is broader; as the majority recognizes, ratification-era dictionaries “define the word ‘recess’ much as we do today, simply as ‘a period of cessation from usual
386
work.’” And the reasoning behind the “unusual circumstances” exception applies to three-day breaks as well as three to nine-day breaks.
The drafters and ratifiers did not establish a minimum duration of
recesses, and any such limit runs the risk of subverting the Clause’s
core purpose in a time of grave national need.
Despite claiming to follow original meaning, the concurrence’s
analysis is deeply flawed, as it largely mirrors the incomplete and mistaken originalist scholarship that this Article discusses. Like that
scholarship, the concurrence engages in construction (rather than
interpretation) to reach a definition of “recess” that is narrower than
the word’s original public meaning. The concurrence supports its
construction mainly by appeals to original expectations and the principles underlying the text, but these arguments are unpersuasive because they have weak evidentiary support: the concurrence relies on
387
the counter-factual inter-session expectations narrative and ignores
important expected applications such as prompt and effective federal
388
military responses to foreign invasion and domestic rebellion. It also credits a strained and unpersuasive attempt to dismiss evidence
that legal actors around the time of the Andrew Johnson Administration were not concerned about the intra-session nature of many of his
389
recess appointments.
The concurrence’s discussion of “happen” is similarly flawed. It
ignores contrary evidence from ratification-era dictionaries and usage, even stating that “no reasonable reader” would have understood
390
“happen” in the “exist” sense, despite that Thomas Jefferson used
391
the word that way. It also relies credulously on constructions by ear386
387

388
389

390
391

Noel Canning, slip op. at 9.
See id. at 8 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In the founding era, the terms ‘recess’ and ‘session’
had well-understood meanings in the marking out of legislative time. . . . By contrast,
other provisions of the Constitution use the verb ‘adjourn’ rather than ‘recess’ to refer to
the commencement of breaks during a formal legislative session.”).
See supra text accompanying notes 208–15.
See Noel Canning, slip op. at 17–18 (Scalia, J. concurring) (finding that “the precise nature
and historical understanding of many of [the Johnson] appointments is subject to debate”).
Id. at 28.
See id. at 22 (majority opinion) (“Jefferson used the phrase in the [exist] sense when he
wrote to a job seeker that a particular position was unavailable . . . .”); supra text accompanying note 248.
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ly legal actors who appear to have been politically motivated, like
392
Edmund Randolph. And it invokes a partial and flawed account of
the principles and original expectations underlying the Clause, emphasizing the need to prevent the President from side-stepping the
393
Senate while giving short shrift to the Clause’s primary purpose of
ensuring that the federal government fulfill its functions and failing
to credit evidence that the Framers expected both branches to act
394
Instead of citing evidence, the concurrence merely
reasonably.
states that it is “unthinkable” that ratifiers would have overlooked the
395
perils of a permissive appointment policy.
B. Originalisms and the Analysis of the Recess Appointments Clause
It is common among many originalists that the meaning of most
constitutional text, and particularly the “structural constitution,” can
396
The sharp disagreebe ascertained as a matter of objective fact.
ment between this Article’s and other originalist analyses poses a
challenge to claims regarding objectivity in originalist interpretation.
One response, of course, is that everyone makes mistakes, and that as
a result we can expect to observe occasional disagreement even on
matters of objective fact. That response is surely correct. But here,
regarding the word “recess,” if not “happen,” one view has far more
substantial grounding in textual evidence, the principles and purposes underlying the Recess Appointments Clause, and likely even the
original expectations of the Framers. If “recess” has an objective
meaning, then the technical position is mistaken. Even if one disagrees with that view, it remains that proponents of the technical position—whose ranks include prominent originalists—have failed to
consider or respond to some of the most important evidence and ar-

392

393

394
395
396

See Noel Canning, slip op. at 30 (Scalia, J., concurring) (approvingly citing Randolph and
stating that he “provided the Executive Branch’s first formal interpretation of the
Clause”).
Id. at 29 (arguing that under the majority’s view, “[w]henever there was a fair prospect of
the Senate’s rejecting his preferred nominee, the President could have appointed that
individual unilaterally during the recess, allowed the appointment to expire at the end of
the next session, renewed the appointment the following day, and so on ad infinitum” and
that [i]t is unthinkable that such an obvious means for the Executive to expand its power
would have been overlooked during the ratification debates”).
See id. (assuming that the Senate and President would be in conflict); see also id. at 34–35.
Id. at 29 (“It is unthinkable that such an obvious means for the Executive to expand its
power would have been overlooked during the ratification debates.”).
See, e.g., Solum, supra note 276, at 530 (“As I understand the position of the New Originalists (and I count myself as among them), most of the provisions of the Constitution are
structural and have clear original meanings . . . .”).

Oct. 2014]

THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF RECESS

253

gument. What is one to make of these lapses? This Subpart offers
two initial suggestions.
1. The Difficulty of Establishing Narrow or Specialized Original
Meanings
First is a simple but potentially useful point that appears to be underappreciated: it is difficult to establish a specialized original meaning of a general term. One cannot establish it with a handful of usage examples, as has been attempted with the technical position on
“recess.” Those examples do not rule out other possible uses. Rather, to support a narrow meaning of a general term through usage
examples, one must find an overwhelming number of the particular
397
An illustration
uses and none (or virtually none) to the contrary.
will help make this point: imagine that one wishes to establish that
“instrument” refers only to musical instruments. One cannot accomplish the task simply by citing a few (or even many) examples in
which “instrument” was used to refer to a musical instrument. Despite these examples, the word also might have been used to refer to
other objects that fall within the general word “instrument,” such as
surgical equipment. Conversely, just a few examples in which “instrument” refers to something other than a musical instrument will
deeply undermine the claim of narrow meaning. Better evidence, of
course, would be a document that refers to many types of objects that
are arguably “instruments” but uses that word to refer only to musical
instruments. A single document of this type might still be the result
of chance; several examples would look convincing. Better still, of
course, would be texts that explicitly discuss when “instrument” is and
is not apt, or ones that actually define it. Aside from dictionaries,
documents like these will be rare. None of them exist to support the
technical position on “recess.” The closest—and it is not very close—
is the OED’s definition of “session,” which lists a technical meaning of
that word, not “recess,” as a specific usage in English parliamentary
398
Even in that context, the OED notes that “session” is
practice.
399
Had the difficulty of establishing
sometimes used more broadly.
specialized original meanings been more widely appreciated, then
397

398
399

I do not take a position on the dispute between Randy Barnett and John Balkin regarding
the original meaning of the Commerce Clause, but Barnett’s work is a good example of
attempting to undertake comprehensive research to establish a narrow meaning. See
Barnett, supra note 3, at 416 (detailing comprehensive research that he argues yields
overwhelming support for a particular reading of “commerce”).
See supra text accompanying notes 223–30.
See id.
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perhaps the technical position on “recess” would have gained less
traction in the first place.
2. Methods of Objective Inquiry—and Originalist Claims and
Disclaimers
Claims regarding the Constitution’s original meaning can have
great force in contemporary legal analysis, as they purport to flow
from the highest authority in a textualist legal culture and to be objective in nature. This force no doubt helps explain why the technical position on “recess” gained influence so rapidly despite contradicting a longstanding consensus among all three branches of
government. Not every claim about original meaning is given such a
wide berth, of course, particularly not those that implicate complex
and controversial questions of policy, political philosophy, ethics, or
400
morality. Unlike those arguments, however, the technical position
on “recess” involves a provision in which few people have an enduring interest or stake. Therefore, there is little reason to resist an apparently authoritative account of the word’s original meaning.
At the same time, originalist interpretation is not an easy task.
There are countless sources one could (and arguably should) investigate, many of which are not readily accessible or easy to search, and it
is not always clear how to weigh them. Few, if any, originalist accounts will examine all potentially relevant evidence. And despite
claims of objectivity, as well as extensive research into the original
meaning of particular language, disputes regarding original meaning
are common. To be sure, there are instances in which the original
public meaning of constitutional text can be established objectively,
so to speak. There are standard examples, like that the President
401
Indeed, in these cases, the
must be at least thirty-five years old.
text’s meaning is so plain that no inquiry is necessary to resolve it,
and no one disputes its meaning. Even prominent “living constitutionalists” like David Strauss agree that we must follow the letter of
402
these provisions. Beyond some core of text whose meaning we can
readily treat as objective, whether due to the unanimous consent of
all observers or some other means, originalists who seek objective answers to disputed text would do well to adopt a set of standards or
methods to assure quality, rigor, and thoroughness in their analyses.
400
401
402

Cf. Barnett, supra note 3, at 420 (referring to his back-and-forth with Jack Balkin over the
original meaning of “commerce”).
See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 292, at 56.
See STRAUSS, supra note 3.
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In other fields that seek objective answers, such as the “hard” sciences
and social science, as well as in courts that attempt to establish facts,
inquiries are guided by rules, standards, and methods geared to increase quality and reliability.
It is far beyond the scope of this Article to suggest methodological
standards for originalist legal inquiry. It is perhaps a good test for
originalism whether any such standards can be developed. If they
cannot, then perhaps the notion of objectivity in original public
meaning should be limited to those areas in which everyone can
agree. Even that metric is one of consensus rather than objectivity itself—a mere absence of dispute. But this Article can suggest a modest initial step: originalist scholarship would benefit from a practice
of providing a clear accounting of its scope and limitations. To the
extent possible, originalist researchers should identify potentially useful sources that they did not examine and analyses that they do not
conduct. Judges and scholars should exercise caution before relying
on originalist scholarship that does not provide this type of accounting. Because of originalism’s special claim to authority, and the
complexity of the enterprise, scholarly accounts of original meaning
403
should be thorough. No less important, as few if any inquiries into
original meaning can be complete, they should frankly acknowledge
their limitations.
Here, then, are this Article’s accounts of its evidence and its disclaimers. Some are discussed above, but it is useful to collect them in
a single place. This Article is based on textual analysis of the Constitution (the Recess Appointments Clause, the Rules of Proceedings
Clause, the Senate Vacancy Clause, and the use of potentially relevant
terms like “session” and “adjournment” elsewhere in the document),
a survey of Johnson’s dictionaries and the OED, and a comprehensive
examination of the usage of “recess,” as well as discussions of the Recess Appointments Clause’s purpose to the extent they exist, in the
records of the Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates, ratification-era state constitutions, and the Federalist Papers.
The Article relies on a few other sources, such as the records of the
House of Commons, Blackstone’s Commentaries, Jefferson’s Manual for
the Senate, some personal correspondence of the Framers, and some
records of the Pennsylvania Gazette, and certain ratification-era state

403

Barnett has written that originalist research “should be as systematic and comprehensive
as possible with respect to any source one surveys, reporting deviant as well as predominate usage.” Barnett, supra note 3, at 416.
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statutes. It does not rely on a systematic or thorough study of these
latter sources.
This Article also considers dictionary evidence on “session” and
reads that word in the context of the Constitution and contemporaneous state legislative usage, but it does not adopt a firm position on
404
It also contemplates a provisional view on
the word’s meaning.
405
“happen” but does not rely on an in-depth study of that word. Nor
does it conduct a thorough study of other potentially relevant terms
such as “adjourn,” “adjournment,” “intermission,” or “prorogation.”
The Article does not undertake a comprehensive analysis of the Rules
of Proceedings Clause. Finally, this Article does not offer a comprehensive view on the Noel Canning controversy. To evaluate that case,
one would need a more complete account of the Recess Appointments Clause and should likely consider questions on which this Article barely touches, such as the constitutionality of filibusters of presidential nominees and House interference with the President’s and
the Senate’s appointment powers.
CONCLUSION: ERASING THE RECESS APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE?
The recent willingness to read the Recess Appointments Clause
narrowly appears to stem from two factors: a distaste for the presidential practice of using recess appointments to avoid Senate confirmation and a sense that the Clause has become irrelevant in an era of
406
Neither of these contemporary
rapid communication and travel.
notions should influence one’s assessment of the Clause’s original
meaning.
Presidents have typically used recess appointments to combat ob407
struction by Senate minorities, not majorities. Whatever the desirability of that practice, it does not clearly present a constitutional problem, as filibusters of nominees may have no more constitutional basis
408
Most recently, the Presithan intra-session recess appointments.
404

405
406

407
408

This Article’s view is that a settled meaning of “session” would not compel any particular
meaning of “recess,” see supra text accompanying notes 218–20, but one might argue to
the contrary.
See supra text accompanying notes 240–74.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281, slip op. at 12 (U.S. June 26, 2014) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“The Recess Appointments Clause therefore is, or rather, should be, an
anachronism—‘essentially an historic relic, something whose original purpose has disappeared.’”(citation omitted)).
See supra text accompanying notes 348–58.
See, e.g., Emmet J. Bondurant, The Senate Filibuster: The Politics of Obstruction, 48 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 467, 480 (2011) (“[T]he sixty-vote supermajority requirement in Senate Rule
XXII is unconstitutional because it conflicts with the Constitution in seven ways.”).

Oct. 2014]

THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF RECESS

257

dent used recess appointments to circumvent obstruction by the
House of Representatives, which likely acted unconstitutionally when
409
it attempted to interfere with appointments. Moreover, the Senate
recently changed its rules to prevent most filibusters of nominees,
which suggests that we may witness a sharp decline in the use of recess appointments to avoid Senate obstruction. When the Senate majority opposes the President’s nominees, it can reject them. When it
supports nominees, it can confirm them by simple majority vote,
without interference by the minority. In short, there is little reason to
let the filibuster and presidential responses to it guide our view of the
Recess Appointments Clause.
The sense that the Clause is a needless anachronism requires
more discussion. The idea is that, in modern times, if the President
needs to make an appointment and the Senate is away, he can simply
410
This is an unduly superficial take on the
ask it to return quickly.
Clause. Both of its generally accepted purposes—enabling to President to make appointments when the Senate is unavailable and permitting the Senate to spend more time away from Washington—
remain relevant despite the relative ease of travel. One can imagine
circumstances in which the President needs to make appointments
quickly and the Senate is not available, for example in the event of a
411
Indeed, if the Senate is ever
military conflict or natural disaster.
away and unable to return quickly, it is more likely to be on an intrasession than inter-session recess, as the former are much more common. It would make little sense for the Constitution to bar the President from appointing replacements for officers killed by an enemy
merely because an attack happens to have occurred during an intrasession rather than inter-session recess. Moreover, as communication
and travel have hastened, so have world events that could give rise to
a need for urgent appointments. There is no reason to assume that
the speed at which the President and Senate can respond to crises has
outpaced the speed at which they emerge.
409
410
411

See Arkush, supra note 2, at 6–7 (“The Constitution assigns virtually all authority over appointments to the President and the Senate . . . .”).
Id. at 5 (“If the President needs to make an appointment and the Senate is out of town,
the argument goes, he can call it back quickly.”).
The Framers were certainly aware that an invasion or domestic rebellion might prevent
legislatures from acting, at least in the case of state legislatures. That is why they gave
state executives, not just legislatures, the power to trigger federal aid in the Guarantee
Clause. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 42, at 467
(“Mr. Dickinson moved to insert the words, ‘or Executive’ after the words ‘application of
its Legislature’—The occasion itself he remarked might hinder the Legislature from
meeting.”).
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Even when the Senate is available and the United States does not
face an imminent threat of violence, recess appointments may serve a
useful purpose. Senators may simply wish to spend more uninterrupted time in their home states, as the Framers’ republican theory
412
Perhaps someday Gary Lawson’s, Randy Barnett’s, or
prescribes.
Justice Clarence Thomas’s views of limited federal powers will prevail,
and the Senate will choose to spend less time in Washington, holding
brief semiannual or quarterly work periods with long intra-session recesses between them. Even if the Senate keeps with its current meeting practices, there will still be times when it is simply inefficient to
call one hundred senators back to Washington to confirm a nominee
whom a majority of senators would gladly permit the President to ap413
point unilaterally.
As for the Clause’s original meaning, the ordinary tools of textual
analysis strongly support a general reading of the word recess, and
that reading is consistent with the Clause’s widely accepted purposes.
By contrast, the technical position finds little support from the Constitution’s text or contemporaneous usage. It pencils in the word “inter-session” to force the Clause to conform to a twenty-first-century
narrative about the Framers’ expectations for Senate practice, and it
transforms the Clause from a pragmatic tool for the President and
the Senate to advance the national interest into, curiously, a bulwark
against presidential usurpation. In the process, it effectively reads the
Recess Appointments Clause out of the Constitution. By contrast,
under a method that recognizes the text’s broad original meaning
and adheres to its underlying principles, the Clause remains a relevant and potentially valuable part of the constitutional framework.

412
413

See supra note 80.
Note that the view that the President can quickly call the Senate back to confirm a nominee implies that the Senate would grant consent quickly. In that case, there is particularly little value in barring the Senate from permitting a recess appointment.

